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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Henry W. Houston 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Department of International Studies 
 
June 2017 
 
Title: Words Between Lines: Development Discourse on Dams for Sustainable 
Development and a Climate Change Future in Pakistan 
 
 
Pakistan currently experiences a deficit in its energy supply and upcoming water 
shortage. Lack of energy negatively impacts the country's economy, and water shortage 
would put stress on its agriculture, for example. Furthermore, climate change will further 
exacerbate these two problems. Dams are considered as a solution because of their ability 
to manage water resources while generating electricity. Informed by Michel Foucault's 
power/ knowledge, the purpose of this thesis is to understand how energy and water 
professionals in Pakistan view sustainable development, and if dams can be considered as 
sustainable development and climate change adaptive infrastructure. Drawing on 
interviews in Pakistan, I found that professionals supported dams through mobilizing 
technocratic discourses that were perceived as apolitical. Yet, I also find that these 
discourses are political, and I discuss the ramifications of the mobilization of technical 
discourses that claim to be apolitical for future energy policy decisions in Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Power interruptions are barely noticed in Pakistan. It does not cause even a hiccup in 
daily life and operations. During my field research, I lost count of the amount of times I 
experienced a power outage in which Internet connection was lost, television shows were 
interrupted, and lights were extinguished. In the middle of a conversation, lights will 
flicker out and not even a pause of recognition of loss of power is mentioned. In 
Islamabad, the interlude between electricity from the power grid to the switch of the 
power generator is quick, though. It is a near immediate switch thanks to the loud and 
polluting use of a fossil fuel-operated generator. On average, there is a daily reliance on 
power generators of about 12 hours (Malik, 2011; Ullah, 2015). These diesel-fueled 
generators blare out 88 decibels of noise, and those that are gasoline-fueled exceed 95 
decibels. It is parallel to an idling bus outside one’s house, and the amount of greenhouse 
gas emissions generated from these generators in Pakistan equates to a thermal power 
plant (Malik, 2011). Besides serious hearing damage from power generators, pollutants 
emitted can result in public health issues, such as bronchitis (Teepu, 2011).  
Power generators are especially essential for Pakistanis when temperatures swell 
during summer. In preparation for summer, the purchases of imported power generators 
rose in 2014 and 2016. In economic terms, a reliance on imported power generators from 
China force the country to spend a large amount of foreign exchange reserve, putting 
stress on the country’s balance of payments (Khan, 2016). The economic effect of power 
generators hits the industrial sector as well. Large firms are able to rely on sufficient 
  2 
generators; however, smaller and medium sized enterprises either use smaller generators 
or are forced to shut down their production (Anwar, 2015).   
Pakistanis are not fond of their reliance on power generators and the cost of 
operation, but it is how the population continues their life within a country that suffers 
severely from a gap in supply of energy generation. Pakistanis depend on their power 
generators, which is essentially a Band-Aid approach for power shortages. A power gap 
is not unique to Pakistan. The whole region of South Asia experiences a drastic 
infrastructure gap—about $2.5 trillion (Andres et al., 2014). Despite a 6.7 percent annual 
growth rate in the region, the infrastructure gap places stress on the region but more 
importantly on households. 71 percent of the population has access to electricity, 
compared to 92 percent in East Asia. In Pakistan, according to 2010 data, only 67 percent 
of the country has access to electricity (Andres et al., 2014).  
In the meantime, in Pakistan, power generators are a short-term solution for a 
country that needs at least $64 billion in investments to its electricity sector (Andres, 
2014). However, the political atmosphere in Pakistan only exacerbates the ability to 
delivery electricity. One reason for political shortcomings is that leadership often focuses 
on short-term projects, which is what participants I spoke with often described. Before 
current Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) 
Party came to power in 2013, Sharif accused the former administration of being unable to 
solve the electricity crisis (The Economist, 2012). Sharif’s promise to end power outages 
is what brought him to power in 2013, and power outages are a large indicator for many 
voters in deciding whether he gets another term in 2018. Because of this, Nawaz Sharif 
and his PML-N party have mobilized development narratives in support for large-scale 
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development projects. This is apparent with Nawaz Sharif and his inspiration from Sher 
Shah Suri—the Mughal-era ruler who built the Grand Turk Road—to pursue 
development in Pakistan (Jorgic, 2016; Sethi, 2013; Anwar, 2014).  
Foreign aid is often thought of as the most realistic option to finance 
infrastructure projects. Indeed, Pakistan’s energy projects have become dependent on 
foreign aid. Currently, the most notable aid package is the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor1 (CPEC), an aid package that resulted in China promising Pakistan about $46 
billion, for infrastructure (Tiezzi, 2016). CPEC will provide clean energy sources, such as 
solar and hydro; however, coal power plants will also accompany these energy projects. 
Officials at the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) said Chinese 
development firms would invest about $15 billion over the next 15 years out of $33 
billion reserved for energy generation from CPEC. This will result in an increase of 
carbon dioxide emissions, and Pakistan is already experiencing an annual increase of 3.9 
percent (Shaikh & Tunio, 2017). Since the aid package consists of coal-fired power 
plants, which are largely seen as highly polluting, along with some clean energy projects, 
it puts forth the question of what can be considered as sustainable energy generation 
when the country is so dependent upon such dirty energy.  
In addition to its energy deficiencies, the country also faces a water resource 
shortage that remains a challenge to the economy. Most of the water supply is sourced 
from the Indus system, a collection of six tributaries: the Indus, Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi, 
Beas, and Sutlej Rivers. There is additional snowmelt, glacier melt, and rainfall that 
average about 494 mm a year. Most of this rainfall comes from summer monsoons, yet is 
                                                
1 See Figure 5 in Chapter VI for a brief breakdown on projects that are funded by CPEC and location of the 
trade route through Pakistan. 
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uneven in patterns (Mustafa et al., 2013). The country is water stressed, and by 2030 it 
faces a future of being categorized as experiencing water scarcity2 (Mustafa, 2013; 
Kugelman, 2009). This change will be felt in its agricultural sector, which is a large 
component of the country’s economy on which many people have built their livelihoods 
and use about 90 percent of the country’s water resources (Kugelman, 2009). 
At the same time, Pakistan experiences other forms of water stress that will only 
be exacerbated as the climate change era continues. One does not have to look toward 
2030 to see a gap in water supply and demand begin to burgeon in Pakistan. At 2025, the 
total demand is projected to be at 338 cubic meters although the country’s water supply 
will remain at 236 cubic meters. Besides a physical shortage of water, there are also other 
variables that add to an overall shortage. This includes dilapidated irrigation 
infrastructure, agricultural practices, and an overall population growth among other 
factors. With this in mind, Kugelman (2009) said there is an immediate need for solving 
the country’s supply and demand gap, which is fitting considering scarcity occurs at 
different levels of supply (Kamal, 2009)  
Although the twin issues of a gap in the supply and demand of water resources 
and energy affect the country currently, infrastructure problems are not new to Pakistan. 
Ever since Partition, when Great Britain divided the South Asian subcontinent, Pakistan 
inherited an infrastructure shortage (Weiss, 2014; Jaffrelot, 2016). Despite this 
imbalanced boundary drawing, Pakistan and India experienced similar economic growth 
rates, but it did not take long for Pakistan to face stagnation (McCartney, 2011). 
Currently, the state and economy of Pakistan are fragile even though its position in the 
                                                
2 Water scarcity and water shortages use a designation given to a country with annual water availability 
below 1,000 m3. However, Kamal (2009) views water shortages as an absolute term and scarcity as a 
relative concept.  
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region shows promise for economic growth. Although there is promise, there are 
considerable barriers: lack of reliable electricity that stunts economic growth, natural 
disasters, and climate change vulnerability that appear likely to return on a regular basis 
in the South Asian subcontinent.  
To solve the issues of energy deficiencies and the increased threat of climate 
change-induced natural disasters, dams have emerged as a possible solution to both of 
Pakistan’s issues (Ebrahim, 2014). Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) 
is Pakistan’s public utility that owns about 54 percent of the country’s total electrical 
power generation capacity. In 2001, WAPDA announced its strategy, titled Vision 2025, 
to build 23 dams over three phases to prepare for an increase of the population by 2025 
(Mirza, et al., 2007). WAPDA’s plan has not had an update, but in 2013, Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif, in the government’s Pakistan Vision 2025 report, provided a list of goals 
that included increasing energy in the national grid. Out of a list of 10 goals, hydropower 
is a large part of an energy generation resource mix, including a call to complete the 
large-scale projects of Diamer-Bhasha and Dasu dams. The two dams are projected to 
generate a potential of 9,500 megawatts, which is more than half of the country’s current 
energy demand (Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform, 2013). In 2015, former 
United States President Barack Obama and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met in 
the White House, and dams were discussed as a solution for strengthening Pakistan’s 
electric grid. The two leaders agreed to cooperate to allow foreign direct investment, and 
local investment, to fund construction of the dams. President Obama also expressed 
explicit support for Pakistan to build the two large-scale dams, Diamer-Bhasha and Dasu 
dams (Obama White House, 2015).  
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Dams are perceived as an infrastructural solution that can provide relatively clean 
energy production to transmit electricity to electrical grids, as well as provide flood 
management services (WCD, 2000). This debate emerges time after time from civil 
society organizations, governmental bureaucracies, and foreign agencies. However, the 
quality of these debates are often generalized by critics who believe these professionals 
echo the views of decision makers, therefore perpetuating hegemonic rule of certain 
knowledge in Pakistan (Ahmed & Rashid, 2010). This thesis project will examine 
developmental discourses among water and energy professionals in Pakistan in regards to 
climate change and possible clean energy resources and also nuance an otherwise 
generalized perspectives held by professionals in the country. Therefore, I focused my 
research on the question of how water and energy policy experts in Pakistan perceive 
dams as sustainable energy generation and climate change adaptation.  
 
A context to Pakistan 
Where Quaid-e-azam3 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, founder and first governor general of 
Pakistan, stood in Lahore in 1947 to announce the birth of a nation-state for Muslims 
living in South Asia now stands a landmark, Minar-e-Pakistan, across from the historical 
cultural presence of the Lahore Fort. Before this historical proclamation, years of 
negotiations of how to organize a nation-state faltered and that is when Jinnah put forth 
the idea there were two nations in India: Hindu and Islam. The result in the Lahore 
Resolution in 1940 codified that areas in the Indian northwest and eastern areas, which 
were Muslim majority, should be autonomous independent states. At the same time, this 
                                                
3 Urdu for “Father of the nation”  
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should not be seen as a call for Pakistan because there was no mention of a partition. 
Newspapers instead took it as an opportunity to frame the resolution as a call for 
independence, though Muslim politicians did not take the idea of partition seriously 
(Weiss, 2014).   
 
Figure 1: Administrative map of Pakistan (Government of Pakistan, 2014) 
The Muslim League pressured Jinnah to establish a homeland for Muslims who 
would not be persecuted by a Hindu majority population in India. The result was the 
  8 
founding of Pakistan4, which, in Urdu, translates to “land of the pure.” Partitioning India 
and Pakistan was the result of the Muslim League who felt unsure about their existence 
under a Hindu Congress (Weiss, 2014; Jaffrelot, 2015). Jinnah aimed for a country that 
would have an active civil society that would be dedicated to the well-being of the people 
and was not influenced by religious and ethnic divides (Weiss, 2014).  
Uneasiness was apparent in the early founding of Pakistan when, after the first 
war with India in 1948, many Pakistanis felt the need to have a strong military for 
existential security (Weiss, 2014).  Since 1948, the military grew to become a 
consequential figure within Pakistan, and power has not left its grip. Siddiqa (2007) 
views the military and government’s relationship as a “milbus” (p. 7). The milbus in 
Pakistan grew alongside the military coming into the political front. Whereas Indian 
political leadership created a political class and civil bureaucracy, Pakistani milbus 
crafted an economic command of the state and within the country. The military created a 
system wherein senior officers are able to access state resources and profit off this access. 
It did not take long for the military to gain a foothold within the state after its war with 
India. Immediately after Jinnah died in 1948, there were three aspects of conflict within 
the state: within different political groups for state control, civil and military bureaucracy 
against the political classes, and military and other civilian actors. Political party clashing 
led to the stagnation of adopting a constitution since political parties became 
factionalized within the country. Since there was chaos underway in the infancy of the 
state, other civil bureaucrats joined forces with the armed forces. Ghulam Mohammed, 
governor-general during the 1950s, believed the military had the ability to pacify political 
                                                
4 The name of Pakistan also serves as an acronym to represent the regions that unified to form the country: 
Punjab, Afghania, Kashmir, Sindh, Tan (the final portion of Balochistan) (Weiss, 2014).  
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infighting and keep “raucous politicians at bay” (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 70). Because of the 
greater trust held in the Army over the civilian prime ministers, Governor-General 
Ghulam Mohammed asked General Ayub Khan to take over Prime Minister Mohammad 
Ali Borga’s position. This then led to governor-general Iskandar Mirza to take over 
(Siddiqa, 2007; Jaffrelot, 2015).  
The Ayub-Mirza alliance was an attempt by the civil bureaucracy to have a 
“superordinate-subordinate” relationship (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 70). The armed forces 
through Ayub Khan gained more power and authority in the state, but Mirza grew 
suspicious and proclaimed martial law in 1958; however, this was in vain since Ayub 
Khan brought the military to the forefront of the state during a counter-coup within a 
month of Iskander Mirza’s martial law. Both Ayub Khan in 1958 and General Yahya 
Khan in 1969 came to power through coup d’états and not through election (as did Zia ul-
Haq in 1977 and Pervez Musharraf in 1999). The military gained more prominence 
through quickly grabbing control of national defense, which included foreign affairs. In 
addition, the military was able to secure backing from the United States. This was in part 
because the United States saw a strategic advantage in fighting the Soviet Union 
(Siddiqa, 2007; Nawaz, 2008). Military expenditures would come to total about 68 
percent of the national budget (Siddiqa, 2007). The military subsided during Zulfiqar al 
Bhutto’s rule during the 1970s, but when he attempted to use the military for his absolute 
authority, the military came back to power (Siddiqa, 2007). To this day, the military is 
suspected of developing former international cricket superstar Imran Khan, who is Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif’s rival, into a politician (Jaffrelot, 2015).  
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The presence of the military has not been limited to power in political leadership. 
Anatol Lieven (2010) sees a presence of political power in retired military officers as 
well due to a higher standard of education and experience in the efficient organization. 
Some members of the military have shown that the army views itself as not just morally 
superior, but also more modern and better-educated than the political class (Lieven, 
2007). Ayub Khan injected the state with active and retired members of the military. 
Military members were trusted with managing military boards (Siddiqa, 2007). Lieven 
(2007) attributes this to the fact that there was a lack of a well-tended middle class 
citizenry. The military, though, has been seen as an institution that has brought mobility 
to people as well. Over the years, Siddiqa (2007) said the military provided social 
mobility to a wide variety of people within Pakistan, due to the institution’s activity in the 
economic and political spheres. The political class is aware of this. During the 1999 
military coup, politicians did not contest martial law. In addition, both Lieven (2010) and 
Siddiqa (2007) found that the military is an arbitrator in terms of political conflicts. 
Whereas political leaders may not question the role of the military, members of the 
military view politicians as inherently inept because politicians have not received a 
proper education and discipline in governance and to manage the state, compared to the 
military. This is apparent with the former head of Musharraf’s National Reconstruction 
Bureau. He experienced a contrast in parliamentary upbringing in Germany where every 
member received institutional training and education. Because of this, the military is 
perceived as overall more qualified and more educated than a politician (Siddiqa, 2007).  
It is important to note the demographic that has historically made up institutions 
such as Pakistan’s military and bureaucracy. Although some Punjabi Muslims were 
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unsure about the idea of Pakistan, the demographic dominated the country from its 
inception. Punjabis were only about a quarter of the population, according to the 1951 
census, but they held about 80 percent of the military’s and government administration 
posts (Jaffrelot, 2015). Muhajirs, those who migrated from India during Partition, came to 
dominate the country economically. The power and influence of Muhajirs (economically) 
and Punjabis (politically and somewhat culturally) became problematic for other ethnic 
groups in Pakistan, which periodically rose up to resist this domination through ethnic 
nationalism. This included Sindhi nationalism that emerged and assisted in bringing 
down the military-led government of Ayub Khan in 1968, Bengali resistance to West 
Pakistan’s domination and the issue of self-determination in Balochistan (Jaffrelot, 2015).  
Another factor in influencing policy within Pakistan is the meager number of 
local professionals who engage in substantive applied research on the environment, 
which places Pakistan essentially at the mercy of the recommendations of international 
institutions.5 This is the result of a government whose policymaking is confined behind 
closed doors due to its “strong military-administrative apparatus” (Ahmad & Rashid, 
2011, p. 89). Additionally, aid agencies have filled the space local think tanks usually 
inhabit. Donors define projects, policies and programs based on their lending needs. Then 
consultants, who are local though directed by international organizations, develop the 
projects. In the end, the government accepts these projects due to diplomatic goodwill 
pressures (Rashid, 2011). This is exacerbated by the fact that many of the highly qualified 
candidates for the civil bureaucracy opt out for local government service and instead 
                                                
5 SDPI is a notable exception and is a globally ranked think tank on sustainable development. 
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work for international institutions—such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
USAID, and the United Nations Development Program (Shafqat, 2013).  
 Politicians within Pakistan focus on gaining political legitimacy, a frequent 
concern pursued through attempting to essentially buy the poor. For example, politicians 
offer cash transfers to the poor rather than building the infrastructure needed to advance 
education and other gauges of progress. This process is, however, temporary. Numerous 
cash transfer programs are viewed as politically motivated for votes and parties both in 
power and in the opposition recognize this, so there is a welfare race via cash transfers. 
This results in bleeding out the state’s coffers, though. Pakistan really needs investment 
in social policies that are not political or development safety nets (Khattak, 2010).  
While Pakistan has relied heavily on aid from international financial institutions, 
domestic revenue should also be examined to see the state’s role in creating 
infrastructure. Rather than invest in programs such as cash transfers that are concentrated 
on advantaging a political party, McCartney (2011) said the government’s role should be 
in allocating surpluses toward economic development that may not be undertaken by the 
private sector, which includes increasing the power supply of a country. The role of the 
state in constructing developmental infrastructure is examined in different episodes of 
growth. State-created credit institutions played a role in providing the finances necessary 
for established firms to invest in long-gestation projects—such as dams. Although the 
return of profit was substantially less than with private firms—about half—the fact is that 
the private sector was avoiding these industries. In times where the state was not active in 
mobilizing and allocating resources through its apparatus, economic growth rates fell to 
stagnation (McCartney, 2011).  
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Lack of local research data, the power of the military, and the dependence on 
temporary welfare programs converge to create developmental insecurity in the country 
and state. Crises that hit Pakistan often come as fiscal, fuel/ power, food, the war on 
terror, and functional democracy—and now fragility, due to externalities from climate 
change. Human development insecurities surface due to the state’s expenditures on debt 
repayment, defense, corruption, and daily operation costs. Constable (2011) observed the 
detachment the middle class has felt, as they feel the economy is not able to support 
them. University-educated Pakistanis find their place in the local and domestic economy 
limited. However, building senseless infrastructure also does not solve the issue, which 
can be illustrated through the existence of ghost schools in which there are no teachers 
present (Constable, 2011). Education is seen as a human right that needs investment to 
eradicate poverty and can lead to populating ghost schools with personnel when lack of 
employees is a problem. Khattak (2010) argues that for Pakistan to move forward, the 
state needs to end its policies of cash transfers that decrease other investments, such as in 
the health and education sectors. Politicians rely upon the coffers more to sway the poor 
within the country, which, from a state perspective, has stunted the economy substantially 
(Khan, 2011; McCartney, 2011). The country has not progressed from these as they only 
serve a small margin of the population (Khattak, 2013). Ahmad and Rashid (2015) claim 
that these past policies have historically weakened civil society in Pakistan that permits 
shortsighted politicians and the military’s grip on the government and policymaking 
process. An investment in education and structural institutions can also provide Pakistan 
with the sovereignty in knowledge needed to step away from the external policy research 
that dictates development models (Ahmad & Rashid, 2015). 
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Given the strong presence of the military and the dominant top-down decisions 
made from national levels, social commentary in Pakistan often criticizes the role that 
civil society professional organizations have had in checking the role of an at times-
authoritarian government (Ahmed, 2010). Following the arguments of Alexis de 
Tocqueville regarding the importance of free associations—or civil society—
governments are tempted to grab more power whenever the individual attitude of 
citizenry weakens, which is why Ahmed and Rashid (2010) argue a weak civil society is 
a problematic aspect of policy making in Pakistan. Despite the issues that arise in regards 
to the performance of civil society organizations, theoretically there is importance in their 
existence. In fact, Weiss (1999) makes the argument that when women organize in 
groups to advance a political purpose, significant advancements in the presence of a civil 
society appear.  
The presence of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and a general existence of 
a civil society with a mission of development and advocacy surfaced during the mid-
1980s. NGOs emerged as a reaction to the failure of a top-down, centralized approach 
and instead called for a bottom-up approach to development. Historically, civil society in 
Pakistan has helped in agenda setting issues such as entitlements of vulnerable 
populations. Because of this, Khan (2001) argues that civil society and organizations 
within this realm are creating a space for democratizing a state that has otherwise been 
dominated by authoritative forces. Empowering women through civil society groups is 
also perceived as an action that can work toward not only freeing the country of 
Pakistanis stuck in poverty, but also toward a more democratic country (Weiss, 1999; 
2001).  
  15 
 Pakistan’s development story was meant to become an example for the world, 
according to modernization theorists. In order to make Pakistan this example, large sums 
of foreign capital would be used to lessen the gap between the poor and rich in the 
country. The Harvard Advisory Group utilized their influence in Pakistan during the 
1950s and 1960s to argue that, with loans or joint ventures, economic growth would 
boom. During this time, from 1958 to 1968, Pakistan experienced its Golden Age of 
Development (Weiss, 2014). However, this development boom had the caveat that it 
benefited the industrial elite, known as the “Twenty-Two Families” (Weiss, 2014, p. 179; 
McCartney, 2011). Developmental discourses during this period were focused on the 
importance of infrastructure planning and long-term development plans. Long-term 
planning included engineering firms leading extensive studies for countrywide electrical 
grids in East and West Pakistan. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s economy growth remained 
dependent on foreign advisors and aid (Anwar, 2014).   
 Foreign expertise and investment played an important role in Pakistan’s 
development history. For its future, climate change will transform the country, which is a 
bigger threat than terrorism (Nazar, 2016). This change is apparent in its cotton value 
chain, an industry that is experiencing water resource change. The cotton value chain is 
the largest source of export earnings for the country and supports livelihoods of about 42 
percent of the labor force (Government of Pakistan, 2016). Climate change is a factor that 
is threatening this industry. Cotton production in Punjab and Sindh regions is found along 
the Indus River, which is susceptible to flooding: nearly 21 percent of the cotton 
cultivation area was destroyed during the 2010 flood. Whereas floods could wipe away 
cultivation areas, a change in rainfall will be detrimental to growing, and salinization is 
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already destroying the crops. Rising temperatures will also jeopardize crop productivity 
(Batool & Saeed, 2016). Pakistan’s parliament recently passed a climate change bill that 
establishes a framework Climate Change Council and Climate Change Authority to move 
the country forward to adapt to climate change and set a bar on greenhouse emissions. 
The bill establishes the Climate Change Council, which the Pakistan Prime Minister will 
serve as a chairperson, along with provincial chief ministers, and other stakeholders. The 
council is empowered through the legislature to develop policies to meet climate change 
obligations, such as the Paris Agreement. This bill comes after the Nawaz Sharif 
government stripped the Ministry of Climate Change by more than 60 percent in 2013 
(Khan, 2017).  
  
Research Methodology 
The aim of my research was to understand how water and energy professionals view the 
role of dams as sustainable energy and climate change-adaptive infrastructure. Ahmed 
and Rashid (2010) argue that professionals frequently base decisions on knowledge 
sourced from multilateral donors, such as the World Bank. Therefore, the purpose of this 
thesis is to nuance professionals’ perspectives on dams and development.  
My research, which was conducted in Pakistan from January to March 2016, 
allowed me an opportunity to understand how professionals view dams—especially 
during the sustainable development era.  This thesis is built on two forms of research: 
secondary research and qualitative field research, which includes interviews. I read and 
analyzed literature about Pakistan, its water and energy policies, and reports from 
governmental and international nongovernmental organizations. My argument is further 
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supported by the independent research I conducted while in Islamabad and Lahore, 
Pakistan, as well as my internship at a top ranked policy think tank, the Sustainable 
Development Policy Institute (SDPI).  
Since SDPI is located in Islamabad, I primarily conducted my interviews in this 
city. The capital of Pakistan, Islamabad, is the most diverse metropolis in the country and 
has the largest expatriate and foreigner population, so the majority of Pakistan’s 
diplomatic and governmental agencies are located in the city (Capital Development 
Authority, 2016). Because of the diversity of the city, as well as its role as a detached 
city—ideal for developmental planning—Islamabad provided professionals who would 
be able to participate in the study (Hull, 2012). Pakistan’s original capital was located in 
Karachi, a port city in the south, but a new capital city was founded and named 
Islamabad. A European firm led by Constantinos Doxiadis designed a master plan of 
Islamabad. He believed that, in order to control the growth of the city, the capital should 
include all social and income groups. However, President Ayub Khan wanted to isolate 
bureaucratic agencies from the rest of the country as a means to control the country (Hull, 
2012). By focusing my research in Islamabad, I therefore had an opportunity to speak 
with professionals located in this capital who had some experience with government 
officials.  
 While conducting field research, I followed purposive sampling, specifically 
stakeholder sampling. Since I was immersing myself in the field and looking to interview 
prominent policy experts about water and energy issues in Pakistan, stakeholder 
methodology was relevant. Palys (2008) summarizes the use of this methodology as one 
relevant for identifying major stakeholders. With stakeholder sampling, interviews are 
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arranged with those who are major stakeholders involved with, in this case, designing or 
providing input on development projects (Palys, 2008). I relied upon stakeholder 
sampling methodology as an intern at SDPI. Given SDPI’s prestige in policy analysis, its 
staff of researchers was well aware of experts I should interview. In order to decide 
which participants I would interview, I attempted to maintain a consistent characteristic 
within them. This resulted in speaking with primarily water and energy professionals who 
have had experience working with energy and water policies. I also chose two 
participants—a journalist and an academic—who have had experience covering water 
and energy policies. Besides using the professional networks of researchers at SDPI, I 
researched professional organizations by examining their mission statements and research 
operations.  
 I found that participants were easygoing in speaking about their opinions and 
beliefs regarding dams. Although I used a hand-held audio recorder whenever possible, I 
continued to rely upon vigorous note taking. I used a hand held recorder in all but two 
interviews—one due to the participant’s reluctance and the other due to audio issues 
where the interview was conducted.   
  In Pakistan, I held formal, audiotaped interviews with eight Pakistani 
professionals. Although there was a spectrum of professionals, and education, and 
experience differences among them, I asked the same questions, following a semi-
structured format. All participants spoke openly and freely about their opinions and their 
professional backgrounds in natural resource planning, water management, and 
sustainable development in terms of dam planning. Although each participant’s interview 
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was in some way unique, which is the nature of semi-structured interviews, I continued to 
work off a set of questions.  
 In addition to the formal semi-structured interviews, I conducted informal 
interviews at local conferences I attended and during my internship at the SDPI while in 
Pakistan. While in Islamabad, I attended a conference organized by the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Federation in collaboration with a local nongovernmental 
organization that focused on sustainable issues, LEAD Pakistan. In addition, I traveled to 
Lahore to attend a water management workshop at the Lahore University of Management 
Sciences (LUMS), titled “Spring School on Water Systems, Science and Practice.” This 
workshop offered an opportunity to speak with students, working professionals, and 
included a tour of the Nestlé Water Treatment facility outside of the city to understand 
methods of coping with climate change and water management.  
 Upon returning from Pakistan, I relied upon grounded theory to analyze my field 
notes, interviews, and other secondary sources I obtained. In order to analyze my data, I 
coded for themes. To do this, I examined transcripts from the audiotaped interviews—
except the one I had with a journalist for identity protection—for themes that emerged. I 
began with an initial line-by-line coding that allowed me to see themes develop into 
larger, broader themes, such as sustainable development. Charmaz (2006) argues that 
beginning with an initial line-by-line coding process removes the researcher from the 
research, and it provides a fresh perspective for the researcher. After completing line-by-
line coding, I was then able to perceive themes within interviews. Berg (1995) views 
themes for analysis as apparent in documents, news reports, and interviews, which makes 
themes a powerful unit for analysis. Throughout this analysis process, I also adhered to 
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grounded theory in guiding the qualitative analysis process. The benefit of following 
grounded theory is that it allowed me to suspend myself from the field data and the 
analysis stage. Essentially, with grounded theory, I avoided distorting the data into theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Furthermore, grounded theory facilitates ideas to emerge, 
rather than relying on preconceived theories (Charmaz, 2006).  
Coding also shapes the analytic frame that is used to build an analysis and 
provides a method of analysis through coding, which contains different phases. In the 
first phase, initial coding, there are a series of questions that the researcher asks: what 
does the data suggest and from whom is this point of view. In this stage, I remained close 
to the data to ensure the data is not distorted. Focused coding is the second major phase. 
After I had constructed major directions in my analysis, I relied upon memo writing as an 
intermediary between data collection and draft writing, which Charmaz (2006) argues is a 
crucial moment in the research process since it allows for increasing abstraction.  
 
Limitations of this study 
Despite the research design that I followed and the carefulness of grounded theory, there 
were some limitations that emerged during the research process. Due to security 
constraints in Pakistan because of my United States citizenship, I was limited in where I 
was able to conduct research and collect data. Although limited to Islamabad and LUMS 
in Lahore, this limitation was minimized since, as one participant remarked, Pakistanis 
often travel and relocate from other cities in the country to these two major cities for 
research presentations, conferences, and job promotions. Islamabad, therefore, is a 
conglomeration of many perspectives from diverse ethnicities and nationalities.  
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Hull (2012) recounts a joke about the centralization of Islamabad. The theory of 
Islamabad’s founding was to have a detached capital for the sake of planning and, as a 
result, it has created a further distance for others in accessing the capital. Because of the 
perceived detachment of the local Pakistani experience, it seems that this has created a 
limitation. However, because of the cosmopolitanism of Islamabad, it allowed me to 
access varied professionals as a cultural outsider of Pakistan.  
 Since I am not proficient in Urdu, which is considered the national language, I 
conducted interviews in English. I was able to communicate easily with professionals 
since most of them had been educated abroad in either Western European countries or in 
North America.  
 As a United States citizen, gaining a visa into Pakistan limited my time in the 
country for research even further. Because my visa application had been lost at the 
Washington D.C. Pakistan Consulate Office, my trip had been shortened by two weeks. 
In addition to the limitations brought on by a shortened stay in the country, my status as 
an American prevented me from visiting dam locations because they are categorized as 
high security locations; I could not visit them without prior permission from 
governmental officials.  
 Lastly, I have decided to use pseudonyms for the participants in my research. 
Although some of the professionals did not ask for anonymity—because their name, they 
said, was what gave their perspectives its weight—providing pseudonyms provides an 
extra layer of protection to mitigate any unforeseen consequences from their statements.   
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Summary of chapters  
In Chapter II, I provide a literature review that locates my argument and the literature 
written on the role of knowledge in decision-making. Through this navigation of existing 
literature on development, sustainable development, varying perspectives on water, and 
the role of knowledge in society, I plan to contribute to the gap in the literature on how 
technical knowledge held by water and energy professionals in Pakistan is mobilized to 
support dams as sustainable and climate change-adaptive infrastructure.  
In Chapter III, I turn to secondary research to argue that engineering and 
technocratic knowledge has had a historically privileged role within Pakistan. This 
chapter does not strive to be an exhaustive examination of the role of technocratic 
knowledge in Pakistan. Nevertheless, it does intend to provide a context to how 
technocratic knowledge was mobilized to support supposed apolitical development via 
dams. The first moment is the Indus Water Treaty and the role that Tennessee Valley 
Authority founder David Lilienthal had in spearheading the negotiation between the India 
and Pakistan to avoid another war between the countries. Secondly, the reasoning for 
President Ayub Khan’s approval of the Indus Water Treaty was premised on apolitical 
development. The acceptance of the Indus Water Treaty led to a report cataloging optimal 
sites for hydropower infrastructure. This report was mentioned to me during an interview 
with a longtime engineer with the Government of Pakistan, who recommended that I read 
a report written by Pieter Lieftinck for the World Bank. The role of WAPDA and the 
Planning Commission continues the tradition of relying upon technical knowledge for 
development.  
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 In Chapter IV, I turn my focus to primary data from field research I conducted in 
Islamabad and Lahore. In this chapter, I present primary data to support the argument that 
professionals in Pakistan often rely upon technocratic, engineering perspectives in 
supporting dams as infrastructure for sustainable development and climate change 
adaption. I organized perspectives from the interviews into thematic clusters that support 
this argument.  
 In Chapter V, I examine the case of two dams in Pakistan, Kalabagh and Diamer-
Bhasha. Although they are both dams, there are different views held about each dam. 
Kalabagh Dam, is highly controversial and participants brought it up, though it was not a 
part of my interview question list. The Diamer-Bhasha Dam is located in the northern 
region of the country. This dam project was never brought up during conversations, 
except for an informal discussion with a graduate student from Karakoram International 
University in the northern province of Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan. By looking at these two 
dams, it provides a step toward a discussion of overall themes that emerged from my 
research.  
 The final chapter, Chapter VI, serves as a conclusion and briefly discusses the 
future of Pakistan and with its neighbors, India and China. In addition, I discuss ideas for 
future research that would serve as another step toward understanding the role of 
technical knowledge in implementing dams as development in Pakistan.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
“The Pakistan Paradox,” according to Jaffrelot (2015), has three types of tensions: a 
unitary nation-state and strong ethnic identity found in the provinces, the political tension 
of authoritarian political culture and democratic ideals, and a competing notion of Islam 
in how it should be present in the nation-state. Continuing with Jaffrelot’s Pakistan 
Paradox, I draw on literature by Nader (1996), Ferguson (1990), and Goldman (2001, 
2006) to consider how knowledge is used in mobilizing support for dams and 
development in Pakistan under a sustainable development and climate change context. 
This exploration engages with two vectors of Jaffrelot’s “Pakistan Paradox,” namely the 
political tension and unitary nation-state and strong ethnic identity. Some professionals in 
Pakistan I interviewed justified dams as sustainable and as climate change-adaptive 
infrastructure through a technocratic lens, while others who critiqued the role of dams 
said supporters apply a technical justification. These technocratic arguments for dams as 
development often work with an assumption that it is an argument stripped of politics and 
other partisan rhetoric.  
This literature review is split into separate sections but still threads together 
relevant research conducted on dams and development and the role of knowledge. Within 
the first section, I present literature that discusses research on global development studies, 
which leads to a discussion of research on Pakistan’s waterways. In the second section, I 
discuss literature on how knowledge operates in modern society and how it affects 
development.  
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Arrested development 
Development continues to play a large role in molding developing nation-states into a 
specific model. In fact, development has been the vessel in which foreign technical 
knowledge influences developing countries. Whether it is for installing mosquito nets or 
providing expertise for water resources development, technical expertise has historically 
played an important role in development planning.  
McMichael (2012) adds that colonialism forever changed non-European cultures, 
but more along the lines of how international development operates. Immediately after 
World War II, when independent states were separating from colonial relationships with 
Western nation-states, the current notion of development also emerged (McMichael, 
2012; O’Brien & Williams, 2010; Rist, 2008). Easterly (2012) points to early versions of 
the current development model and agendas established through international 
organizations. For example the Rockefeller Foundation attempted to introduce 
technocratic-led development in China during the 1920s that would transcend through 
authoritarianism because development ideals and values were apolitical (Easterly, 2013).  
However, the infrastructure goals of the Marshall Plan would serve as one of the 
origin points of foreign development programs, at times one-sided (Easterly, 2013; Rist, 
2008; McMichael, 2012; Escobar, 1995). The Marshall Plan was United States bilateral 
development for European reconstruction to stabilize and to manage the spread of 
communism (McMichael, 2012). Aside from securing the region for the interest of 
capitalism, Rist (2008) argues the Marshall Plan is evidence that the Global North is 
more invested in itself rather than the Global South.  
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One year after the declaration of the Marshall Plan, United States President Harry 
Truman delivered his Inaugural Address in 1949. He went on to deliver one of the most 
memorable speeches in terms of global development. In his speech, Truman not only 
divided a global population into developed and underdeveloped categories but also 
promised to ensure that all of the world can attain freedom and dignity (McMichael, 
2012; Rist, 2008; Escobar, 1995). Rist (2008) argued the Point Four Program 
announcement is a “minor masterpiece” that stated development as a direction toward a 
final state  (p. 69). Furthermore, Truman’s Inaugural Address marked a moment in which 
the Global North-South relationship departed from a colonizer-colonized relationship 
toward a developed-underdeveloped that followed the recent Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Rist, 2008). For Escobar (1995), the Truman Doctrine intended to urge 
the rest of the world to replicate the high levels of industrialization and urbanization that 
characterized post-World War II societies. This included exporting to developing 
countries capital, science, and technology (Escobar, 1995).  
McMichael (2012) deconstructed the methods underdeveloped nation-states 
underwent for development, which he refers to as the Development Project; it became the 
response to the era of decolonization. McMichael (2012) breaks down the Development 
Project phenomenon with the first portion consisting of the nation-state. The nation-state, 
he argued, was the framework of the project. Nation-states were territorially defined 
political systems based on nineteenth-century Europe. Borders of nation-states within the 
African continent are seen as a problematic product of the Development Project (O’Brien 
& Cox, 2010; McMichael, 2012).  
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The most important aspect of the development project, McMichael (2012) argued, 
was that planners, government elites, and citizens would hold the belief that development 
was destiny. In fact, it was a major tenet of both Cold War blocs. Nation-states were 
encouraged to promote national development policies that would shrink the agriculture 
sector meanwhile growing manufacturing and service sector. Furthermore, industrial 
growth would provide technological advancement in agriculture, therefore lessening the 
need for agriculture labor (McMichael, 2012).   
The Truman Doctrine had good intentions of ensuring that countries around the 
world would be able to enjoy the values of human life that emerged from the Renaissance 
Era, which is what the United States was modeled after. But Escobar (1995) contends the 
Third World has instead experienced underdevelopment, impoverishment, and 
exploitation. The development dream “progressively turned into a nightmare” since 
development began in the 1940s (Escobar, 1995, p. 5). This is further critiqued as Nandy 
(1997) argues that modern colonialism through development prevailed not through 
military or technological advantage but through a creation of a secular hierarchy. This 
hierarchy resulted in a creation of polarities throughout the global community. The 
polarities are indicative through relationships between the scientific versus the non-
scientific, the expert and the non-expert, as well as the modern and the primitive. 
Categorization of knowledge was apparent in Lesotho, a landlocked country 
within South Africa. Ferguson discussed how a World Bank report mobilized a different 
form of discourse to categorize Lesotho. Development discourse used by the World Bank 
painted Lesotho as a country with a blank slate due to government inaction. Lesotho was 
constructed by the World Bank to be a country that was not yet incorporated into the 
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modern world and reliant on agriculture that required improvements. Moreover, if 
development did not materialize, it was the fault of the government, not those of the 
planners. This categorization of Lesotho had a real world effect wherein livelihoods were 
lost (Ferguson, 1994; Braun, 2011).  
Problems associated with development also stem from how aid is distributed to 
countries categorized as less developed. In the case of Lesotho, multi-lateral aid agencies, 
such as the World Bank, have distributed large sums of money for programs to construct 
infrastructure to advance the country into a modern nation-state (Ferguson, 1990; Braun, 
2010). Not only does this aid relationship assume the nation-state relationship necessary 
for the Development Project but also assumes development operates through the state 
regardless of politics (Ferguson, 1990; McMichael, 2012; O’Brien & Williams, 2010; 
Carothers & deGramont, 2013).  
 
Aid and development 
To finance the Development Project, massive amounts of money have been distributed 
from more developed nation-states to lesser-developed nation-states. Western nation-
states previously developed their colonial territories for the sake of exploiting raw 
materials in those territories. During the post-colonial era, developmental aid has 
provided a larger role in supporting the Development Project. Official development 
assistance (ODA) intends to promote economic development and welfare and is provided 
through a grant, loan, or sometimes appears as both. Technical assistance is also included 
with ODA. Infrastructure projects were once the model of the aid industry and are still 
perceived as an approach to engage with an economy that is growing. Typically, these 
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projects are large-scale investments on which the donor has calculated rates on return (de 
Haan, 2014).  
Most aid flows through bilateral or multilateral institutions. Some bilateral ODA 
flows from national governments to both nongovernmental organizations that operate in 
aid-receiving nation-states, multilateral organizations, or to the government of an aid-
receiving nation-state. An issue with bilateral aid is that it follows the foreign policy 
motives of the donor nation-state and is often tied aid, which means money must be spent 
on goods and services from the donor. Aid from multilateral ODA has its own 
problematic dimensions as well. Aid from these organizations stem from Bretton Woods 
institutions—International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank—or other groups of 
nation-states—such as the Asian Development Bank or United Nations (de Haan, 2014). 
The World Bank and the IMF are frequently criticized for their roles in lending large 
sums of development loans in exchange for neoliberal restructuring of aid-receiving 
nation-states, referred to as structural adjustment programs (McMichael, 2012; O’Brien 
& Williams, 2010).  
 Aid is delivered not just through finances but also through technical assistance of 
an exchange of knowledge. Technical assistance forms about one-fourth of total official 
development aid. Technical assistance focuses on transferring knowledge and skills to an 
aid-receiving country that sometimes flows through a nongovernmental organization or 
government agency (de Haan, 2014).  
Debate on aid effectiveness in aid-receiving countries continues, and the issue of 
technical assistance often takes the focus, a debate that William Easterly and Jeffrey 
Sachs have taken issue with localized development versus technocratic development, 
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respectively. This debate between the two represents a larger debate on how aid should 
approach development in the developing world. Sachs (2015) believes these technical 
approaches can be beneficial and that large money infusion into development in nation-
states located in the Global South is necessary. With this in mind, the poor are stuck in a 
poverty trap and are too poor to save enough capital to exit such poverty. Aid should 
therefore work toward individual accumulation of capital, which will then lead to growth. 
Further aid should invest in infrastructure and other services that can improve human 
capital. This investment should be directed at schools, health sectors, and other 
infrastructure (Sachs, 2005).  
For Easterly (2014), development that relies on technical, outside knowledge, is a 
misguided solution. These programs, such as mosquito nets, do not confront the issues 
that are the systemic problems in a nation-state’s economy or government. In addition, 
Easterly (2006) also aimed to discredit the premise that aid effectiveness can encourage 
economic growth. He argues that, in reality, the poverty trap is not the issue that impedes 
economic growth. Instead, it is poor governance (Easterly, 2006). Other academic 
concepts support Easterly’s skepticism about aid effectiveness strategies found in Sachs’s 
arguments. Fungibility of aid finds that whenever an aid-receiving country receives aid, it 
does not have to spend in the way the donor requests it (Feyzioglu et al., 1998). In 
addition, large sums of aid into a country’s relatively small economy can leave the aid 
recipient suffering from Dutch disease, a negative economic effect that increases its 
currency value and affecting its international economic competiveness (Riddell, 2007).  
Essentially, this debate has Easterly supporting that development should empower 
the poor first, and Sachs believes projects and programs that cost large amounts of money 
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can lead to development. Stripping down their arguments further—and associating them 
with mainstream Western economics thinking—finds Sachs aligning with Keynesian 
economics and Easterly along with free-market thinkers, like Hayek (Miller, 2010).   
 The conversation on aid has changed during the sustainable development era. The 
purpose of aid, according to many, is to now provide assistance to nation-states as they 
develop according to the tenets of sustainable development (Sachs, 2016; United Nations 
Development Programme, 2016). Although sustainable development was one of the 
Millennium Development Goals1, it has now become a set of 17 goals, titled Sustainable 
Development Goals.  
 
Sustainability and the future of development  
Sustainable development became the new global goal of development in 2016 after the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) ended in 2015 (Sachs, 2016; UNDP, 2016; 
Pope Francis, 2016; World Bank, 2016). Despite becoming the central focus of 
development in 2016, the modern conception of sustainable development has been 
around since the Brundtland report, titled Our Common Future, was published in 1987 
(McMichael, 2012; O’Brien & Williams, 2010; Sachs, 2016). The report argued that 
ideas of limitations should be defined—whether the state is centrally planned, market-
oriented, developed, or developing. Furthermore, the state should be cognizant of how its 
future ability to meet human needs is jeopardized if it overexploits resources. The 
Brundtland report additionally found that ecological interactions are not confined by 
political boundaries (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). 
                                                
1 MDG Goal No. 7 was to ensure environmental sustainability through an integration of the principles of 
sustainable development (UN, 2015).  
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However, McMichael (2011) finds the development challenge of sustainable 
development as an “environmentalist’s paradox” (p. 251) because living standards have 
risen due to development despite the likelihood of continued development strategies to 
intensify social inequalities and environmental degradation (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2011).  
With sustainable development, one concern, according to the United Nations 
Development Program, is how to reduce poverty and improve welfare through creating 
dignified sustainable work (UNDP, 2015). The other challenge is essentially how to 
avoid a global environmental disaster (Brundtland, 1987; Matthew & Hammill, 2009). 
This means sustainable development must include approaches to confront the “business 
as usual” model—which has the worst case scenario for the future of the global climate at 
a 2° Celsius change in global climate levels—to a drastic change that shows climate 
levels remaining what they are today (McMichael, 2011; Sachs, 2016). Despite hope for 
continuing global temperatures as they are today, McKibben (2010) argues that global 
warming and climate change is no longer a threat but our reality now. Parenti (2011) 
conceptualized this reality as the “catastrophic convergence” (p. 7). This means the 
reality of global climate change will cause a collision of political, economic, and 
environmental disasters that do not necessarily have a domino effect but rather amplify 
each other. To avoid this phenomenon, Parenti (2011) argued the optimal solution is to 
address the effects of climate change and the economic and political consequences that 
leave us vulnerable.  
The question of how to avoid global environmental disasters is a relevant 
sustainable development question for Pakistan. Pakistan is one of the most vulnerable 
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nation-states facing a high risk from increased natural disasters during the era of climate 
change. The 2010 floods affected one-fifth of the population and were responsible for 
impacting the national gross domestic product by 5.8 percent (Khan, 2015).   
 Khan (2015) argues that to avoid disaster risk in Pakistan, the country must 
mitigate and adapt. Pakistan’s energy models currently include coal; its energy sector, 
therefore, will contribute the most to greenhouse gas emissions. However, if the country 
invests in energy conservation and renewable energy, including hydropower, greenhouse 
gas emissions would reduce. Khan’s policy suggestion for adaption to climate change in 
Pakistan follows the first model of sustainable development.  
 
Dams and (sustainable) development 
Seeing how sustainable development discourses have emerged about how development 
operates between aid-receiving countries and donors, as well as the discussion about 
sustainable development, the question of which means are more efficient to arrive at 
sustainable development emerges. Following the tenets of modernization theory of 
encouraging economic growth, infrastructure construction was one way to 
industrialization (McMichael, 2012; O’Brien & Williams, 2010). Water and energy 
security are seen as an important components of sustainable development (Biswas & 
Tortajada, 2016). Dams, therefore, are seen as one way of leading nation-states to 
industrialization—including during the sustainable era (Tortajada, 2014; Khagram, 
2005). This section surveys literature on dams and their entry into infrastructure for 
sustainable development. 
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Although dams can be a source of cleaner energy and cheap electricity, they are, 
without a doubt, highly controversial. There are socio-economic costs to constructing 
large-scale projects, such as hydropower dams. Gellert & Lynch (2003) argue that 
displacement is an inherent feature of what they refer to as mega-project development. 
With this in mind, the authors continue, strong states are able to handle large-scale 
projects in terms of displacement. Weak states, however, are often unable to succeed. 
Furthermore, communities that are detached from the center of power are often more 
affected. Dam planning and development can spur internal displacement of populations 
and require the state to compensate those who are directly affected. In general 
displacement can also push populations into already densely populated cities, which 
exacerbates the already existing inequalities (Gellert & Lynch, 2003). Braun (2011) 
reveals how hydropower infrastructure reinforces gender inequalities through employing 
a feminist analysis of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which contributed to an 
understanding of how women are affected by the large-scale transnational project. The 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a mega project dam that marketed water to South 
Africa, impacted the lives of women living in its proximity and reinforced local and 
global patriarchal policies and hierarchies (Braun, 2010, 2011, 2011a).   
Since developing countries often do not have the capital to finance a dam, it also 
requires developmental aid from multilateral organizations or the state needs to attract 
foreign direct investment through economic liberalization (Ahmed, 2012). Global South 
nation-states, because of these loans, often were restructured through economic policies 
like structural adjustment policies (O’Brien & Williams, 2010; McMichael, 2012). In 
addition to experiencing donor conditionality and its impact on an aid-receiving country’s 
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economy, dams as development benefit the aid industry. Development banks and aid 
agencies have used low-interest loans to finance large-scale dams. Additionally, bilateral 
agencies used dams during the Cold War to illustrate a donor-client relationship 
(McCully, 2001).  
Ecologically, critics who took a hardline stance against dams, like McCully 
(2001), argue that negative externalities, such as sediment retention in dams, loss of 
riparian ecologies, and even water quality, could place additional stress on already-water 
stressed Pakistan. Since dams eliminate natural flooding, it also eliminates a number of 
species in the watershed of the river when dammed. Furthermore, this can devastate a 
river’s delta, as apparent with the Colorado River (Reisner, 1986).  
These negative effects of dams and development became internationally 
publicized during the process of the Narmada Valley Dam Project, where local protestors 
halted dam constructions and escalated to forcing multilateral institutions to alter their 
policies on lending for development (Khagram, 2003; Wade, 2004). This change in 
development practices forced multilateral institutions to include environmental concepts 
in development. In fact, Wade (2004) recalled a World Bank official telling him, “You 
can’t write anything about development these days without mentioning the environment” 
(p. 89). Goldman (2006) contradicts this, though, in assessing the hierarchy of knowledge 
within the World Bank and how economics has a privileging role over social sciences 
within their policies.  
For dams and development, however, the hiatus and uncertainty continued until 
the World Commission on Dams (WCD), a conglomeration of a wide array of 
perspectives on dam building, met in the late 1990s to discuss and come to a consensus 
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on the future of dam building. When the WCD published its seminal report in 2000 to 
discuss the role of dams, it stated that when dams are seen as the best alternative, the 
Commission would support it. The WCD was more than just a decision that said dams 
were a flawed but necessary infrastructure solution (WCD, 2000). Dubash (2010) argued 
the WCD acted as non-state actors who were bridging a gap in governance in regards to 
dams and development. Although the WCD was not effective as a rule-making entity, it 
was a unique way to inject new ways of thinking about dams and development into 
global governance institutions (Dubash, 2010).  
 The WCD may have made the decision that dams are a flawed yet essential 
component of development, but dams have re-emerged in discussions about climate 
change and energy generation to reduce greenhouse gases. Erlewein (2014) argued within 
the context of climate justice that dams were revived thanks to the financial support that 
has come from the United Nations’ Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). CDM 
supports projects that avoid greenhouse gas emissions while working toward sustainable 
development. Although CDM supports other renewable energy—such as solar or wind 
energy—hydroelectric energy projects are dominant. Packaging dams as CDM projects is 
counter-effective to the program’s goals of carbon offsetting. However, the author 
recommends that if dams continue to benefit from the CDM program, the projects should 
comply with the sustainability guidelines of the WCD.  
Different sizes of dams are also discussed to support hydropower without the 
financial strain, ecological degradation, or socio-economic effects. Small dams vary from 
2.5 to 25 MW, mini dams are below 2 MW, micro dams are below 500kW, and pico-
hydro below 10kW. These different sizes provide alternatives to large-scale dams, which 
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often require planning processes that are costly and lengthy. Small dams can also be 
located in more remote areas, benefiting villages that are removed from the national 
electrical grid (Bhutto, et al., 2011). Rather than focusing on just large-scale dams, 
academics have suggested constructing dams according to the needs of the nearby 
community. This means constructing small hydropower projects, which vary in 
generation from 2.5 and 25 megawatts, for smaller populations. Of course, a large 
population would require a larger scale dam. For example, an aspiring international 
industrial region like Punjab would have consumers to pay the costs for a large-scale 
dam. Building to size of the consumer demand and need also decreases the loss of power 
that occurs in transferring electricity (Bhutto, et al., 2011; Siddiqi, et al., 2012). The 
discussion of dam size leaves room to mitigate the issue of the negative externalities of 
dam building for the sake of electrical generation. 
Large dams are still at the forefront of discussion because of the amount of 
potential electricity and ability to provide water (Tortajada, 2014). However, dams have 
changed the ecology around where they are located. Because of this, Nüsser (2014) views 
large dams as not just engineering and infrastructure but instead as a central component 
to the transformation of a fluvial environment; it is a technological hydroscape that has 
transformed the entire socio-environmental landscape (Nüsser, 2014). Because of the 
change of a landscape that a dam can cause, governments and other agencies should 
identify potential impacts in advance of a large project to assist in making better 
decisions about development strategies. This should include establishing meaningful 
social impact assessments that empowers stakeholders, using methods such as 
participatory social impact assessments (Tilt et al., 2009). 
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Water worldviews 
The Narrator in Ernest Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea found the sea on which 
Cubans fished had two ways to refer to it: la mar, when the fisherman loves her like a 
woman; or el mar, as the male enemy (Hemingway, 1952). The narrator’s description of 
a dualistic perspective of the sea prefaces the surrounding literature that exists in showing 
the continuum of how water is perceived. In this section, I provide a survey of literature 
that shows how water is viewed and how it has changed in terms of its relationship with 
the state.    
 Just as Hemingway’s Old Man said fishermen saw the sea as either gender, many 
have examined how water is more than just a chemical bond of hydrogen and oxygen 
(Morgan & Smith, 2013; Bakker, 2014). Morgan & Smith (2013) surveyed various 
perspectives of water to illustrate that “water isn’t just water” (p. 106). By this, the 
authors do not mean to dismiss the dire consequences that many in the world face 
whenever there is a water shortage. Furthermore, pre-modern conceptions of water affect 
water management. Throughout Western history, the hegemonic worldview of water 
management has been influenced by factors including Puritan beliefs of water 
conservation and human motivation to improvement of God’s land. Because of that, 
modern water management is based on belief—whether in the divinity or scientific 
progress (Morgan & Smith, 2013).   
Market environmentalism challenged the state hydraulic paradigm as a way of 
perceiving how water resources are to be managed during the 1980s. Bakker (2014) 
surveyed five dimensions of market environmentalism’s view of water resources, which 
fits alongside a perspective of water through an economic lens for water resource 
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planning. The worldview of market environmentalism is that positive environmental 
goals can be accomplished through the market, market institutions, and organizations. 
The worldview of market environmentalism is not considered hegemonic, and has only 
replaced the state hydraulic programs in some nation-states as to how water resources 
should be managed. Although the state hydraulic paradigm was a model—and still is for 
some—for industrialization, the paradigm has been critiqued for overlooking 
environmental issues and an over-consumption of water resources (Bakker, 2014). 
Bakker (2014) also applies the market environmentalism concept to the water 
sector, which consists of five dimensions. Privatization in the water sector is fueled with 
the intentions that private sector actors can contribute to solving the global water crisis. 
Commercialization in the water sector often involves private companies managing water 
supply infrastructure or injecting private-sector business models into government 
agencies. Marketization is supported because it is perceived as a way to allocate scarce 
water resources to support efficient use of water. The fourth dimension of market 
environmentalism is the use of liberalization of governance. This supports reforms that 
will enforce good governance through transparency and empowering stakeholders. One 
of the most important dimensions in considering perceptions of water is in the 
establishment of economic valuation of water. Those who support this argue that it can 
lead to an improvement of water security and water governance (Bakker, 2014).  
Shiva (2002) asks the question of to whom water belongs and how it should be 
accessed. Although market environmentalism surveyed by Bakker is seen as a departure 
from the state hydraulic paradigm role in water resource management, Shiva (2002) 
argues instead for an embrace of peoples’ alternatives—not the state or the market. When 
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Maharashtra was hit by a drought in the 1970s, perceptions of water resources 
management supported pushing away from the export-oriented crop sugarcane to support 
water control toward its residents instead (Shiva, 2002).  
 In order to understand water resources, some have examined the role of the 
hydrological cycle within which water moves (Linton, 2008; Linton & Budds, 2013; 
Linton, 2014; Bakker, 2002). Bakker (2002) clarified the chemical reaction H20 circulates 
through the hydrologic cycle. Instead, water as a resource moves through a complex 
network of pipes, meters, and garden hoses. Water as a resource is regulated by water law 
and treaties and has an end-user: the consumer (Bakker, 2002). Meehan (2014) provides 
insight into a more localized water cycle in Tijuana, Mexico. In Tijuana, some collect 
rainwater under the eaves of housetops with a rain barrel that is then treated as gray 
water, meaning it is used for non-consumption uses in times when water is not delivered 
from the government. This form of water collection serves in a way to limit the power of 
the Mexican state power, especially as some harvest rainwater in the absence of state 
water infrastructure. This water cycle also illustrates segments of alternative forms of 
water authority, decision-making, and power that can even move communities toward a 
more democratic form of water use, whether under a context of neoliberalism or 
governmental authority of water.  
Linton (2008) further problematizes the hydrological cycle by questioning 
whether it is sustainable. Under the modern hydrological cycle, Linton argues, dams and 
development are natural inventions. Within this cycle is a humid fallacy in which it is 
assumed a hydrological cycle is as similar in England as it is in India. This is further 
described as a hydrological Orientalism. This means hydrological engineering is needed 
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to civilize non-West arid regions. Therefore, Linton (2008) argues, a sustained use of the 
modern hydrological cycle will jeopardize the health of ecosystems and water resources 
(Linton, 2008). Furthermore, Linton & Budds (2013) perceive that the modern hydrologic 
cycle also created a special field of scientific inquiry, scientists referred to as 
hydrologists. By creating this new field of expertise, it legitimized a technical authority 
over water (Linton & Budds, 2013).   
Rather than viewing the upcoming water crisis as a resource problem, Linton 
(2013) argues that all water problems are fundamentally social problems and should be 
solved this way as well. If water is instead perceived as going through a hydrosocial 
cycle, a process in which water and society make and remake each other over space and 
time, it puts people and politics at the center of all water issues (Linton, 2014). Linton & 
Budds (2013) advance the concept of the hydrosocial cycle by highlighting the dialectical 
and relational process through which water and society relate with each other. 
 Certain lenses have been historically applied to water, besides the hydrological 
cycle or hydrosocial cycle. Blatter, et al. (2001) discussed how emerging perspectives of 
water have challenged dominant modern perspectives of water. Modern meanings of 
water have included a legal, economic, and engineering dimension. Lawyers have viewed 
water as a property of territory, engineers as transformable products for consumption, and 
economists view it as a commodity that can be traded and exchanged. These are 
categorized as low variety in difference of approaches, according to the authors, meaning 
that it has supported a narrow understanding of water. However, under a social 
constructivist approach, water is an essential component to identity creation for 
communities.  
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Given the apparent diversity of water perspectives, some have argued this should 
be integrated in future research. Blatter, et al. (2001) argued future scholarship on water 
should include one of two approaches. The first is to help bridge between various 
meanings and understandings. The second is to enhance legitimacy of non-instrumental 
uses of water, such as explaining specific cultural meanings of water (Blatter, et al., 
2001). Swyngedouw (2009) viewed the debate of water resources takes priority over 
democratic governance and instead supports technological or economic efficiency. As 
water-related crises increase during the climate change era, the question of what capacity 
democratic and other forms of governments are capable of emerges (Swyngdouw, 2009). 
These suggestions for future research are relevant when looking at how professionals 
view dams as development in the climate change era of Pakistan. 
 
Pakistan’s waterscape 
Before colonial intervention by the British, the Indus River experienced minimal 
diversions and damming by the riparian farmers for the sake of irrigation. During British 
colonialism, though, the British were awestruck by the similarities the Indus River had to 
that of the Nile River—except the Indus was about three times the size as the Nile 
(Pearce, 2007). The British increased diversion and damming exponentially in southern 
Punjab so as to irrigate land for the cotton necessary to run the textile industries back in 
England, essentially developing water for the sake of exploitation. This irrigation system 
devised by the British is seen by Pearce (2007) to be the origin of the hydraulic state in 
Pakistan in which the state—or colonialist—dominated the management of freshwater 
supply (Bakker, 2014). 
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 The revolutionary beginning of state-led irrigation infrastructure can be traced to 
the irrigation of the western territory of the United States and then British Punjab. During 
the end of the 1800s, irrigation engineers began to introduce large-scale modern irrigation 
structures that created the role of experts, state power, and how agrarian zones would be 
developed. These engineers were revolutionary in introducing changes that resulted in 
ecological, technological, and social changes. However, expertise in the United States 
west and the British Punjab had different experiences. In the United States west, the 
federal government argued they should control irrigation because of the speculative value 
of water in the west. On the other hand, the British Punjab maintained control reluctantly 
to preserve imperial power. Engineers relied on utilizing irrigation methods in both 
regions to increase production and settlement. For these authors, their analysis on the two 
regions, though focused on the 1900s, is indicative of the dynamics in both regions and 
their relationship with engineers and the population. Specifically, professional engineers 
hoped to resolve social problems through an expansion of profit and territory meanwhile 
expanding the power of the state (Akhter & Omerod, 2015).  
For Pakistan, the issue of relying upon engineering principles to resolve social 
problems is evident with large-scale projects, such as Tarbela Dam and can instead result 
in a continued fragmented political state. Majed Akhter (2015) examines the role of these 
large-scale projects on creating national identity. Since Pakistan emerged in 1947, it is a 
very young country relatively speaking, yet the two provinces of Sindh and Punjab have 
had a tumultuous history, and this was evident during the planning process of Tarbela 
Dam. Essentially, Akhter drew technocratic debates within Pakistan to show how Tarbela 
Dam was presented by a Punjabi-dominated government as a development strategy that 
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was good for the rest of the country. This research left Akhter with commenting that the 
political question one must ask is “for whom is this state, and nation, called ‘Pakistan’ 
for?” (p. 868).  
Organizationally, Pakistan has an extensive network of actors involved in 
implementing hydropower projects, who are criticized for not supplying the country with 
steady electricity. The major organization is the Water and Power Development 
Authority (WAPDA). WAPDA was established in 1958 to generate, transmit, and 
distribute electricity; in addition, it provided irrigation, flood control, and water supply. 
Overall, it supplies electricity to 88 percent of Pakistan and owns 54 percent of the 
country’s total electrical power. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC) is one of 
the oldest utilities in the South Asian region and serves Karachi’s population. Due to the 
organizations’ inability to supply electricity in the 1980s, the Government of Pakistan 
reacted with its power policies. After the 1995 Hydel Power Policy, more than 41 Letters 
of Interest were sent to the state (Mirza et al, 2007). Pakistan has continued to codify its 
power reforms through its 2013 Power Policy, spearheaded by the Nawaz Sharif 
administration. Some stipulations have met the approval of Pakistan’s donors, such as the 
withdrawal of subsidies for a three-year period. The state has addressed financial 
shortfalls through raising tariffs on commercial and industrial users by 44 percent and on 
residents by 32 percent in late 2013 (Aziz & Ahmad, 2015).  
Nausheen Anwar (2014) asserts that Pakistan developed much like many nation-
states in the Global South. International borrowing was utilized to finance large-scale 
projects in the country in order to spur economic growth. Additionally, gross domestic 
product was the focal point of measuring success. Anwar adds that early in Pakistan’s 
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existence, outside expertise had suggested energy development projects for its industrial 
growth. These foreign engineering firms undertook installations of energy generation 
sites throughout East and West Pakistan. Most of the foreign advisors, who were 
characterized as competent experts, came from the United States and Western Europe. 
Foreign aid was therefore seen as an essential need for economic development.  
  
Knowledge and its keepers  
So far, I have discussed the overall discussion surrounding development—which includes 
evolving ideas including sustainable development, perceptions of water, and how dams 
fit in within these discussions. Since technical assistance—the lending of development 
expertise from the donor country—has an effect on how development programs and 
projects are designed, in order to understand the discourse behind technical assistance, it 
is necessary to understand the literature on how knowledge operates in relation to power 
and politics.  
 
Technocratic mentality  
When justifying public comment on the Kalabagh Dam, Ghazanfar (2008) wrote that 
every person—whether they are illiterate or not—has a right to comment just as 
spectators of a cricket game have the right to criticize a cricket player even if they do not 
know how even to hold a bat. This comment segues into a presentation of technocratic 
thinking. Just as a professional cricket player is immensely more talented at cricket than 
any spectator in the stands, a technocrat is someone who possesses different sorts of 
knowledge of their specialty compared to the common person.  
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 There are several definitions of technocracy. The general definition is a form of 
governance in which experts rule (Burris, 1993). Meynaud (1968) nuances this by 
claiming that technocrats are drawn from pools of technologists, a group of skilled 
individuals. This can include those who are skilled in mechanical, economic, industrial, 
or national planning. These individuals therefore also enjoy a privileged role in how their 
expert advice influences policy since “no politician would dare question the value or 
expediency of their advice and actions” (Meynaud, 1969, p. 37). Arguments extend this 
further by stating that it implies industrial technology is important to shaping society. 
Another argument views technocracy as an idea that claims technical discourses are more 
important than political discourses, which therefore minimizes the role of politics in 
policy making. Burris (1993), however, argues that technocracy does in fact engage with 
politics in many ways and that politics has a role in technocratic societies.   
The roots of technocracy ideology, according to Burris (1993), stems from the 
Western Enlightenment period during which reason, science, rationality, and technology 
were emphasized. This foundation, however, emphasized a hierarchical and patriarchal 
society, though ruling through science was rooted in enlightenment and benevolence. 
Meynaud (1969), by examining media clippings, illustrated themes of technocratic 
ideology. The technocrat is lauded for being an image of competence because of their 
efficiency in terms of prioritizing facts before preconceived ideas. This quality of a 
technocrat means the individual will be more likely to keep peace in society, Meynaud 
said. Although modern technocratic thought supports democracy, there are authoritarian 
tendencies in technocracy because reforms under a democratic system can make it 
impossible to find agreement.  
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Putnam (1977) outlined a typical picture of a technocrat, someone who holds firm 
the belief that technical knowledge must replace politics and whose role is defined as 
apolitical. The core principle is in rational, scientific approaches. Secondly, a 
technocrat’s decision-making process is based on technical knowledge and is skeptical 
about political institutions and politicians. This can elevate to a “technocratic 
dictatorship” since under a technocratic mindset, non-experts should not be considered in 
the decision-making process. Policy is also not discussed along the lines of ideology or 
morals because each issue has a solution sourced in practical terms. Lastly, the technocrat 
commits to technological progress rather than social justice. However, it is more than just 
what sort of education an individual received. It depends on how much politics are 
involved in a certain ministry—or government department—that creates variability in the 
technocratic mindset, Ribbhagen (2011) argued. 
 The early work of Hayek (1945) can be seen as a critique of central planning that 
is based on technocratic knowledge. Hayek (1945) questions not only how to allocate 
resources, but how to secure the best uses of resources that are known to members of a 
society. To apply Hayek in a situational scenario, the knowledge of water resource use in 
Pakistan, is not someone in an international nongovernmental organization, such as the 
anti-dam organization International Rivers, nor is it someone in the large, multilateral 
organization of the World Bank. It should be someone who is aware of the local 
resources. Hayek continues to critique sciences that support the assumptions of 
Keynesian economic models, which are asserted to inform a central planner what exactly 
a population needs. This critique is concentrated further at the use of statistical models by 
central authorities. To avoid the glaring generalizations that occur when central 
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authorities rely heavily on statistical models, Hayek posits that those who are familiar 
with a territory or a particular resource should be empowered rather than central planners 
focusing on statistical models and other sciences needed for large-scale planning. 
Easterly (2014) has since applied Hayek to argue how development strategies that rely on 
central planning and technical expertise, rather than empowering people as a way of 
confronting poverty, in reality traps those in poverty.  
 When considering the role of technical knowledge and technocracy in society, it 
is important—in the case of this thesis—to consider the role of bureaucracies since this is 
often a space of governing that a technocrat occupies. According to Weber (1978), 
bureaucracy is threefold: first, there is a rigid division of labor; secondly, a chain of 
command reinforced through regulations; and, thirdly, the people employed in this chain 
are qualified through education and training. Since bureaucracies consist of people who 
are trained with technical knowledge—what could be seen as by Meynaud (1969) as 
technologists or even technocrats—engaging with the work of Weber’s literature proves 
useful in how to frame the developmental discourse behind supporting dams as 
development.  
 
Foucault and Knowledge  
Technocracy and bureaucracy are related to how dams are implemented as development 
(McCully, 2001). Pakistan not only has a history with bureaucracy in governing practices 
(Hull, 2012) but a system of actors in water management and hydropower infrastructure 
implementation. In order to justify dams as development, bureaucracy and technocrats 
often rely on technical discourse because it strips politics from development.  
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Within Pakistan, state actors are criticized for implementing development policies 
behind closed doors in a non-participatory fashion and members of civil society also 
receive criticism for acting as a “rubber stamp” for these top-down decisions. Overall, 
though, the international donor community dominates knowledge that circulates 
throughout the country (Ahmad & Rashid, 2011). Despite the critiques of the 
overwhelming power of the international donor community in decision-making, there is 
still a place to examine the discourses used by professionals in terms of suggesting dams 
as climate change adaptive infrastructure and for energy generation. I will focus on how 
local professional organizations perceive these problems. Within local discourses, there 
are solutions apparent, such as WAPDA’s Vision 2025 commitment and the Ministry of 
Planning and Development’s Vision 2025. Insight into the knowledge production process 
within the civil society organizations is important to understand the processes of 
decision-making—whether it is for planning hydropower projects or defining what 
sustainability is. To make these discourses intelligible, I will frame it within a 
Foucauldian power/ knowledge paradigm, as well as branches of the paradigm.   
 The approach of this thesis is influenced by Foucault’s writings of power and 
knowledge. Since knowledge is expressed through discourse and discourse is coded with 
power, knowledge is discursive. Power/ knowledge is explored in Foucault’s lectures:  
… in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold 
relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, 
and these relations of power cannot be established, consolidated nor implemented 
without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 93).  
Foucault’s definition of discourse revolves around producing and circulating knowledge 
to convince people about what exists in the world in order to dictate peoples’ behaviors. 
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Essentially, discourse is defined by rules of knowledge production and it outlines clear 
specifications in validating a statement (Waitt, 2010).  
 In order to conceptualize another understanding of how power operates not only 
in terms of a top-down state-population relationship but also domestic institutions like 
schools and factories. Foucault (1977, 1978, 1980) developed the concept of 
governmentality. The role of these domestic institutions, such as the school, was to 
enforce knowledge and power to its inhabitants. In addition to governmentality, 
biopolitics became an important aspect of how power mechanisms manage life in modern 
society (Lemke, 2011). Biopolitics refers to Foucault (1978) confronted how power over 
life evolved during the 17th Century in History of Sexuality. Two poles—one centered on 
the body and the other on the species—were developed during this time and were 
regulated by disciplining the individual and the other through holistic regulation, such as 
births and mortality, level of health, and life expectancy. With the advent of public 
institutions, the Western power was now concerned with investment of life rather than 
power through the right to kill (Foucault, 1978). Others have also interrogated the role of 
power in other ways of life, such as in statistics and migration (Hacking, 1975; 1990; 
Lemke, 2011; Agamben, 1998).  
 Rutherford (1999) expanded Foucault’s work on governmentality and biopolitics 
to include the role of the environment and titled the phenomenon as eco-governmentality. 
In order to justify the application of biopolitics to that of the ecology and environment, he 
argued the management of environment is concerned with similar issues as Foucault’s 
concept of biopolitics: they both attempt to solve the problems and concerns through 
technologies of power. Eco-governmentality entered as a power after World War II as 
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“big science,” a capital-intensive, research concerned with industrialization and 
computerizing ecology and environment, attempted to manage the environment. 
Furthermore, eco-governmentality shows that scientific expertise often influences policy, 
as apparent in the influence of mundane environmental impact surveys (Rutherford, 
1999).  
A Foucauldian approach had been undertaken by Ferguson (1994), who provided 
a discursive analysis of development in his study of development in Lesotho. 
Development discourse in and about Lesotho stripped politics from its discourse of 
planners. Instead, the government was intended to operate as a neutral machine in which 
social services and economic growth would go through (Ferguson, 1994).   
  A discursive analysis relying upon a power/ knowledge approach has shown a 
hierarchy of knowledge is evident in multilateral donors as well. In his examination of 
the World Bank, Goldman (2006) utilized a power/ knowledge approach. He found 
throughout his conversations with natural and social scientists that expertise that 
conflicted formal scientific reports were never published. Goldman (2006) argues that 
this process of knowledge/ production established hegemony in development discourses. 
The knowledge that is created by the World Bank is read all around the world and is 
some of the most cited material in the social sciences. Goldman (2006) found that the 
World Bank supplies themselves with their own data and a dominant culture within the 
organization. Pakistan often receives knowledge from institutions that either craft 
knowledge like the World Bank or cite material from them.  
Furthermore, it is possible to view other works on scientific research—social 
science included—as a product of a power/ knowledge relationship. Although scientific 
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research is often seen as the byproduct of neutral observations, Nader (1996) critiques the 
usually glorified life of the scientist in the West. Nader’s observation has place in 
Pakistan’s knowledge production as well. Although Pakistan is far from being located in 
the West, the place of professional think tank organizations and government bureaucrats 
in Pakistan still applies to Nader’s statement that “all science has social and political 
implications” (Nader, 1996, p. 9).  
Lastly, Escobar (1994) examined the role of discourse in development. In terms of 
sustainable development, he questioned who would be viewed as the knowledge keeper 
of saving the earth from disaster. “But who is this ‘we’ who knows what is best for the 
world as a whole?” (Escobar, 1994, p. 193). In reality, it was going to most likely be the 
Western scientist, who he said speaks for the earth rather than peasants or other 
indigenous forms of knowledge (Escobar, 1994). Sustainable development is more 
prevalent in today, so this question that Escobar asked is still relevant today. With 
Pakistan, who views what is best for sustainable development? Are dams a part of that 
conversation?  
In the context of Pakistan and its current policies on dams for hydropower and 
climate change disaster mitigation, it is possible to see that science has social and 
political implications. Knowledge that comes from foreign aid agencies has implications 
in directing public policy and the creation of knowledge within Pakistan (Ahmad & 
Rashid, 2010). Since Pakistan receives a sizeable amount of developmental aid2, there are 
concerns about the role of locally created knowledge in country decisions and plans. This 
is not a recent phenomenon. For most of Pakistan’s history, Ahmad & Rashid (2010) 
                                                
2 In 2014, Pakistan received more than $3.4 billion in official developmental aid (World Bank, 2016).  
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argue that there has been a lack of locally credible evidence-based policies because 
international aid agencies have replaced the function of the local think tank and civil 
society organizations. Dr. Nazir Ahmad, perceived as a highly respected scientist in 
Pakistan, argues that Pakistan has always relied on foreign expertise ever since its 
Independence, which eroded local expertise and distorted the benefits of constructing the 
Indus Basin Irrigation System (Ahmed, 2003). 
As professionals consider dams as the solution for climate change-adaptive 
infrastructure and energy production, it is important to see how this conclusion was 
made. To understand this perspective, the concept of “studying up” emerges as a strategy 
for research, which is why I selected water and energy professionals as participants 
(Nader, 1972, p. 289). In this case, this strategy aims not to inquire how those who are 
affected by support for dams as sustainable infrastructure but to instead understand why 
people are affected by the discourse that supports dams as sustainable development. In 
other words, what informs these decisions in supporting dams in Pakistan (Nader, 1972)? 
Essentially, how do professionals view dams in solving Pakistan’s electricity shortage 
and minimizing natural disasters that stem from climate change? According to local 
professionals in Pakistan, what is sustainable energy and climate change-adaptive 
infrastructure, and are dams a solution?
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CHAPTER III 
A HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TECHNOCRACY  
AND DAMS IN PAKISTAN 
After a tumultuous struggle for independence from Great Britain, South Asia ended up 
divided after political parties were unable to find common ground. Pakistan, despite 
becoming an independent nation-state on Aug. 14, 1947, continues to be divided with 
how to resolve its myriad internal conflicts. There has not been a national consensus on 
issues such as sharing water, the rights of women, the role of Islam in the government, 
and a back and forth leadership between military-rule and democratically elected leaders 
(Weiss, 2014). After war with India in 1948, technocratic solutions emerged, as a way to 
avoid future conflicts that the West feared could result in the spread of Communism. The 
West, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, saw India and Pakistan as 
valuable nation-states through a geo-political lens. Nevertheless, technocratic solutions 
emerged in the lead-up to the Indus Water Treaty and continue in a way to shape 
Pakistan’s water and energy shortages (Akhter, 2014).  
These technocratic solutions, which assume engineering principles can 
circumvent politics, is problematic for a nation-state that is embedded with political 
struggles and a strong religious identity that is apparent in Pakistan. I argue in this 
chapter that there is a history of technocratic knowledge that is privileged within 
decision-making process in Pakistan. Dams had been viewed historically as a 
technocratic solution to manage water resources in Pakistan, which has been categorized 
as a water-stressed country, as well as provide electricity for a country that is affected by 
a large gap in energy supply for its demand. I will illustrate this through the Tennessee 
  55 
Valley Authority (TVA) founder David Lilienthal’s role in the Indus Water Treaty, a 
report developed by Pieter Lieftinck for the World Bank, WAPDA’s role in Pakistan, as 
well as recent reports published by officials in Pakistan. Through an application of works 
by Ferguson (1990), Goldman (2001, 2006) and Weber (1978), it will be apparent that 
technocratic solutions have a history in Pakistan in support of dams as technical and 
apolitical solutions for development. 
 
Technical justification for dams as development 
Dams have long been an instrument of river control in South Asia and have even been 
discovered to have been used in ancient civilizations. In greater India, damming was used 
for river control for the sake of agricultural purposes to sustain the Buddhist monk class 
(Shaw & Sutcliffe, 2000). On the other hand, it is thought that Mohenjo Daro, one of the 
largest cities of the Indus Valley civilization that was excavated in what is now Sindh 
province, was a city planned by builders familiar with how the Indus River flowed and 
who tried to capture control of the river. (Jansen, 1993) It is a possibility that, evident 
from the presence of silt sediment, natural dams were utilized near Mohenjo Daro. 
(Possehl, 1979) 
Dams historically played an important role in many civilizations outside of South 
Asia. An example of state-dictated water-engineering projects is evident in the 
Mesopotamian city of Mashkan-Shapir for the sake of diverting water to irrigate wheat 
crops in arid regions, though soil salinization in the system led the city and project to fail. 
There have also been accounts of river control infrastructure in the New World. As the 
Spanish Conquistadores entered the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan, expecting to export 
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development technologies to the New World, they were surprised to see elaborate water-
engineering projects that were used to irrigate and control floods, as well as for urban use 
(Tilt, 2015). In terms of modern development, however, dams have received justification 
from technocratic-minded experts because of the infrastructure’s ability to accomplish 
two functions: store water and generate electricity.  
These two functions are why dams continue to be present in development 
discussions despite the controversies of dislocated populations and environmental 
degradation. Technically, dams can yield benefits for regional and national economies. 
For Tortajada (2013), dams are an essential component of development. Hydropower is 
the most accessible source of energy generation since its technology is always advancing, 
it is relatively inexpensive and flowing rivers retain a visible presence. The hydropower 
industry continues to adapt to sustainable principles through adoption of bettering its 
performance by revisiting the principles of planning, design, optimization, the 
construction process, and operations systems. Because of this, hydropower has the 
potential to be a large part of the global supply of renewable energy (Tortajada, 2013).  
The World Commission on Dams (WCD), in their seminal report in 2000, upheld 
the technical benefits of a dam for its population. The technical features of a large dam 
provide an ability to deliver water and electricity to a population for a prolonged period 
although there is an impact on rivers, watersheds, and ecosystems. The extended life of a 
dam may justify its environmental degradation since dams roughly exist for about 30 to 
40 years before requiring renovation. Throughout this time period, large dams are able to 
deliver electricity and water to a population. Although dams often do not meet the 
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potential level at which they are planned, it typically generates enough power to meet 
financial targets (WCD, 2000).  
In order for a dam to generate electricity, there are technical conceptions 
necessary for consideration when planning the projects, a consideration that makes some 
sites more optimal than others. Various models and strategies for dams are seen as 
benefits compared to other forms of energy generation—such as coal and nuclear. For 
dams to generate electricity, a steeper gradient will allow for water to turn turbines, 
which turns water flow into energy. An additional option is the use of pumped storage 
dams. This strategy has dams generating electricity during peak hours of electrical 
consumption. Then the water is pumped back up-hill during the off-peak electrical times. 
An alternative to the typical hydroelectric dam is a run-of-river dam—one that does not 
possess a large reservoir. However McCully (2001) contends it is a bit misleading in 
name since it still have an ecological effect. A body of water is still needed in order to 
generate a stable level of electricity, and this can still impact the surrounding ecology. 
These are all options that supporters of dams use when promoting the use of dams as 
development. 
A technocratic discursive reasoning behind modern day dam development is 
utilized in China. Tilt (2015) explored the role of dams in development in China. The 
Chinese government has prioritized dams as clean energy based on the technical 
specifications of dams. China continues to experience the effects of fossil fuel energy for 
its industrial development, which includes dense pollution. To combat this, it has utilized 
dams as green energy, as evident in its development on its western rivers to transfer 
electricity to its coastal cities. Furthermore, the Chinese government is an entity that 
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prides technical knowledge over other forms of knowledge. This is especially apparent 
with the high number of scientific higher education degrees held by policymakers. In 
fact, former President Hu Jintao has a degree in hydraulic engineering (Tilt, 2015). In this 
case, technical expertise within planning ministries in China utilizes dams as 
development for their technical allure in spurring economic development.  
 This technical discourse is used to justify dams as development: it is found in 
China’s support for dams, and had a role in development of dams in Pakistan both past 
and present. In the following sections, I present discourse used to promote dams to 
resolve development crises in Pakistan, but first, the story begins in Tennessee.  
 
Figure 2: The Indus River System after Partition (Haines, 2014). 
 
 
  59 
The road to the Indus Water Treaty 
David Lilienthal had already made a successful career by the 1950s. He established the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) during the Great Depression, which brought its 
residents inexpensive electricity rates in a regional economy where there was formerly a 
monopoly on electricity. In order to develop the TVA, it required developing a shared 
water space for the six states (Ekbladh, 2002). With his success in the United States,he 
considered the TVA a size-fits-all approach to energy and water resources management 
throughout the world1 (Lilienthal, 1951). Lilienthal hoped to use an engineering voice—
which brought cheap electricity to the United States’ south—to solve a water conflict in 
India and Pakistan. His hope for the two countries to view the Indus River as a natural 
space failed. Instead, the Indus Water Treaty resulted in political discourse, which he 
hoped to avoid (Haines, 2014). Rather than the treaty being vetted through a neutral, 
technocratic discourse, which Lilienthal believed is mutually exclusive with politics and 
religion, it took finances and infrastructure for the countries to agree (Haines, 2014). In 
this section, I present secondary research to show that Lilienthal was seeking a de-
politicization of development that Ferguson (1994) found in Lesotho. In a way, this 
discourse worked when Pakistan experienced a change in government make-up, which 
supported the role of technocratic-led expertise. 
  Partition of India and Pakistan created nation-states that would become embroiled 
in political conflict. The two countries had already fought a war in 1948, yet Lilienthal, 
after visiting both countries, would posit a technocratic solution based on engineering 
infrastructure to settle a future conflict over Kashmir and the Indus River and its 
                                                
1 Lilienthal’s efforts of exporting the TVA model to Iran and Southeast Asia would find failure since 
political issues in those regions would problematize his engineering solutions (Neuse, 1996; Haines, 2014).  
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tributaries since newly drawn boundaries cut through the rivers (see Fig. 2). Lilienthal 
wrote an article, “Kashmir: Another Korea in the Making?” that was published by a 
United States magazine publication, Collier’s, in 1951. Throughout the article, he warned 
readers in the United States how dangerous the political relationship between India and 
Pakistan was, and it would have drastic consequences for the international community if 
they warred over the Kashmir territory. For Lilienthal (1951), the kernel of the conflict 
was over water rights to the Indus, the source of which is in Kashmir. It represented a 
political conflict over a space that could be solved through shared development.  
Lilienthal wanted the two nation-states to put aside their religious and political 
differences and adopt “common sense” engineering principles (Lilienthal, 1951, p. 58). 
Now, besides keeping the two nation-states from falling into military conflict with each 
other, Lilienthal wanted the two to view the five rivers of the Indus as a shared space 
rather than a space through which two borders were drawn. By implementing a water 
resource management system similar to the TVA, he hoped to also solve India’s lack of 
irrigated agriculture land and Pakistan’s lack of water resources for irrigation—as well as 
ease Pakistani paranoia about India tampering with the water flow (Lilienthal, 1951; 
Haines, 2014). This intention does follow the Foucauldian “instrument-effects” Ferguson 
alluded to (1990, p. 255). In the case of Lesotho, Ferguson argued that the development 
apparatus was not a machine for eliminating poverty. Instead, it is a machine to reinforce 
the power of a state bureaucracy that enters to solve poverty (Ferguson, 1990). In the case 
of the Indus Water Treaty, Lilienthal hoped to have shared bureaucratic water 
resources—like the TVA—enter to solve the poverty issues between India and Pakistan 
(Haines, 2014). What Lilienthal thought was common sense was essentially what 
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Ferguson said is like turning off gravity with an anti-gravity machine. In this case, 
Pakistan and India would, with the aid of the anti-politics machine, set aside the political 
tensions they had for an engineering perspective on viewing the system as a natural 
space—not as territory.  
 In the moments leading up to the agreement on the Indus Water Treaty, it is 
possible to perceive technocratic principles emerging between Lilienthal, India and 
Pakistan. He did not want to have political discourse or nationalistic fervor come into the 
way. In fact, he attempted to bar the two from even issuing official comment to their 
respective news media sources for fear that politics would tamper with otherwise rational, 
scientific discussions (Lilienthal, 1967). This intention does appear to be a technocratic 
motive of avoiding politics into what should be a discussion of scientific reasoning—such 
as the principles of applied engineering on the Indus River System. It is noteworthy, 
however, that Cold War politics was a motivating factor for Lilienthal, and he hoped to 
use it as a vessel to raise awareness of the India-Pakistan conflict.  
 
The World Bank’s intentions 
India and Pakistan sat down to sign the Indus Water Treaty on September 19, 1960 in 
Karachi. The World Bank issued a press release after the two countries set aside the 
possibility of war to sign the treaty that “marks the end of a critical and long-standing 
dispute and opens the way for development of water resources in the Indus basin, on 
which depends the livelihood of some 50 million in India and Pakistan” (Ahmad, 2011, p. 
75). Although Lilienthal saw a vision of the two countries sharing the Indus, the World 
Bank mobilized its influence to have India and Pakistan sign a treaty. The World Bank, 
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just as Lilienthal, mobilized supposed technocratic discourses to support a shared water 
space.  
 The Indus Waters Treaty is 102-pages long. Within this document, it gave India 
unrestricted use of the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi Rivers. For Pakistan, it received control of 
water in the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. Under the treaty, India was not to interfere with 
the flow of water that would cause any interference. The treaty also established the right 
for each country to appoint a permanent Commissioner of Indus Waters, a high-ranking 
engineer competent in hydrology and water reuse, to represent the country. The two 
commissioners would be a part of the Permanent Indus Commission that is required to 
meet once a year (Biswas, 1992). The Indus Waters Treaty did more than just brought the 
two countries to agree on dividing the Indus. To encourage the agreement, Eugene Black, 
then World Bank president, put together a consortium of countries: the United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, and New Zealand. 
This consortium’s purpose was to provide money for the Indus Basin Development Fund 
Agreement. This fund was used to provide $541 million to Pakistan for grants although 
the specified amount for Pakistan after the treaty negotiations was $893.5 million.  
 Before the Indus Water Treaty was even negotiated, the World Bank repeatedly 
denied loan requests from India and Pakistan to develop along then-disputed Sutlej River. 
This resulted in raised tensions between India and Pakistan because an inability to 
develop on the Sutlej River threatened to curb any potential development possibilities for 
the two countries. The World Bank therefore offered a mediation based on three 
principles: the Indus basin possess enough water for both countries, the Indus basin 
would be treated as a single space rather than arguing over individual rivers, and 
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negotiations would be set aside political grievances and focus on technical focus (Alam, 
2002).  
 With the two countries at a negotiating table, the World Bank involved itself in 
drafting a treaty. Through pushing for the countries to agree to a solution, it was the first 
major intervention the World Bank is responsible for (Akhter, 2010). However, the role 
of engineers in drafting the treaty held what Akhter (2010) see as a sort of unusual 
prominence, which therefore suggests modernist assumptions in the role of water 
resources management. The World Bank intended for the Indus Waters Treaty, at its core, 
to prove that technology can and does resolve social and political conflicts (Akhter, 
2010). This is evident through the third principle the World Bank stated above that 
negotiations would set aside political grievances and therefore focus on technical matters.  
 Many academics, since the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960, have 
analyzed the motives of the World Bank to bring India and Pakistan to the table. Biswas 
(1992) sees Eugene Black’s leadership in resolving conflict with positive solutions as a 
model that should be replicated by bilateral and multilateral institutions throughout the 
world today. Viewing Black as exhibiting exceptional leadership is further seen by Alam 
(2002) who sees the Indus Water Treaty as an example that illustrates that cooperation is 
the result of water scarcity, which is contrary to the water war rationale that states war 
occurs between countries dependent on a shared water resource if there is water scarcity.  
 
Indus Water Treaty and military technocracy in Pakistan  
The military is an active decision-maker within Pakistan, and their role had a 
consequential moment during the negotiations of the Indus Water Treaty. The military 
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control often relates to the ineffectual nature of political parties within the country 
(Siddiqa, 2007). Because of the military’s involvement in development, it is possible to 
see their developmental decisions based on a continuation of privileging technical 
knowledge over politics for development. There are several ways to disseminate the role 
of the military’s involvement in Pakistan—especially their role in restructuring the 
government and economy to benefit them2. However, for this thesis, I focus on their role 
in implementing development after the Indus Water Treaty.  
The military’s entry into support of a technocratic, development state is evident in 
the Indus Water Treaty negotiations, and the lead up to the negotiation involved 
restructuring the government to reflect a more technical perspective. In 1958, top-ranking 
bureaucrat, Iskander Mirza, collaborated with Field Marshall Ayub Khan to conduct a 
coup, which was successful. Ayub Khan later ousted Iskander Mirza from the 
government and Ayub Khan worked toward a military-bureaucratic state. It was under 
this state that Pakistani elites accepted the Indus Water Treaty under the belief that, 
through advanced technology on the Indus, Pakistan would be under less downstream 
vulnerability from India (Jaffrelot, 2016; Akhter, 2015). Under a military government, 
the decision to accept the World Bank-funded projects, despite previous disagreements 
under the leadership of politicians, was justified under technical—albeit military 
strategy—decisions. 
 Ayub Khan agreed to the Indus Basin Project to legitimize a technocratic military-
bureaucratic government in the role of leadership within Pakistan (Akhter, 2015). Akhter 
(2015) argued Ayub Khan used this river development that was financed through the 
                                                
2 See Siddiqa, A. (2007). Military Inc. for insightful analysis on the role of the military in creating a self-
beneficial government and economy. Also see Nawaz, S. (2008) Cross Swords for a holistic view of the 
military institution.  
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Indus Basin Project as an example of a developmentalist passive revolution—a 
Gramscian concept that posits a masked top-level revolution to ease political opposition 
below in a hierarchy of political classes. Essentially, Ayub Khan aimed to transform top-
level leadership in Pakistan under the ideology of technocratic knowledge and 
development through accepting the Indus Water Treaty. Ayub Khan’s term is referred to 
as the Golden Age of development. It was during this period that the country’s economy 
grew with a boost in the agricultural and industrial sectors (Weiss, 1991; Akhter, 2015).  
 Even after Ayub Khan was ousted in a coup d’état in 1968, the military still 
continued its role in legitimizing its leadership via technocratic knowledge. The 
military’s involvement in development was justified because of the ineffectual state of 
politics in the country (Nawaz, 2008; Siddiqa, 2007). Pakistani military not only trains its 
officers in military science but also to tackle social issues. However, Nawaz (2008) 
argues that it is not a wide range of learning material. Rather, military officers learn from 
experts and a small collection of reading material. Nevertheless, military officers are 
revered as a highly qualified group of professionals once retired because they apply an 
apolitical, technocratic approach. 
  “If you look [at the history of governments in Pakistan] the sustainable policies 
came about in military regimes, like Zia and Musharraf,” a participant told me during an 
interview. “For 10 years policies were consistent…” For this participant, the military—
despite the problematic issues that emerge from a prolonged military dictatorship—are 
able to implement and sustain policies that would otherwise be overthrown by a rival 
political party in a civilian government. These are political parties, he added, that 
typically come to power through offering short-term promises and priorities that 
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contradict with that of the opposing party. In a way, this participant’s views align with 
Iskander Mirza when he echoed similar concerns. “The country, to put it bluntly, is being 
ruined by the politicians,” Mirza told his son in a letter (Jaffrelot, 2016, p. 303).   
 Essentially, Ayub Khan’s military-bureaucrat government was used to implement 
technocratic development policies funded by the Indus Basin Project. It is possible to 
extract from this data that during this time Pakistan experienced a developmental 
discourse in which technocratic knowledge had a privileged role in informing decision 
makers. It has left a mixed legacy for some of the participants I interviewed. Although 
one of them noted a military government did not have the same drawbacks as a civilian 
government, another lamented the loss of water from the Indus River when Ayub Khan 
“gave away one-third of the water” without seeking advice from outside of the Punjab 
region. However, Ayub Khan believed he did not need to discuss the deal with other 
officials because it was a justified decision based on technical knowledge.  
 
Lieftinck’s image of Pakistan 
In the previous section, I provided two examples of how technical knowledge was used 
as a way to mobilize dams as development in a way to extinguish two near-warring 
nation-states. Through an examination of Lilienthal’s involvement in bringing India and 
Pakistan to the table for negotiations and the justifications of Ayub Khan for accepting 
the Indus Water Treaty, it becomes apparent that technical knowledge did have an 
important role over politics to bring economic development to India and Pakistan. In this 
section, I discuss the role of a World Bank report that deconstructed how Pakistan should 
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develop to encourage economic development. Throughout this report, development can 
be possible according to the technocratic suggestions from Lieftinck.  
“You could write a whole dissertation on this report,” Fazlullah Qaisrani, a 
consultant and specialist with Sindh affairs, told me toward the end of our interview. 
Fazlullah Qaisrani was referencing Pieter Lieftinck’s report on the water resources of 
West Pakistan and the effect it had on development within the country. Consisting of 
three volumes, each of which are several hundred pages long, the report provides an 
analysis of how the country can be developed to implement economic growth.  
Lieftinck’s report is exhaustive. It covers in detail several dimensions of water 
resources development in West Pakistan. However, it does align with what Ferguson had 
discussed in terms of apolitical development. Throughout the document, the authors base 
their findings on a methodology that only discusses the technical issues of Pakistan; the 
politics of Pakistan are neglected. For example, World Bank consultants gathered data 
through conducting surveys on farming practices in the sample areas. When examining 
the requirements for irrigation water needs, it was determined by three factors: cropping 
pattern, crop water requirements, and cropping intensity. What informed these factors 
included analyses of the agriculture sector, and it all surrounded requirements to grow 
food.  
When the report was published in 1968, Lieftinck’s approach to dams in Pakistan 
is much like the views established by the World Bank when proposing development 
programs and projects in Lesotho. Ferguson (1994) argued that the state is viewed as a 
machine that implements development programs, which are apolitical tools for 
delivering—in this case—agricultural inputs and engineering economic growth. After 
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reading Lieftinck’s report, his suggestions also follow this same logic posited by 
Ferguson.  
 The central message of the report maintains Ferguson’s argument about 
governmentality in development discourse. For the authors of the report, dams and other 
water resources infrastructure will act as a vessel to facilitate economic growth. In this 
case, West Pakistan’s economy will therefore be responsive to higher economic growth if 
policymakers follow the authors’ suggestions.  
The report is divides programs into divisions of yearlong periods. Whether it is 
for tube wells3 or other projects, the authors stress the importance of implementing 
programs to kick-start the economy. These statements follow under similar critiques of 
Ferguson’s premise of governmentality. Attention should be directed toward the report’s 
discussion of the Tarbela and Mangla Dams. For the authors, they viewed it as the “most 
critical meeting point” between agriculture and power that justified the dam (p. 69). With 
Mangla and Tarbela Dam, two choices are made in terms of national planning. Either the 
dams could release water during the kharif4 season for irrigation use during the rabi 
season, or it could maintain a steady flow for hydropower (Lieftinck, et al., 1968).   
The technical solution to the issue of developing Pakistan once again falls into 
development for the sake of inclusion into the global economy.  
It follows that agricultural output must grow nearly as fast as the total output of 
the economy as a whole simply to meet increasing domestic demands. If it grows 
at less than this rate, then domestic consumption eats into the surpluses that were 
previously available for export. (Lieftinck, et al., 1968, p. 19)  
                                                
3 A tube well is a pipe that bores into the ground to access an underground aquifer.  
4 The Pakistani and Indian cropping season is divided into two seasons: kharif refers to the crop season 
from July through October during the southwest monsoon, and the rabi is during the winter season. 
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Building a large-scale dam in this case reinforces the premise of development for the 
purpose of involvement into the global economy.  
 
Pakistan continues technical, engineering views 
In the introduction of Lieftinck’s report, he urged that West Pakistan should continue the 
process of future development past 1975, which is when the report’s proposed two Five 
Year Plan periods would cease (Lieftinck, et al., 1968). This was a strategy that Pakistan 
followed since, as Figure 3 shows, dams have emerged along the Indus System. In this 
section, I examine documents published by the Government of Pakistan in regards to 
water and power generations and their plans to development. In addition, I discuss the 
strategy of WAPDA in the Vision 2025 that was released in 2003. Because of the 
difficulty in accessing WAPDA’s strategy, I relied upon news articles and other accounts 
printed during the time of Musharraf’s administration. 
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Figure 3: Locations of dams along the Indus System (WAPDA, 2014). 
 
Planning Commission in Pakistan 
Pakistan’s Vision 2025, presented by Pakistan’s Ministry of Planning, Development, and 
Reform, announced that it was designed to address the increasing water and energy needs 
in the country (WAPDA, 2014). One of the seven pillars was providing energy, water, 
and food security for the nation-state. The report attributed the damages from its energy 
shortfall as a four to seven percent loss in the country’s GDP. Almost 30 percent of the 
population is without electricity, the report adds. To increase electricity access in the 
country, the report proposed to add 25,000 MW by 2025 through an energy mix of oil, 
gas, hydro, coal, nuclear, wind, and biomass.  
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In order to lessen the electrical gap in the country, the report commits to 
completing the Diamer Bhasha5 and Dasu dams. Although the planning commission’s 
report does not discuss in depth the Dasu Dam, WAPDA does offer its thorough report on 
its website. Dasu Dam is projected to emit an annual 7,284 tons of carbon dioxide and is 
located in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province within the Kohistan District. It is partially 
funded by the World Bank, WAPDA, and the Chinese government (WAPDA, 2014; 
Dawn, 2017). Consultants for the project are Japanese and Turkish experts. WAPDA 
officials claim the project will provide cheap electricity and also improve the living 
standards of local people who are dislocated since they will be moved to a new town with 
modern facilities, as well as provide them with jobs during the construction process 
(WAPDA, 2014). 
In addition, the dam will improve the tourism sector in Kohistan and Gilgit 
Baltistan. In the Dasu Dam report, there is discussion about the social demographics of 
those who would be affected by the development. However, the section paints a 
population who is more in need of this project than the rest of the country’s energy needs 
since it would provide a high level of economic growth and economic opportunities. 
Although census data cited by WAPDA perceives people in the Dasu area as poor, at the 
same time the agency is also aware that “people in the area do not consider themselves 
poor; they see themselves as a lower middle class agrarian society” (p. 5-24). 
Nevertheless, the dam project is seen as a technical boost to the area in not only 
upgrading their access to modern conveniences that can also support Pakistan’s hope for 
a tourism industry, since there are numerous cultural artifacts near the dam, especially 
                                                
5 Diamer Bhasha will be discussed later in Chapter V 
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two ancient mosques (WAPDA, 2014). What is important of this information published 
about the social demographics is that WAPDA believes the Dasu Dam will impact the 
area positively. Once again, it is possible to see this discourse follow similar logic of 
Ferguson’s governmentality argument about Lesotho. This project is viewed as an 
apolitical approach to inject economic growth into the Dasu area.  
Returning to the planning commission report, foreign technical and economic 
contributions from China—through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—is 
claimed that it would “serve as a backbone of the energy strategy to overcome power 
crisis in Pakistan (p. 61). Besides Chinese financial assistance, CPEC will additionally 
provide increased technical assistance in Pakistan, thus making it a more technocratic 
decision.   
The report also looks to reservoirs to help as the country experiences climate 
change. Since 75 percent of the country’s water supply is rain-fed from its three months 
of monsoon rain, the report commits the country in building new reservoirs. These 
reservoirs will provide water for the agriculture, industrial, and domestic sectors. The 
language of this commitment is of interest. The Planning Commission’s report added that 
reservoirs are needed since the water ends up running to the sea. This statement ignores 
the purpose of water flows wherein water carries sediment to provide deltas—as well as 
downstream terrain—with necessary sediment. Furthermore, centralized large-scale 
infrastructure projects, such as reservoirs, are technocratic in nature. There are two ways 
of meeting water-related needs: hard path, such as large-scale infrastructure; and soft 
path, investment in decentralized facilities (Wolff & Gleick, 2002). Embedded within 
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hard paths, such as large-scale reservoirs, are premises rooted in engineering principles. 
This includes dams that are supported in the Planning Commission’s Vision 2025 report.  
The planning commission report, as well as the WAPDA report on the Dasu Dam, 
are examples of technocratic, apolitical approaches to finding solutions toward the 
country’s water and energy crises. These approaches are justified because large-scale 
dam projects will work toward providing a stable percentage of energy into the country’s 
energy mix and will provide economic growth to the affected areas. These government 
arguments follow technocratic as they are presented as rational and scientific planning. 
The following subsection will discuss the role of WAPDA in cultivating and maintaining 
knowledge within Pakistan.   
 
Knowledge management  
Lilienthal believed a regional dam water resources bureaucracy, such as the TVA, was 
important because it provides more access for the population it affects (Ekbladh, 2002). 
He was not the only one who saw regional development being supported through local 
governmental agencies of knowledge possession. During the late 1960s, the United States 
invited representatives throughout the world to learn about the secrets of water resources 
development the United States used (Stamm, 1967). Furthermore, in Lieftinck’s report, 
he encouraged Pakistan to continue re-evaluating its water resources every five years. For 
Pakistan, WAPDA has filled both roles. It was established in 1958 and was empowered 
to establish the construction of energy generation infrastructure and water resources 
management. The agency distributes energy to about 88 percent of Pakistan and owns 54 
percent of the electrical power generation. Nowadays, WAPDA also performs a wide 
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range of duties. From sponsoring activities—such as bodybuilding and cricket teams—to 
housing schemes and colleges, it is a well-known organization. WAPDA, in its own 
words, is a major contributor to the progress of the country in the engineering field 
(WAPDA, 2015).  
 The establishment of WAPDA as the de facto water and energy resources 
management institution can be seen not just when it was established but about ten years 
later. Once the Indus Water Treaty was signed by India and Pakistan, WAPDA received a 
large sum of money, which made it the most funded agency in the country with the 
exception of military branches (Akhter, 2015). This can be seen as an early empowering 
of the agency by international organizations since it created an organization in which 
money and knowledge can flow through.  
Furthermore, WAPDA functions as a research institute that informs policymakers, 
as well as an agency that collects data to plan future water and energy projects 
(Bandaragoda, 1993; Mustafa, 2010). The strength of its research abilities is reinforced 
throughout Pakistan, where there are WAPDA housing schemes, training institutes, and 
universities. In fact, in 2016, current WAPDA chairman, retired Lt. Gen. Muzammil 
Hussain, announced that the agency would establish a university of engineering and 
technology and a postgraduate college in the vicinity of Tarbela Dam (Dawn, 2016). Just 
as Goldman argued that the World Bank established hegemony of certain disciplines in 
its organization, WAPDA’s reputation as a research organization is reinforced through 
establishment of a university.  
These are a few themes of note that illustrates the organization as an important 
agency within Pakistan in terms of knowledge management. This purpose illustrates 
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WAPDA as an agency that operates as a bureaucracy as characterized by Weber and 
maintains a knowledge hierarchy that Goldman (2001, 2006) discussed. 
 
WAPDA’s Vision 
Working with the argument that WAPDA is a bureaucratic institution apparent in 
Weber’s argument, it proves useful to look inside the organization’s commitment, titled 
Vision 2025, to implement a number of hydropower infrastructure. This example shows 
how the bureaucratic institution of WAPDA justifies its development commitment 
through technocratic discourses.  
General Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan from 2001 to 2008, was in his 
military attire when he announced the WAPDA’s plan to spend $45 billion to get 
Pakistan back on track to closing its energy gap and prepare for the explosive population 
increase the country would experience in 2025. Musharraf was confident in the 
leadership that Lieutenant General Zulfiqar Ali Khan would exemplify in leading 
WAPDA to this goal.  
 Whereas previous dam and water resources developments in Pakistan were rooted 
in technocracy trumping politics, the case of WAPDA’s Vision 2025 is an illustration of 
the government delivering upon development through its military as a way to avoid 
politics. Official documentation on this seminar is missing, but there still are online news 
articles that covered the strategy. The purpose of the seminar, then WAPDA chairman 
said, was to inform potential national and international investors about hydropower 
projects the agency planned.  
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 The developmental state of Pakistan at the time of this seminar was abysmal, 
according to General Zulfiqar Ali Khan. The seminar discussed three phases. All of these 
dam projects placed priority in constructing large-scale dams. In fact, the strategy had 
been described as the most ambitious development program in the country’s history. The 
ineffectual infrastructure was far below its surface water reservoir potential. Because of 
sediment build up, Tarbela, Mangla, and Chashma reservoirs lost a capacity of 4.26 
MAF, and its loss was projected to a further 5.94 MAF by 2010. A $45 billion investment 
in hydropower dams would be necessary to confront the lack of water for agriculture 
(Rizvi, 2001). WAPDA does not have information about this ambitious development 
program, however. Because of this lack of information on the program, I have relied on 
newspaper articles published about the strategy. However, strategy was created without 
input from those possessing knowledge from other disciplines. In addition, the strategy 
works with the assumption of utilizing a hard path will provide the country with water 
and energy security.  
The decision making process behind this strategy involved technocratic 
knowledge sourced from the Pakistani military. During Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s 
initial period of leadership in the 1990s, he asked the Pakistani Army to manage WAPDA 
(Rizvi, 2001). This shift reflects more of a move that recognizes that the military, as 
Ayesha Siddiqa (2007) and Shuja Nawaz (2008) have explored, is more capable of 
handling technocratic development planning—as apparent in Ayub Khan’s leadership 
discussed earlier.  
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Conclusion 
When Ayub Khan led a coup that brought him to leadership, Akhter (2015) argued it was 
the moment that ushered in Pakistan’s developmental state, and, under his presidency, 
Pakistan experienced a “golden age of development” (Weiss, 2014, p. 179). During this 
time, the economy had grown, which included industrialism (Weiss, 2014; McCartney, 
2010). Much of this, McCartney (2010) argued, is because of the state’s engagement with 
financing the development projects. It should also be added that during Ayub Khan’s 
presidency, Pakistan saw the construction of the Tarbela Dam—which is the world’s 
largest earth-fill dam. In addition to providing a picture of what sort of discourses drove 
dam development in Pakistan, focusing on the periods during Ayub Khan’s presidency 
shows the most activity of dam development from the international community.  
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CHAPTER IV  
PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON DAMS  
“When in doubt, we blame India,” a well-respected ambassador and researcher at 
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) told me, in a half-joking tone, after 
hearing about my research. Although I did not have a chance to interview him because of 
his active schedule, that one line has reverberated in my mind. Essentially, this comment 
represents a justification for supporting dams in Pakistan along the Indus River system in 
part for an uneasiness and distrust targeted at India. So, despite dams having a sort of 
technocratic purpose, they also have a justification based on preemptive politics since 
politicians are not to be trusted.  
In Chapter III, I discussed the privileging role that technocratic expertise 
historically had in Pakistan’s decision-making regarding dams and development. This 
was apparent through the lead-up and signatures of the Indus Water Treaty, the 
cataloging of water resources sites by the World Bank, and current perspectives held by 
Pakistani agencies regarding water resources. In this chapter, I draw on primary data I 
collected through semi-structured interviews in Pakistan to show that dams are perceived 
as sustainable infrastructure to solve the country’s future—and current—water resources 
and energy problem. But when justifying dams as sustainable infrastructure, most 
professionals justified it through the perception that dams, as development infrastructure, 
are technical and apolitical. Although technocratic discourse works under the assumption 
that politics does not permeate into their discourse, others have argued that technocratic 
discourse does in fact engage with politics. This is a case where support for dams that is 
anchored in technocratic discourse has politics in the background.   
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Professionals define sustainable development 
The planning and development of future hydropower sites in Pakistan is an investment in 
inexpensive, dependable, and environmentally friendly infrastructure, according to 
WAPDA. Furthermore, the agency said, there is a need to increase the hydropower share 
to the overall energy mix in Pakistan to create sustainable economic development in the 
country (WAPDA, 2015). It is clear that, for WAPDA, dams are sustainable. However, I 
wanted to understand how professionals in Pakistan define sustainable development. 
Before discussing dams and sustainable development with professionals in Pakistan, it is 
important to note that all professionals spoke about sustainable development in similar 
ways. Each participant viewed sustainable development as something that not only meets 
technical definitions in terms of inexpensive renewable energy, but also something that 
should not divide the country in political terms. That being said, differences did emerge 
whenever I discussed sustainable development with participants. In this section, by 
engaging with participant interviews, I will discuss how participants viewed the concept 
of sustainable development. This discussion will provide a necessary background before 
talking about how dams can be considered sustainable.   
 The most technical definition of the phrase sustainable development came from 
Majid Ibrahim, an engineer and researcher with a membership organization that had an 
office in Islamabad and actively works in Pakistan. In fact, a few times he corrected me 
whenever I mistakenly called his organization a nongovernmental organization. He said it 
was instead a member-run organization that receives donations from donors to maintain 
its operations of educating the people of Pakistan about environmental issues and 
  80 
development. For Ibrahim, he said the principles of sustainable development are “very 
clear.” It’s a technical definition that requires a project generate energy that doesn’t affect 
the environment or its local conditions and should be a long-term operation. Through 
environmental assessments, he added, the construction process can also be sustainable. 
Essentially, he views sustainable development as a very clear concept. It should not affect 
natural resources once installed and, if designed carefully, dams can be sustainable.  
 Hamza Malik used to be a chairman at WAPDA, and he later found himself in 
political leadership of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Today he serves as an executive director of 
a scientific institute. He earned a Bachelors of Science from Lahore Engineering, but 
speaks with pride that he was awarded an honorary doctorate, which he added his son 
tells him he earned from a lifetime of working in science. For him, he argued, in addition 
to factors that everyone else said, that sustainable development is something that must be 
agreeable politically, offers an affordable price for infrastructure and consumers, and 
does not adversely affect other natural resources.  
 Wasseem Anwar works for an international nongovernmental organization that 
focuses on environmental issues and studied engineering and business. For him, he looks 
at it in terms of how long the project can be functional. “It’s sustainable if it can supply 
for 50 to 75 years,” he said. No matter what the project is, for this participant, the lifespan 
of a project is a priority when considering sustainability.   
However, Naseer Mirza, executive director for another nongovernmental 
organization in Islamabad, perceived sustainable development as something that is not 
just restricted to infrastructure. For him, sustainable development should not be harmful 
to the environment and not place financial stress on a country or its population. In terms 
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of the context of Pakistan, he wanted to see two dimensions be added to the concept of 
sustainable development. The first, he said, is that development projects have to be 
equally beneficial for the poor and the disadvantaged. Projects have to be considered 
politically, not just in technical terms. Mirza viewed many projects as detached from their 
political impact on poorer populations in the country. This concern is accented in his 
assessment of including the project construction process.  
Secondly, Mirza said, projects should not jeopardize the political interests of a 
country. Because some projects have political implications, he views dams as not just 
technical solutions. It does not have simply socio-economic but serious political factors. 
An example of how downstream cutoffs can become political is apparent through the 
relationship between Pakistan and India. “India brought us on our knees when they 
stopped the water in canals,” he said. From this perspective, there are downstream effects 
to dam projects, which can increase political pressure, as apparent with his comment on 
India’s upstream development. Pakistan has a history of not applying sustainable 
principles in its development, Mirza added. Those who are downstream from large-scale 
projects have historically been negatively affected. With this track record, Mirza holds 
some suspicion of whether Pakistan can implement dams as sustainable infrastructure, 
especially since a large portion of the population lives near the Indus River.  
 
Dams and sustainable development 
In the previous section, I discussed how participants I interviewed viewed sustainable 
development. Overall, there was a shared understanding of what is meant for a project to 
be considered sustainable. First, it must be something that can last a long period of time. 
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This ensures that the project can be financially stable and pay off the investment. 
Secondly, the project must not irreplaceably use resources. What is missing when 
applying a technical view that assumes an apolitical stance is the fact that downstream 
effects can become political, according to one participant.  
In this section, I will discuss how participants viewed dams as technical, yet 
sustainable, infrastructure. Dams are seen as a technical solution because it meets several 
needs that Pakistan will face in the upcoming future. However, that means dams need 
careful planning, which requires technical expertise to navigate through some conflicts it 
could face. Lastly, dams are seen as a step on what professionals view as a linear pathway 
to sustainable development.  
 
It’s technically right  
For Hamza Malik, the water resources of Pakistan are the lifeblood of the country. It 
would be foolish to think otherwise.  For him, dams are not just sustainable it’s a 
necessity.  
We have not yet found gas, oil, anything of that nature. But there were two 
prominent: Indus Basin, the 60,000 square miles of rich soils; and Indus River—
the sixth largest river in the world… what we inherited was a system of canals, 
barrages, and operating those systems so for us there were problems. The problem 
was that our river system was variable in flows. 
Malik views dams as an instrument that is necessary for the country to harness its only 
natural resource advantage: water. Furthermore, it seems rational to him that Pakistan 
would continue the pathway of dams as development when it was the main infrastructure 
that was left behind by the British. In fact, Malik was not the only one who held pride in 
Pakistan’s irrigation system. While I attended the Lahore University of Management 
  83 
Sciences water conference, many spoke highly of the irrigation system, even calling it the 
most complex in the world.  
Dams may be the lifeblood of the country but it is also a step on the ladder toward 
sustainable development. “Solar power is for the rich countries,” Hamid Ali told me. For 
him, solar panels are good for small-scale development, such as powering fans in 
villages. It is possible to see this argument align with linear models of development. 
Dams are considered an early—yet important—step for Pakistan in sustainable 
development. Fazlullah Qaisrani agreed with solar power seen as a pathway to 
sustainable development further down the road. For him, solar and wind power are 
sustainable and renewable resources, but it comes with high costs of importing experts 
and technology.  
  With more than 40,000 MW in potential within the country, Majid Ibrahim 
viewed dams as a cheaper form of energy generation. Furthermore, the infrastructure’s 
effectiveness can be maximized and negative externalities avoided to achieve utility 
through Pakistan’s technological system. “If you control that water, according to very 
good forecasts that we have, if you have lower rainfall, just keep water in the dam and 
save it according to scientifically forecasts,” he said. 
 Mirza questions the discourse that emerges from professionals who support dams, 
on the other hand. “One side of the economic benefits are presented. There are counter 
arguments,” he said. If dams are built according to their technical specifications, it does 
destroy resources, which is a contradiction of how professionals defined sustainable 
development.   
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Dams need careful planning to be sustainable 
The inter-provincial conflict between Sindh and the Punjab provinces emerged several 
times when talking with participants. Planning for dam sites should require awareness of 
the historical relationship between the provinces of Sindh and Punjab and the negative 
externalities of dam development.  
“It depends for dams as sustainable development. For reservoirs holding dams, 
they should be downstream and upstream for hydropower—run of river. That will help 
manage political conflicts in the country—for example between regions of Sindh and 
Punjab,” Anwar told me. 
 Careful planning should include the decision of where to locate future sites for 
dams, some participants noted. For Waseem Anwar, there are better alternatives for water 
resources management than just constructing a dam with a large reservoir. For Anwar, 
just like many Pakistanis, he has pride in the complex irrigation and canal system the 
country inherited from the British. Because of this canal system, dams should be planned 
more along the lines of hydropower rather than managing water resources during the 
climate change era. However, he added that if dams are the best solution for the country, 
the place of the dam is more than just looking at the physical landscape of the terrain. By 
this, he means that for dams that have a large reservoir, they should be downstream and 
run of river dams should be located in the north. Through careful planning of reservoirs, 
it will help manage the political tensions between Sindhi and Punjabi people.  
 Especially for dams to be considered in the sustainable development period, each 
dam must possess a relocation program as part of its plan. Malik, a former province 
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governor and manager at WAPDA, told me that if any people are affected to better the 
country through development projects, those affected people should benefit more.  
 
Multi-purpose uses 
Although there is a long period for a dam to be functional—participants estimated about 
seven years—it still appears as a more efficient form of sustainable infrastructure as the 
country experiences effects from climate change. This is apparent in the support for dams 
based on its multiple uses, whereas other energy sources like solar or wind were 
dismissed since it only has one function. For a financially stressed country like Pakistan 
that is also water stressed, dams can provide water storage while generating energy.  
 Hamza Malik said hydropower plants are more efficient infrastructure compared 
to other renewable energy. This is because there are three uses for dams, which can 
include agricultural, power, and flood management dimensions. When compared to other 
energy infrastructure—which includes run-of-river dams—hydropower dams with 
reservoirs provide more use.  
 Furthermore, he added, Pakistan is in need of increasing its agriculture yield. 
Pakistan’s kharif season—summer—experiences higher levels of flow in the Indus with 
84 percent runoff. During the winter—or rabi—season, flow decreases to 16 percent. 
Because of these radically different numbers, Malik said Pakistan needs to address it to 
ensure there is irrigation water for the rabi season. He said that Pakistan only needs about 
66 percent of the Indus flow for irrigation during the kharif season, so nearly 20 percent 
is lost in runoff that should be saved for the rabi season. “The water is lost! It’s not 
available when you need it.”   
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 Some participants noted that Pakistan does have wind corridors and areas of the 
country that are sunny near-year round, but a one-purpose energy solution like solar is 
not something that Pakistan should invest its money in. For one reason, Hamid Ali said, 
is because the country just doesn’t have the money in its coffers for something like that:  
But the solar energy is more green [sic] since there are more sunny days in 
Pakistan. At the moment, the technology is not at that level so that solar is 
expensive also… So maybe one day it would become cheaper and capture the 
potential and therefore although Pakistan uses them in the poorer regions.  
Because of the high cost of solar and wind energy, hydropower is supported as a more 
sustainable option because the country not only has some of the expertise, but for a 
country that is not as wealthy as Western countries, participants said, hydropower can be 
a good first step toward sustainable development. This is because climate change will be 
affecting the country in a way that hydropower is designed for: water retention and 
sustaining its agriculture.  
 
Can provide cheaper rates for consumers 
Inexpensive rates are important for a country where there is a high rate of electricity 
theft1, especially since tariffs are then used to fund future projects (Mustafa, 2010). 
Professionals I spoke with hoped to address the electricity theft issue from a supply side, 
meaning that if the government invested in more affordable energy, therefore providing a 
cheaper tariff for its customers, it would deter theft.   
Hamid Ali said the government is losing money at each unit sold because of 
political motives. Since the government subsidizes energy prices, energy projects should 
                                                
1 The Pakistani government identified electricity theft as a problem and seeks to punish those who steal 
electricity through the establishment of a judicial system of handling it case-by-case and is codified through 
the Theft Control and Recovery Act of 2016 (Government of Pakistan, 2016).  
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be constructed on how much electricity would cost at a per unit basis. Energy sourced 
from hydropower projects, for Hamid Ali, makes the most sense for providing low-cost 
tariffs for customers. Hamid Ali said thermal energy per unit is about 14 to 16 rupees2 per 
unit. However, hydropower energy is projected at two to three cents per unit3.   
 Malik elaborated further on the inexpensive rates for customers with hydropower. 
He said the next cheapest option is gas, which is seven cents per unit. He added that 
according to the letter of intents for solar and wind energy projects in the country, 
proposed rates surpass 20 cents per unit.   
 Fazlullah also commented that solar panels are five times more expensive than 
hydropower and three times more than coal power. It is expensive because the technology 
is imported from other countries. “As far as we are importing, it will be expensive,” he 
said. He was also critical of the use of wind power because of their low capacity and 
because the technology is also imported from other countries. Since there has not been 
any private—foreign or domestic—the state would be responsible for investing in these 
energy forms. Because of that, hydropower, he said, is the most sustainable option 
considering the prices.  
 
Size matters for dams 
Controversy is associated with size of dams. After the Narmada Valley Project in India 
mobilized international environmental networks, the international development 
community exercised more caution when supporting large-scale dams4. 
                                                
2 As of 2017, the conversion rate would be about 14 to 16 US cents.  
3 This participant originally used rupees. I converted to US currency, which as of 2017, was rated at 1 rupee 
to 1 US cent. 
4 ICOLD defines large-scale dams as 15 meters tall. 
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Malik remembers traveling to a workshop in Washington D.C. during a period of 
international uneasiness about large-scale dams. World Bank officials invited him to 
come to the United States to speak at the workshop, where protestors were confronting 
the attending professionals, suggesting them to support the implementation of small-scale 
dams instead of larger ones. Malik recalled that he then took the stage and presented why 
small-scale dams were not useful for Pakistan.  
Now what happened there were environmentalists and protestors, who said ‘large 
is ugly and small is beautiful.’ I stood up and said, ‘Gentlemen, I have a problem. 
We have a river that becomes 10 miles wide during the floods… [can a] small 
irrigation project be built on a river that is 10 miles wide?’ Nobody said anything. 
‘Well, could somebody tell me how to build a small powerhouse on a river that 
large? So let’s agree that there are certain things that nature has made and there 
are specific ways that those resources can be developed. A large river cannot be 
developed by a small dam… If you want to do that development you have to do it 
thousands of times because there are many villages.’  
The World Bank workshop was also an attempt to include other professionals from other 
disciplines, he said, by including social scientists and environmentalists.  
The international development’s shift from large-scale dams to the more 
supposedly environmental-friendly approach of small-scale dams is, in a way, resulting in 
a sort of inequity for Pakistan, according to Malik.  
It’s not fair that China, USA, and India have been allowed to dam their waterways 
with dams that environmentalists said would have destroyed the country. If a 
large dam would have destroyed those countries, they would have been destroyed 
several hundred times over… This should settle the argument. Because they can 
store three years flow of Colorado River. 850 days of flow of Colorado River. 
They have not done damage. They have done good. The people who say 
[otherwise]? They are living somewhere—even dreams do not give such 
irresponsible and unsustainable conclusions. 
For Malik, this unfair principle that Pakistan must adhere to compared to India, China, 
and the United States represented an international inequality based on political discourse 
rather than rational, technocratic discourse. The United States, India, and China are able 
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to have a safety net of water storage, yet Pakistan continues to suffer from international 
pressure on large-scale dam opposition: “If it’s so dangerous that I should contain myself 
to fewer water days and agriculture yield because your children will die. If this was to 
happen, it should’ve happened in China, Colorado? Why is it that only Pakistan should be 
singled out for this?” Although Malik views the discourse that now restricts Pakistan 
from receiving international support for dams irrational and based on political discourse, 
it is possible to see how his own discourse—which includes exaggerating language—has 
political connotations to it.  
While the international community discusses the role of large-scale dams in 
development, time is meanwhile running out for Pakistani dam local expertise. Fazlullah 
Qaisrani told me that if Pakistan wants to plan and build large-scale dams, it would have 
to involve foreign experts. Although the country does have capable and competent 
experts, gone are the days of the working professionals who worked on past large-scale 
dams. “Mangla and Tarbela intellect generation is over,” he told me. “They studied 
Kalabagh and then left.” In the meantime, in order to plan and construct the Neelum-
Jhelum Dam, located a few kilometers from the Line of Control between India and 
Pakistan’s claim of the conflicted territory of Kashmir, it required collaboration with the 
Chinese. In addition, the political relationship influenced the Chinese on the project since 
the project was located in the Azad Kashmir province. Niazi told me that the decision to 
have the Chinese construct the Neelum-Jhelum Dam was also because of its location in 
Kashmir and to avoid Indian conflict. One broader issue that stems from the completion 
of the Neelum-Jhelum Dam project is that works as a legal claim to the Neelum River, 
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which some have said is under threat from India’s development on the river (Kiani, 
2011).  
 
Can provide a step toward more sustainable projects 
Many participants suggested that dams would be a step toward more sustainable projects. 
It was an argument that seemed reminiscent to linear stages of development. In this case, 
early stages to sustainable development required harnessing the indigenous resources—
such as water for hydropower—before generating energy from solar, which could be 
considered as the final stage in sustainable development.  
 Despite Hamid Khan’s concerns stated earlier about solar power only for “rich 
countries like the United States,” he does conclude that solar is the ultimate end goal for 
sustainable energy generation. For right now, however, solar power is best used 
according to scalability. This means dams have the capability to provide electricity that 
can be reliable for a national grid. Solar power, on the other hand, is useful for smaller 
villages. As an example, he told me how it is best to run something like a fan in a village. 
“Maybe one day it would become cheaper… We should be hopeful that one day we 
would be able to harness this for our industry and domestic energy needs,” he told me. 
Dams for Hamid Khan, serve as a step on a linear pathway to pure sustainable 
development.   
 Hamza Malik agreed with Hamid Khan when he criticized solar power options to 
me as: “options, which filthy rich can afford. We must pursue hydro.” To be fair, 
hydropower projects do, of course, come with a high price tag as well. It is a price tag 
that Majid Abdul said is worth the investment because it can pay for itself quickly. This 
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is evident in the case of Tarbela Dam. Tarbela Dam was a project that was financially 
supported after India and Pakistan accepted the terms of the Indus Water Treaty as a way 
to replace the loss of the Indus System’s three eastern rivers to India. The agreement 
secured about $895 million to construct two large dams and other irrigation 
infrastructure, all financed from grants from Global North nation-states. The price tag, 
however, began to rise, which worried the international donor community (Akhter, 2015).   
Tarbela was at a huge cost but it has repaid itself. Agricultural water is cheap but 
for the sake of electricity, it has repaid itself two or three times over. I have gone 
over the numbers many times. If you take the debt for building a good dam, it will 
pay back. Tarbela was classic because it paid off the interest so right now we are 
receiving free electricity.  
Abdul is not the only one who believes dam projects can repay themselves, despite 
drawing money from foreign investors. For those who support the high price tag that 
comes with multi-use hydroelectric projects, the case of Tarbela Dam paying off its debts 
is an indication that these projects should not be dismissed with the argument of debt.  
 
Dams, climate change— and politics? 
In the previous section, I discussed how professionals viewed dam building as an 
apolitical, technical solution for development in a sustainable and climate change context. 
However, in this section, I will show how these ostensible apolitical solutions actually 
have political ramifications.  
Although dams seem to fit as sustainable development in a climate change 
context, it is more complex to participants. In fact, those who supported the infrastructure 
were aware that it could also increase disaster. “Can your solution be a part of the 
problem as well?” Mirza asked me. “What if a dam could not sustain the flow? It would 
be devastating.” During my interviews, participants recognized that climate change-
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related natural disasters are primarily human-made disasters and dams are a part of that 
problem—although they are at the same time packaged as solutions. Furthermore, dams 
for the sake of Pakistan would have to be solely for flood management.  
 A lot of climate change discussion focuses on the issues of carbon dioxide 
emissions. Pakistan, for the most part, missed curtailing its emissions targets, as well as 
failed to meet any of the Millennium Development Goals set forth by the United Nations. 
There are opportunities to develop clean energy in the country, Bina Siddiqui, an 
environmental journalist covering South Asia, said, but Pakistan’s relationship with 
China has continued a commitment to dirty energy. Bina Siddiqui was the only female I 
spoke with but spoke with the most disdain about Pakistani global political relationship. 
Although she was a journalist, she earned a graduate degree in England. The relationship, 
according to her, embarrassed Pakistan at the Paris Climate Talks in 2015.  
At the Climate Talk in Paris, the delegates from Pakistan wouldn’t even make any 
promises because they had been waiting until [China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor] was finalized. I think our leaders understand the importance of climate 
change and are preparing for it. They attended Paris. It’s just not a priority. From 
a planning perspective, the “business-as-usual” perspective of Pakistan’s leaders 
is putting the country in a difficult position. 
Bina Siddiqui’s recalling of Pakistani officials attending a global climate change 
conference with restrictions is an illustration that shows how there is a political 
background to development projects. Pakistan’s planning objectives are continuing to 
change the physical landscape by operating under “business as usual,” she added. This is 
apparent in the over-development of Lahore with its constant construction. When I 
traveled through Lahore, I noticed the heavy construction that I had been told contributed 
to a large amount of pollution and carbon emissions. In fact, there was some outcry 
within the country for some of the construction was destroying cultural artifacts of the 
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city. Bina Siddiqui said this was turning Lahore into Karachi—referencing the 
commercial megacity in Pakistan. “During the summer, it’s going to result in a high heat 
wave period not to mention ruin ground water resources. It’s not sustainable planning.”  
 The Pakistani state is more interested in building larger projects, Bina Siddiqui 
added. There are a lot of smaller projects in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region. Smaller 
projects would be more effective, she said, but the government wants its projects to be 
visible for the whole country. These larger projects are a waste of money and just cause a 
lot of controversy, though. Large-scale projects, which are supported through technical 
knowledge, in reality, serve a political purpose.  
 Bina Siddiqui argued that these large projects have resulted in irreversible damage 
to the environment, which will become problematic as the climate change era continues. 
Such large projects are influenced through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. “The 
Chinese are pushing us with loans to do old technology. They are selling us projects that 
are low grade and the fossil fuel emissions are causing pollution. The public is being 
misled with these CPEC policies,” she told me.  
 Rather than pursuing large, technical projects such as dams with large reservoirs, 
she instead suggested more ecological alternatives. Bina Siddiqui said the Pakistani 
ecology is in need of restoration and the forests need protection to protect groundwater 
recharge. Business as usual development in Pakistan is instead causing damage to 
groundwater and other water bodies: “The Ravi [River] is filled with dead water because 
of all the construction that goes on in Lahore.”  
 Business as usual is evident in the bilateral development relationship between 
China and Pakistan. This is apparent, according to Fazlullah, in the construction of coal 
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plants. Pakistan agreed to the construction of very low-grade coal plants, he said, despite 
the rest of the world has critiqued the use of this low-grade coal.  “The Chinese want 
more coal power… We import coal, too. Now the world is moving from critical to super 
critical to ultra critical, but we are in the dangerous place with coal,” he said. Pakistan is 
investing in coal power due to political pressure from China. Because of this, Pakistan is 
committed to heavy pollution inherent in coal power although there is international 
pressure to pursue more sustainable options.  
Finding a balance of ecological protection and development is a tricky thing for 
Anwar. He recognized two threats that Pakistan faces. The first is the country’s security 
from terrorism and the second was poverty. He said that climate change resilience needs 
to be linked to poverty and food security and then there can be a discussion about 
development. Once government officials see this link, they will begin to decide from a 
better informed position.  
However, to solve poverty, Anwar added, there has to be some sort of 
development projects enacted as Pakistan experiences its population growth. With this in 
mind, development should take some priority over environmental protection. “With 
population growing and other factors, there is a need to implement some sort of 
development to eradicate poverty. We might need to focus more on development so 
people can eradicate poverty, then we can protect our environment,” he told me.  
During interviews with participants, they all felt the state should undertake dam 
projects, even though there has been a trend in other nation-states for private companies 
to build hydropower plants. Now, SinoHydro and Three Gorges Corporation—both of 
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which are Chinese corporations—are active in Pakistan, but there is not any other private 
interest in dam construction in Pakistan.  
“It’s always going have to be built by the government,” Hamid Ali told me. Part 
of this is because of disaster risk. Since 2010, Pakistan has experienced high-risk floods, 
and this is concerning for private enterprises that are investing in a six to seven year 
project, he said. The other reason why the government must take the risk of dam 
construction is evident with the fact that there is a security concern that affects foreign 
investment despite Pakistan’s potential investment opportunities5 (Khan & Ullah, 2015).  
“If you look at the floods that Pakistan has experienced—the 2010 and 2013—
they were so devastated that so much water was wasted and went to the sea,” Abdul told 
me. An important aspect of this quote is that he referred to water being wasted by going 
to the sea. For those in the Sindh region, it is important that the Indus flows to the sea for 
the health of the Indus Delta. Before the 20th century, average discharge of the Indus was 
3,000 cubic meters and a silt load of 250 million tons per year. Continued construction 
along the Indus River resulted in deterioration of the Indus Delta, which results in sea 
intrusion, since sediment is not able to flow from the mountainous ranges to the delta 
(Syvitski et al., 2013; Kalhoro et al., 2016).  
 
Climate change and water solutions 
During my internship at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, I attended a 
presentation led by a researcher from SDPI regarding the near future of water scarcity in 
Pakistan. Essentially, the researcher argued, if planetary carbon dioxide levels do not 
                                                
5 The issue of security and investment is discussed in Chapter VI with CPEC and security.  
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drastically change, Pakistan will experience a totally different rainfall pattern that will 
decimate its agricultural sectors, which includes its cotton industry. It was an ominous 
future the researcher was describing, yet for other researchers it was news they were used 
to hearing.  
 The higher rate of melting glaciers in Pakistan is another issue the country faces 
and will directly impact the amount of flow in the Indus River System since it is glacier-
fed, in addition to monsoon and snowmelt. World Bank researchers estimate that glacial 
runoff contributes 19.6 MAF to the total flow of the Upper Indus Basin (Yu et al., 2013). 
In other terms, Pakistan’s glacier area covers 17,000 km2 and is the largest mass of 
glaciers after the north and south poles. Glacier melts feed into more than fifty rivers in 
the country. In the absence of glacier melt, river flows will be hindered and significantly 
affect agriculture, industrial and residential water consumption, and hydropower 
generation (Rahman & Shaw, 2015). The glaciers are currently experiencing melting due 
to climate change. Warmer temperatures have been consistent and are projected to 
increase exponentially, which will affect the Himalaya-Karakoram-Hindu Kush glacial 
ranges. This creates increased stream flow in the country and is resulting in glacial 
retreating (Rasul et al., 2008). Using glacial melting as a reason for damming does not 
seem as an appropriate measure for the country for Bina Siddiqui. The country has not 
even measured the total area of glaciers in the country, she told me, so the government 
does not know how much will melt.   
 “Climate change will push Pakistan into a water starved category. To mitigate 
this, we need more reservoirs. Maybe not dams, though,” Bina Siddiqui told me. She is 
wary of dams because of the high cost that is associated with them. Therefore, even in a 
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climate change context, it is not a wise financial decision. Naseer Mirza, the civil 
engineer working with LEAD and WWF, agreed. With a country that has a high per 
capita debt, accepting foreign aid has costly strings attached. It means following along 
geopolitical strategies set forth by the donor. “There’s a political price, which is not often 
accounted for.” For example, he said, if Pakistan borrows from Saudi Arabia, then they 
would be asked to fight in Yemen. In this case, searching for donors to finance dams 
commits the government to donor conditionality. This concern of Mirza also seems to 
follow the concerns of Parenti’s catastrophic convergence. Parenti (2011) argued that 
climate violence would amplify during the era of climate change. This could appear as 
counter-terrorism tactics, as apparent with the continued War on Terrorism that United 
States involves itself and allies—like Pakistan. That means that, as signified by Mirza, 
accepting aid and financial support from donor countries can tie the government to 
increase their involvement in military conflicts.   
 In short, dams seemed to be too expensive as a saving grace for Pakistan in the 
upcoming era of climate change. Anwar noted that there were better alternatives than 
dams. The idea that there were better alternatives to dams emerged to a few other 
participants as well. Muballigh Mustafa, an academic who works out of England but 
frequently travels to Pakistan for research, was cautious in considering dams as 
sustainable or even renewable energy. For him, he said dams are too costly infrastructure 
for a climate change future. In addition, Mirza told me that if Pakistan were truly 
concerned about becoming water stressed, the government would consider confronting 
the water losses that occur from its canals. Overall, relying on dams is problematic for 
Mirza because “climate change can deceive you.”  
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Dams and natural disasters? 
Malik said when engineers rank floods, they do so based on statistical occurrence. 
Through this statistical ranking system, a 1:1 flood is annual. The floods of the past few 
years, he said, were a 1:10,000 year floods. Because of this, Pakistan needs to be 
prepared for more frequent floods, otherwise there could be massive population 
displacement. “What would have to be? A migrant society?” He asked me. “These floods 
happen and for that you have to be ready.” In this sense, dams should be a higher priority 
than protection of the environment because it can provide a sense of existential security.  
When asked if dams could manage against natural disasters, participants remarked 
they saw natural disasters caused by humanity. Dams, for example, can cause disasters. 
However, the role of dams could also provide a “buffer,” as Abdul told me, for floods. He 
referenced the 2010 and 2013 floods in which water was “wasted and went to the sea.” 
Despite a buffer role, dams need to be carefully designed in terms of where they will be 
located otherwise they could be deadly due to either increased snowmelt or earthquakes. 
Abdul also looked back at an incident decades ago when he said management was not 
trained for deciding on releasing flows. “He had to open the gates and many people died 
and lots of property damage as well. It’s difficult to predict natural disasters and on the 
climate side…” he told me. Nevertheless, he sees it as a necessity in the era of climate 
change, especially as drought increases in Pakistan.   
In addition, Hamid criticized the role of dams used for flood management and the 
motives of those who managed the planning process of dams. He pointed to Tarbela Dam 
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as proof of an ulterior motive. Before the construction, about 300,000 cusecs6 would run 
through the Sindh province every year. During flood seasons every 15 years, about 
500,000 cusecs would flow and did not cause much damage. This flow of water and 
sediment was the basis of the province’s agriculture industry. It recharged groundwater 
and provided silt and sediment to Sindhi farmers. After Tarbela was constructed, 
however, this changed. “You never know what you get… All [dam management 
officials] do is distribution for irrigation. That is the priority,” Hamid told me. His 
concern was that those who control the dam flow release only divert for irrigation and 
have ignored ecological or socio-economic concerns for water. It is a primarily technical 
approach to floods and water resources management, he said.  
Before I left my interview with Hamid, he provided me with some research7 he 
wrote about dams and Pakistan. His research provides an augmentation of what he spoke 
with me about since he had published these articles to raise awareness about the damage 
dams have done for so-called technical development. His research discussed how 
damming on the Indus River System has in reality worsened floods in Pakistan. There has 
been flood plain settlement where the Indus River System would flow through. This is a 
large reason for increased flood damage. Furthermore, the removal of forestlands that 
would absorb some of the floodwaters has been removed because of development.  
 
Without water management tools, all is lost 
In the previous section, I discussed how dams are observed at the intersection of climate 
change and politics. Professionals I spoke with either applied a technical argument in 
                                                
6 A unit of flow equal to one cubic foot per second 
7 To maintain anonymity of this participant, I will not provide a citation for his research. 
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why hydropower was a more sustainable option for Pakistan or critiqued support for 
dams as a narrow and technical mindset. In this section, I will present observations and 
themes that supported increased water resources in Pakistan.  
 There is a management problem right now in Pakistan that is necessary for large-
scale dams. Abdul said for large dams—such as Mangla and Tarbela—the country needs 
outside expertise to manage the dams. Without the expertise needed, it can increase the 
problem of dam failure. Mirza already considers dam management in the country 
abysmal. He told me that dam management does not have an understanding of the 
benefits and costs of the dam.  
At the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) water conference, 
speakers reminded water professionals and students in the audience of the importance of 
water management throughout the country. Those attending the conference seemed to not 
have any faith in the government to spearhead proper, neutral water management 
strategies undertaken by Pakistan. This aligned with some participants I spoke with when 
they pointed to the poor state of Pakistan’s canal system and the amount of water that is 
lost in the system from poor management and seepage. Without these water resources 
management strategies, investing in large-scale infrastructure was futile. However, the 
conference discussed how LUMS students are confronting this water resources 
management problem. During a classroom visit, LUMS students presented drone cameras 
that were controlled through Microsoft XBOX 360 video game consoles. The purpose of 
the drone camera was to fly along canals to observe how much water was flowing in it at 
a given time. Furthermore, it would inspect the state of the canals.  
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 The World Wildlife Foundation of Pakistan and Nestle sponsored the conference. 
Although members of the conference spoke dismissingly about Nestle and its history with 
Lahore, a tour of the water treatment center provided participants a chance to observe 
how Nestle, a multinational corporation based in Switzerland, sells bottled water to the 
nearly 10 million people who live in Lahore. Nestle arranged for the conference 
attendants to visit their water treatment plant in Sheikhupura, an industrial city outside of 
Lahore. The tour illustrated the company’s dedication to treat water and its bottling 
practices despite the falling water table where the treatment facility is located. The 
purpose of the field trip was to observe a solution to water shortages and how the 
multinational corporation treats water that is otherwise brackish and polluted. What 
motivated the tour was for the company to showcase its state-of-the-art methods in water 
treatment and the group I was in was pressured to not leave until reporting to the 
marketing and communications department of the impression the plant had on us for a 
public relations video.  
 Although Nestle considered their water treatment to be a success for the Lahore 
region, the broader issue of privatizing water resources in the country will not occur in 
the country, according to Hamid Ali. He told me that Pakistanis are terrible with how 
they appreciate water. “As a nation, the whole nation throws water away… since water is 
seen as a free commodity and unlimited.” However, if a private organization were to 
build a dam and sell the water as irrigation, he said there would be outcry. At the same 
time, he added that the concept of buying bottles of water was a foreign concept 20 years 
ago, so there is a possibility that the country would be convinced to do so. Nevertheless, 
Pakistan remains a country that is inhospitable for foreign direct investment. In the end, 
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he said people are not mentally ready for privatized water markets and the government is 
not willing to attract the necessary private investment, domestically or foreign.   
 
Politicians are uninformed 
In the previous section, I discussed the technical justifications professionals apply when 
discussing dams as sustainable infrastructure. Considering all of what these professionals 
mentioned about dams and sustainable development, politicians in Pakistan do not 
comprehend this technical justification for dams.   
 Imran Niazi is a consultant with a Chinese dam construction firm and former 
politician. When he talked about the current Nawaz Sharif administration, he criticized it 
for not relying on actual scientists or professionals in their decision-making process. 
Rather than relying on their opinion or expertise, Nawaz Sharif appointed politicians to 
lead government ministries. By doing this, he said the government is looking at the short 
term instead of working toward development that actually works. In short, this has 
fostered an environment in the government that prioritizes planning according to political 
discourses rather than planning according to science.  
 Hamid Ali agreed with this when he told me that he views politicians as a group 
that focuses on elections rather than long-term projects. This is how the government has 
worked for the past 30 years, he said. Hamid Ali added that technocrats and bureaucrats 
are hesitant to change the system of governance in Pakistan because they are happy with 
the system. “Since they are not very close to the people, they are not aware of how people 
are affected,” he told me. Furthermore, the priorities of each political party are to 
contradict the opposing party’s policies, which does not move the country forward, he 
  103 
said. In this case, technocrats and bureaucrats take advantage of a poisonous political 
system that is not productive to prove their discourse is better for the country.  
 The 18th Amendment in the country is an example of the government being too 
afraid to govern, Hamid Ali added. One aspect of the 18th Constitutional Amendment 
was that the Council of Common Interest (CCI) was responsible to settle center-province 
or inter-provincial conflicts over water resources management. Membership of CCI 
consists of chief ministers from all four provinces and four members nominated by the 
Prime Minister (Zahid, 2013). He said the amendment empowered each province in the 
country to have more autonomy, but not to deal with bigger issues that are apparent in 
environmental issues. This also made constructing large-scale projects a bigger problem. 
This is part of the reason why dams near provincial borders—like Kalabagh Dam—are 
politicized: because the federal government gave too much power to the province. Hamid 
Ali does feel hopeful with Pakistan’s history with negotiations, as long as there is a 
strong government. Furthermore, since “the water of Punjab” was given to India after the 
Indus Water Treaty, Hamid Ali told me that Pakistanis and politicians need to be 
reminded that infrastructure should ensure enough water for all.  
 Abdul echoed Hamid Ali’s concern about the 18th Amendment. Although the 
18th Amendment did allow for provinces to develop their own small- and micro-scale 
dams, it was not addressing the shortage that is present at the national level, he said. 
Abdul said there had been a lot of projects in hilly areas that produce enough electricity 
for small villages and the energy does not connect to the national grid.  
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Civil Society’s impact on state officials 
Hamid Ali recognized that civil society experiences a barrier in informing politicians and 
the population. Over time civil society has become more empowered, but he said 
technocrats and bureaucrats in the government are too comfortable with their position in 
power. Furthermore, he added, these people in power are detached from everyday 
Pakistani lived experiences.  
The bureaucrats come from a particular place and then come to Islamabad after a 
long time working in other areas. By the time in Islamabad, he is aged and has 
served a long time in the bureaucratic channels. They become the habit of bosses 
so on a technical matter, it’s their product and their area and they are not 
sensitized to climate change and the environment. 
Nevertheless, he said, civil society has made some strides in democratizing Pakistan in 
terms of providing different perspectives in decision-making roles. He recalled that in 
1992, there were not any environmental seats in governmental agencies. However, that 
changed after the international nongovernmental organization International Union for 
Conservation of Nature published a report about environmental impacts in the country.   
 Mirza added that civil society organizations have had a positive effect in shedding 
light on the socio-economic effect that development projects have on populations. With 
work that International Union for Conservation of Nature, World Wildlife Foundation, 
SDPI, and LEAD has published, he said that policymakers could not ignore ecological 
and socio-economic issues—but he still recognized that it would be a while until it is 
made a priority. Despite an overall pessimism that seemed present in how participants 
talked about how civil society is ignored by policymakers in government, there seemed to 
be a glimmer of hope that they are in fact listened to.   
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 “Actually, civil society is very biased,” Fazlullah told me. Because Fazlullah 
mentioned that civil society organizations are biased, they do not distribute neutral 
information to policy makers and decision-makers that can be considered apolitical and 
therefore used in rational policymaking. “When you talk to someone in Punjab, they will 
say they need the dams to control the river flows. In Sindh they always complain and say 
that the water is diverted too much in Punjab,” he told me. The location of a civil society 
organization therefore taints its reputation as knowledge that bases its discourse on 
politics rather than technical data.  
 Furthermore, he added, in his experience working in the government, he never 
consulted any professionals outside of the state. Yet, state officials claim they have 
consulted with outside professionals for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC)—which seems untrue to him. “When you talk about CPEC, I talk to civil society 
a lot and people don’t like it.” Anwar agreed that although civil society organizations are 
raising awareness about issues in Pakistan, government officials listen—but don’t pay 
attention.  
 Nevertheless, the role of civil society organizations has played a small, yet 
impactful, role in steering government policies, Bina Siddiqui said. Just in Islamabad, she 
said, organizations have reversed decisions that were made top-down that would cause 
environmental harm. A case that she provided an example of was some projects that 
would have degraded the Margalla Hills, a hill range that is a part of the foothills to the 
Himalayas located outside the city of Islamabad. The courts ended up invalidating the 
development projects, she said.  
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 Civil society organizations have therefore been able to change how the argument 
is conducted in Pakistan, Abid Mustafa said. He said that these are organizations that are 
providing research for public consumption is different from WAPDA. He was still 
critical about these civil society organizations, however; he still saw it as a positive thing 
that they were changing the conversation.   
 
Dams as sustainable development  
Sustainable development is a concept that all professionals interviewed have similar 
perspectives. Technical aspects of a project emerged from their definitions, as well as the 
idea of environmental sustainability and it justified the support of dams as sustainable 
development. However, politics does emerge as a larger role rather than within just one 
component, however. It is evident in each aspect of their definition. Therefore, 
sustainable development principles do illustrate a need to include political discussions 
into planning, which complicates the view of supporting a project just because it is 
viewed as a technical solution.  
At first, it seemed that defining sustainable development was a straightforward 
thing for participants. In order to be considered as sustainable development, according 
participants, there are technical aspects each project must meet: it has to provide low 
tariffs for consumers, it must not affect the environment, and operate for a long period of 
time. With these aspects, participants felt confident in suggesting dams as a form of 
sustainable energy generation. But there is also a political aspect to it that needs to be 
confronted whenever implementing development projects, they added. A sustainable 
project must not jeopardize political factors within the country. Now this was an entry 
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point into looking at how politics can play a role in an otherwise technical project. As one 
participant said, politics of uprooting a community who held a particular piece of land for 
centuries can undermine a whole project.  
 After an exploration of maintaining a stable relationship between the state and its 
population, it becomes clear that the other components have political dimensions to them 
as well. Although sustainable development definitions were meant to be technical, 
component to it as well. Dams are considered to provide low cost rates for tariffs when 
compared to solar and wind. Many participants did not believe that solar and wind can 
provide a low rate for consumers. If there is not a low rate for consumers, it is very likely 
that energy theft will either increase and/ or there will be political turmoil in elections. 
This means that support for dams and the technical feature of dams to provide low cost 
rates for consumers has a backdrop of politics in its discussion, especially when solving 
the energy crisis and reducing the cost of energy to benefit the industrial and residential 
users was a campaign promise by Nawaz Sharif (Dawn, 2015).   
Each participant included the environmental health of the country into their 
definition as a way to ensure that development projects do not overexploit natural 
resources. This can also be seen as a factor that has a political nature to it since 
downstream effects can amplify any political conflict, especially in a country that has an 
already-strained interprovincial history. Within Pakistan, upstream development of dams 
has not only provoked suspicion of the province of Punjab attempting to grab more 
political power in the country but also weakening the economic performance of the 
province of Sindh’s agriculture8 by affecting the flow of the Indus System. To support 
                                                
8 More about this will be discussed in Chapter V with the case of Kalabagh Dam. 
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dam development therefore supports environmental degradation experienced in the Sindh 
province. Now, this seemed to be noticed by some participants. That is why there seemed 
to be many calls for national unity under one Pakistan rather than a continuation of 
fragmented regional politics.  
The contentious history between India and Pakistan and the loss of the three Indus 
System eastern rivers to India represents an additional ongoing environmental political 
issue that should be taken as a cautionary story according to some participants. The 
international concern for upstream development is apparent in the hydropower 
development that India led.  
 Going further with their concept of sustainable development maintaining a 
political dimension is evident in the argument that dams are justified as a more 
sustainable development approach that is more efficient than solar and wind based on an 
economic perspective. As O’Brien and Roberts (2010) discuss, it is impossible to 
separate politics from economics and vice versa. For these participants, the opportunity 
cost of pursing other renewable energy projects over dams is an opportunity cost that is 
too high for the country.  
Participants told me that Pakistan has regions that would be advantageous for 
solar and wind energy development. “Pakistan is not ready to develop these 
technologies,” Fazlullah Qaisrani told me. This concern is based on importing these 
technologies and expertise from other countries in order to establish a large-scale project. 
Others told me it is fine if you are putting in a solar panel in a village to power a cell 
phone or fan during summer, but it cannot be enough to solve the country’s energy crisis. 
  109 
However, other participants had informed me that foreign expertise is needed for large-
scale dams.  
 Sustainable development was thought to be a rather technical definition, though 
there was some acceptance that politics had a small part in making something sustainable. 
Through examination of participants’ definitions, it is possible to see a political backdrop 
in each variable of the definition of sustainable development. After this, it is reasonable 
to see why Abid Mustafa did not want to discuss dams as sustainable development but 
rather as renewable energy generation.    
 
Conclusion 
In this section I threaded together the views of participants who participated in my study. 
Their views showed that there is support for dams as sustainable development and during 
the climate change era. However, the way in which participants supported dams as 
sustainable development involved mobilizing technocratic discourse that both supported 
dams and critiqued those who relied on politics to oppose dams. In the following chapter, 
I discuss how technocratic support does, in fact, have a political dimension to it. In a way, 
it aligns with Burris’ (1993) argument that technocratic discourse does in fact engage 
with political discourse. 
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CHAPTER V 
TALE OF TWO DAMS:  
KALABAGH AND DIAMER-BHASHA 
So far, I have shown how technocratic knowledge has had a privileged role in Pakistan, 
as apparent in Chapter III. That was evident in the role that technical knowledge played 
in motivating the negotiations between India and Pakistan kicked off by the founder of 
Tennessee Valley Authority, David Lilienthal. Dams were central to Lilienthal’s 
argument, just as it was for Pieter Lieftinck in his World Bank-funded research of the 
water resources of Pakistan. This development discourse has continued throughout 
Pakistan, as apparent in the Planning Commission’s Vision 2025 report and WAPDA’s 
Vision 2025 strategy. In Chapter IV, I discussed the primary data I gathered through field 
research in Islamabad and Lahore, Pakistan.  
In this chapter, I analyze data I gathered to show that although development 
discourse in support of dams as sustainable development within the context of climate 
change is portrayed as something technical and apolitical, there is in fact a political 
dimension within this discourse. Interestingly, although Lilienthal aimed for dams to be a 
vessel to make the Indus River System a natural space rather than water resources split by 
political demarcations, he worked with Cold War politics in the background of his 
otherwise “common sense engineering” principles. This foreshadows the research I 
conducted in Pakistan. Water and energy experts I spoke with said that professionals in 
Pakistan have a belief that dams are infrastructure necessary for Pakistan to develop 
sustainably and for in bracing themselves for the climate change era. Although this 
discourse aims to be technical and apolitical, this discourse indeed engages with political 
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discourse. In this case, the two dams of Kalabagh, located in the Punjab province near the 
border of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Diamer-Bhasha Dam, located in the northern region, 
serve as an illustration of this discourse.  
 
A Tale Of Two Dams  
There was nothing wrong with Kalabagh Dam. It unfairly became political. That’s what 
some professionals thought when Kalabagh Dam emerged during conversations. At the 
root of the problem is that Pakistanis refuse to see themselves united under one national 
identity, according to Hamid. Of course, to argue that Pakistan has a national identity 
problem is to pull at a thread that consists of a large library of literature that confronts 
that issue, though this is outside the scope of this thesis. However, it seems that 
professionals in this case argued that Pakistan should see itself as one country under a 
national identity of technocratic-led development.  
In this section, I discuss the cases of Kalabagh Dam and Diamer-Bhasha Dam. 
The issue of Kalabagh Dam became political, some participants said, although there was 
nothing wrong with the project. On the other hand, participants spoke less about Diamer-
Bhasha, which is located in the northern region of Pakistan. Nevertheless, the discourse 
that emerged about these dams serves as an illustration of how technocratic perspectives 
engage with political discourses.   
 
Kalabagh Dam 
Engineering firms began to search for the best site for the Kalabagh Dam in 1953 and two 
sites were found, which were within 10 miles of the current location (Nawaz, 2011).  
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More than 10 years later, Kalabagh emerged once again as a viable dam, but Tarbela 
Dam was prioritized instead since it was more advantageous. This decision, according to 
Pieter Lieftinck’s (1968) World Bank report, was because Kalabagh Dam was more 
susceptible to silt, therefore affecting potential power generation, compared to Tarbela 
Dam. Putting Tarbela and Kalabagh Dam side by side, Lieftinck wrote, it would be a 
more financial-wise decision to construct Tarbela Dam before Kalabagh Dam. Kalabagh 
Dam’s construction, due to its controversy, remained dormant until President General 
Pervez Musharraf advocated for the construction of Kalabagh Dam in 2005 while in 
Nowhsera, the town that would be affected by the dam’s construction (Dawn, 2005). 
However, three years later when the Pakistan People’s Party came to power in 2008, 
WAPDA Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf said Kalabagh Dam would be shelved and the 
money reserved for the project spent elsewhere (PakTribune, 2008). Most recently, the 
dam has been listed as a project that is ready for construction, according to the current 
government (Khan, 2016).  
The technical specifications of Kalabagh Dam are fourfold. The first purpose was 
that it would provide 6.1 MAF of excess water storage that flows down the Kotri Barrage 
that would assist other dams that are increasingly burdened with siltation. Secondly, 
through canal irrigation, it would provide 2.4 million acres of new farmlands. It would 
also have the generation potential of 3,600 MW of hydropower. Lastly, it would provide 
flood control, which the Government of Pakistan said uncontrolled floods result in 35 
MAF of waste to the sea (Ghazanfar, 2008).  
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Figure 4: Location of Kalabagh Dam and Diamer Bhasha Dam. Source: Author. 
The former chairman of WAPDA, Zafar Mahmood, wrote a recent article in 2016 
to separate the facts from fiction about the dam. For Mahmood, he felt frustration that 
many vilified the Kalabagh Dam and all provinces supported the Diamer-Bhasha Dam, 
despite being on the same river and providing the same functions (see Figure 1). 
WAPDA is still, nevertheless, dedicated toward publicizing the benefits of Kalabagh 
Dam, which has been embroiled in political controversy for more than 30 years. The 
article series was written because he felt that the “media can play an effective role to 
bring real facts in the domain of public knowledge” (Mahmood, 2016). It is worth 
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mentioning the fallout of that occurred after Mahmood wrote the article. A month after 
writing it1, he was pressured to resign as chairman because of Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif’s discomfort over the support of Kalabagh Dam (Hasnain, 2016). Ironically, the 
point of the article was to extinguish some of the politicization of Kalabagh Dam, yet it 
resulted in Nawaz Sharif reacting politically by requesting the chairman’s resignation.  
Kalabagh Dam’s technical specifications offer Pakistan a lot, which is why many 
talk about it. Whenever I spoke with Pakistanis about why I was in their country—since 
an American in their country often brought interest into why I was there—the issue of 
Kalabagh Dam would emerge. For some, it was an essential element of water resources 
development. It would provide the country with the needed electricity and irrigation. In 
addition, it provided a way of maintaining water resources since India is perceived as 
illegally diverting water that does not belong to them. On the other hand, others viewed 
the dam as a historical continuation of power abuse at the hands of the Punjab province 
against Sindh. In this section, I will discuss how professionals viewed Kalabagh Dam. 
Although I did not include a question about Kalabagh Dam in my interviews, each 
participant nevertheless brought it up.   
 
Diamer-Bhasha Dam 
Before I left for Pakistan, I met with a faculty member from Karakoram International 
University, which is located in the province of Gilgit-Baltistan, the northernmost 
province of Pakistan. He told me how great the Diamer-Bhasha Dam would be for 
                                                
1 The 26-part article that appeared in The Nation from May 31 to June 25, 2016. 
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Pakistan. With the dam constructed, it would provide irrigation for the country so it could 
increase some of its agricultural exports.   
 Diamer-Bhasha does not face any similar criticism that Kalabagh faced, though, 
as a former WAPDA chairman noted, it is a similar dam (Hasnain, 2016). Diamer-Bhasha 
is located 315 kilometers upstream of Tarbela Dam and 180 kilometers downstream of 
Gilgit City, the capital of the Gilgit-Baltistan province. The dam, projected to be 272 
meters tall in height, would feature a storage capability of 6.4 MAF. It would also 
generate a potential 4,500 MW. In addition to providing flood control, it would also 
prolong the life of the Tarbela Dam.  
 WAPDA presents this dam as necessary clean energy as well as a project that is 
needed to assist the country’s strategy in establishing food security. In WAPDA’s 2014 
annual report, the organization said Diamer-Bhasha Dam was a necessary project to 
provide irrigation for the agriculture system, the “backbone of Pakistan’s economy” 
(2015, p. 64). However, the dam has a price tag of $12.6 billion, and, although the dam 
was to be ready in 2016, the project has not finished yet (Kamal, 2009).   
 Participants who did mention Diamer-Bhasha spoke positively about the project 
since development in the northern region of the country was a less politically dangerous 
strategy. Fazlullah said the project would relieve—and therefore protect—the Tarbela 
Dam. Diamer-Bhasha would relieve Tarbela Dam—and Mangla—of too much siltation, 
which comprises the electrical generation of these dams.   
 However, Mirza was critical in terms of the amount of aid that is necessary to pay 
for the Diamer-Bhasha Dam. “We have to borrow. Someone has to pay. Every Pakistani 
and unborn have to pay $60 to $70 billion foreign and domestic [debt]. We need to waste 
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that huge amount? Bhasha is $10 billion,” he told me. The United States is one country 
that has sent financial aid to Pakistan for the project (Obama White House, 2013). Mirza 
reminded me that receiving money from the United States comes with a cost, which 
could mean playing a bigger role in the Global War on Terror by increasing its combat 
role in Afghanistan. Although accepting this project that can be perceived technically as 
sustainable development and infrastructure for climate change-adaption through irrigation 
for agriculture, for Mirza, there are broader political issues that are tied with it.2 
 In addition to Diamer-Bhasha representing a broader geopolitical issue, this 
project also serves as an example of WAPDA’s attempt to retain political and 
development power, Mirza added. If Bhasha is constructed, he told me, then Kalabagh 
Dam does not need to exist. However, WAPDA wants a dam in the Punjab province, 
whereas there would be multiple provinces that would share the benefits of the Diamer-
Bhasha Dam. This shows how Kalabagh Dam in reality serves the interests of WAPDA, 
he said, since WAPDA was delaying the construction of Diamer-Bhasha Dam to try and 
pressure the public into construction of the Kalabagh Dam.  
 
Discussion of themes 
Technically, nothing wrong 
Many participants viewed the Kalabagh Dam as technically correct and that political 
discourse had politicized the issue. This politicization overshadowed the importance of 
the dam for the whole country.   
                                                
2 As of March 2017, Pakistan armed forces are now accompanying Saudi Arabia, a donor and a country a 
participant thought had donor conditionality, in fighting in Yemen. 
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 “There’s nothing wrong with it, they will tell you,” Mustafa told me. Mustafa, an 
academic currently based in England although he still travels to Pakistan for research. He 
expressed concern about how Kalabagh is perceived by experts in the country. These 
professionals frame Kalabagh Dam as an apolitical infrastructure component rather than 
accepting there are socio-economic and alternative ways of viewing water. Engineering 
views, he added, are the only ways of viewing water according to these professionals. 
With the case of Kalabagh Dam, Mustafa believes technical knowledge is used to assuage 
the people of Pakistan that the dam could not have any political connotations to it, due to 
the fact that development founded upon engineering is impossible of political discourse if 
it is carefully planned.  
 For Hamza Malik, those who designed the dam did not bring politics into the 
discussion but the dam became unfairly political. Hamza Malik, once a high-ranking 
political leader in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, said one of the political parties 
in the country used its political power irresponsibly. The Awami National Party (ANP) 
unfairly had their anti-Kalabagh Dam platform become mainstreamed through a coalition 
government. Once ANP formed a coalition party in 2008, their anti-Kalabagh perspective 
represented the whole province. “Out of total registered voters of 10.6 million, ANP got 
.578 million votes. 5.6 percent of the vote,” he told me.  
 Hamza Malik was the only participant to discuss the ANP and the politics of 
Kalabagh Dam in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Despite the silence from participants on the 
province’s view on Kalabagh, it is important to illustrate how some in the province 
criticized the project. The ANP, for example, incorporated opposition of the Kalabagh 
Dam into their agenda as far back as 1988, though Malik criticizes the place of the dam 
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on their 2008 political agenda. Bacha Khan, one of the leaders of the party, told attendees 
at the Peshawar convention against the Kalabagh Dam: “I would leave no stone unturned 
to stop the implementation…. And even would be happy to sacrifice my life in 
resistance… Moreover I also consider the dam as the conspiracy by the Punjab 
government against the smaller provinces” (Muhammad, 2012). What the excerpt from 
Bacha Khan illustrates is that the ANP opposition to the Kalabagh Dam shows more than 
just political opportunism but it is a legitimate concern of an imbalance of representation 
compared to the federal government and the Punjab province’s intentions of the Kalabagh 
Dam. This is evident since chief ministers of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh believed 
they were not included in the preparation of the Kalabagh Dam when five consultants 
developed project proposals (Muhammad, 2012).  
 The technical features of the Kalabagh Dam could also manage any 
environmental concerns that Sindh may have about seawater intrusion in the Indus Delta, 
according to Majid Ibrahim.  
Water is needed to go to the sea—and I have to be careful when saying lost to the 
sea. So we need to protect the Indus Delta. Lots of sea intrusion. I am convinced 
of this even if it gets me enemies in Sindh. If we had Kalabagh, it would have 
stored enough water and could’ve sent enough water to enough stakeholders and 
satisfied all these users. We need 10 MAF to the sea. We have to release enough 
at the right times to make sure that it’s sustainable. So that’s the idea of the dams 
to me at least. These dams act as your saviors of the environment as well as your 
own life. That’s why it’s the lifeline. 
In this case, Kalabagh Dam is presented as a way of operating as a mechanical river. By 
this, I mean that Kalabagh Dam is thought of as a way to not only work to provide water 
resources but also provide enough water necessary to mitigate any environmental crisis 
that will occur from continued damming along the Indus River and the Indus Delta. 
Kalabagh is additionally thought of as a way to assuage tensions between the provinces 
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of Sindh and Punjab. As discussed in Chapter I, Sindh and Punjab are two regions that 
have had a problematic history. Much of this has to do with the Punjabi domination of 
military and government bureaucracies, and WAPDA is included since its headquarters is 
located in the Punjab province. Jaffrelot (2015) recalled that Muhajirs3 looked down on 
Sindh as a backwater of the South Asian subcontinent and felt superior to Sindhis. This 
tension then percolated to hatred. This was further exacerbated through the shifting of 
Pakistan’s capital from Karachi in Sindh to within the Punjab province and Sindhi 
marginalization in the Pakistani military, among other factors (Jaffrelot, 2015). Because 
of this historical drama between the Punjab and Sindh provinces, technocratic support for 
Kalabagh Dam accuse protestors continuing a historical political debate rather than 
sticking to the technical facts. However, it is possible to see that support for Kalabagh 
Dam does follow a business as usual attitude to the issue.  
 
Interprovincial relations 
The provinces of Sindh and Punjab have had history of political conflicts that roots back 
to the British Punjab (Jaffrelot, 2015). Kalabagh Dam, it seemed from talking with 
professionals, is a continuation of the strained relationship between the two provinces. 
Although participants were focused on Sindh and Punjab, there was not any discussion of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the effect Kalabagh Dam has on the region. Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, the western neighboring province of Punjab (see Fig. 3), is affected from 
the development of the Kalabagh Dam. Considering the role of Punjab, Sindh, and 
                                                
3 Migrants from India to Pakistan during Partition.  
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Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Kalabagh Dam is an illustrative example of how dam development 
can strain interprovincial relations in Pakistan.  
“Kalabagh is not a technical but political problem. If we saw [Pakistan] as one 
nation, it wouldn’t be such a problem,” Hamid Ali told me. Political unity through 
appreciation of technical knowledge was also examined by Ghazanfar (2008), who said 
no one province should dictate which project should determine national interest, Hamid 
Ali argued that the rest of Pakistan should follow this dam project that would be located 
in Punjab. The political conflict about the Kalabagh Dam is continuing the energy crisis 
in the country, he added.  
Within the province of Sindh, opposition for Kalabagh Dam is a product of the 
Sindhi wealthy landlords reinforcing their power. Because of this wealthy class, the rest 
of the province has ignored the technical benefits since they do not need the benefits, 
Hamza Malik said.  
The landlords don’t want it. They already have the water. They don’t need 
water… They don’t pay bills off electricity… It doesn’t benefit them. They live in 
towns that are not flood prone. What Kalabagh will do won’t benefit them. 
Secondly, it gives them an opportunity of opposing because they have sort of 
taken over millions of acres of land in the riverbed of the Indus. And to them, 
flooding of Indus is more important than control of Indus.  
Kalabagh Dam for Hamza Malik is a continuation of the wealthy exerting their power to 
preserve their power in the decision-making process in Pakistan. Some landowners would 
experience some loss of land with the construction of the Kalabagh Dam. However, 
increased control of the Indus would allow for more irrigated land in Sindh, thus 
providing increased yields to poorer farmers. However, because landowners would lose 
some land so the poorer farmers could gain stable electricity, protection from floods, and 
increased agricultural lands, these landowners have loudly opposed the dam.  
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 Opposition to the Kalabagh Dam is misinformed and this has injected politics into 
the debate, according to Abdullah. “Kalabagh is nothing more than a political problem. 
This dam is damned because it has been politicized,” he told me. This political debate 
over the Kalabagh Dam is putting additional financial strain on the country. He added 
that millions of dollars has been spent on this project but it cannot be built because of 
misinformation about the project. If the dam is built, he told me, it would generate profit 
and repay the money taken out to support the project. However, the dam is delayed, 
making the country lose money.  
 Kalabagh Dam has a direct impact on the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The 
major concern for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is that Kalabagh Dam would threaten Nowshera 
town. This is because if there is a high flood, which protestors refer to the flood of 1929, 
the reservoir of Kalabagh reservoir will affect the water level in the Kabul River, 
effectively flooding the town. WAPDA, however, cites computer simulations that suggest 
this accusation is false. In addition, some in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa believe the Kalabagh 
Dam would submerge 4,500 acres of land. 100 acres of this land is agricultural land. 
WAPDA once again questions this claim (Nawaz, 2011). Those who are affected by 
development projects should be compensated, as Hamza Malik indicates. However, part 
of the animosity those in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa feel about the Kalabagh Dam is rooted in 
the fact that nearly 96,000 people displaced during the construction of Tarbela Dam still 
have not been compensated. This is a large part of why there is so much distrust between 
displaced people, the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the federal 
government of the country (Muhammad, 2012). Kalabagh Dam would dislocate about 
34,500 people, as well as an additional number of people who are dependent on the river 
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for their livelihood, such as fishermen and boatmen (Nawaz, 2011). Because WAPDA 
objected to these claims, Nawaz (2011) views opposition to Kalabagh as “baseless” (p. 
252). However, these claims cited are based on technical discourses, without taking into 
consideration how, for example, lives are tied to the river and cannot be merely replaced 
through relocation to a new site. Once again, it proves necessary to state that this 
background is thought of as politicization of Kalabagh Dam and not a technical matter, 
therefore not a matter that is necessary to confront.   
Part of Abdullah’s job is to go out into different communities to inform them 
about different policies, which includes presenting how dams can be beneficial. He 
recounted to me about an experience he had when he planned to discuss water 
conservation strategies within a community.  
They said, ‘you are from government to tell us about the Kalabagh…  If you build 
the Kalabagh, then Punjab can steal as much water.’ But, today, we have so many 
checks and balances you can’t steal. That mistrust among the provinces has to be 
removed before you can make large dams. You have to keep hammering your 
message about these dams: Kalabagh isn’t meant to steal. It’s to manage.  
He added that with water resource management today, it is impossible to steal water 
without getting caught. In fact, modern water resources management operation systems 
only make water surveillance more effective.  
 Imran Niazi is aware of the problem of the general public misinformed with the 
purpose of the Kalabagh Dam. However, part of the problem, he said, was that there are 
no longer any trustworthy political leaders in Pakistan. Now, this is a very common 
sentiment in Pakistan. No matter whom you ask in Pakistan, they will most likely tell you 
their last great leader was Muhammad Jinnah.  
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 When Ayub Khan accepted the World Bank’s offer of financing the Tarbela Dam 
and Kalabagh Dam, Ayub Khan requested to construct Tarbela first. His thought-process, 
Niazi said, was that Kalabagh Dam would be easy to build compared to Tarbela. 
However, Ayub Khan was respected by the people as he had empathy for the people 
affected by development projects. By the time Kalabagh was approached for 
development, those affected by the development of Tarbela still had not received their 
settlements, which also affected how people viewed large-scale development.   
 
Dams must be developed by the government  
The Pakistani state, despite the changing nature of the state in the West and most nation-
states in the Global South with structural adjustment and other austerity measures, is still 
thought of as the leading agent toward development. This was evident in my discussions 
with participants who did not mention scenarios in which private foreign direct 
investment would materialize in financing large-scale dams. That means, for the most 
part, the Pakistani state and its government officials—like WAPDA—are responsible for 
locating the funding through engagement with donor countries or multilateral lending 
agencies. Because of that, despite attempts of those who support dam development as 
something technical and apolitical, in reality, it consists of some political discourse.   
  Whenever I asked participants about private investors financing dams in 
Pakistan, they said they were not aware of this happening. There are Chinese firms 
developing in Pakistan, but those are also considered to be products of China’s state-led 
hydropower development firms—SinoHydro, Three Gorges Corporation, for example. 
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Regardless of policies enacted by the state to entice investors4, private investors are 
discouraged by the unstable politics of the country and uncertainty of their rate on return, 
participants told me. Additionally, there is a lack of faith in WAPDA to transmit this 
electricity into the national grid for consumers because participants said the agency aims 
to maximize their ability to control electrical utilities. This all converges into placing 
responsibility of water and energy infrastructure to the state.  
 With the government in charge of planning hydropower projects, it therefore 
makes it receptive to political discourse. There is political discourse, for example, evident 
in supporting dams on the technical feature that the electricity it generates can provide 
cheaper per unit electricity than other forms of large-scale energy generation. Revenue 
from energy rates is how WAPDA maintains infrastructure and uses it to invest in 
constructing new infrastructure as well (Mustafa, 2011). However, Pakistan—as well as 
most of South Asia—experiences a lot of energy theft.  
Furthermore, dam planning through the government, as Niazi mentioned, utilizes 
China’s state-led firms to construct dams in more politically contentious zones. Most 
notably, this is occurring in the Kashmir territory with the 969 MW installed capacity 
Neelum-Jhelum Dam. Fazlullah Qaisrani was aware of this too. He said that Pakistan is 
unable to plan and construct these dams alone, so they work in a consortium with foreign 
experts. In the case of Neelum-Jhelum, the government relies on the expertise of the 
Chinese. Besides providing technical expertise, the Chinese also provide a way for 
Pakistan to construct this dam without resulting in a bigger political conflict with India.  
                                                
4 Pakistan did implement Hydropower Policy 1995 but WAPDA still has the role of large-scale dam 
development.  
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Overall, in this section, I showed that since the Pakistani government must engage 
with dam development, it illustrates the manifestation of politics in the technocratic 
language in support of dams. Despite shown as technocratic and apolitical, the 
appearance of the government pursuing these development projects shows it is not just 
technical discourse but there is a backdrop of politics, which is evident with Niazi’s 
remark about the current Nawaz Sharif administration that has filled positions with 
politicians that should be otherwise be filled with scientists. This political backdrop 
continues into the discourse within dams justified as sustainable development.  
 
Expertise, not politics, is needed for planning dams 
Although dams are perceived as a technical solution for professionals, politics is in the 
background of the discussion. This is apparent after an examination of the narratives in 
their definitions of sustainable development. However, it is also embedded in how 
professionals view the role of expertise in the planning process of dams.  
 Before discussing what participants said, presenting what was not said is 
noteworthy. Professionals who supported dams—and those who did not—said dam 
planning process in Pakistan is designed without participation from the people. For 
example, Abdul mentioned that one of the purposes of the organization he works for is to 
conduct workshops, and, after saying that, he added that he really wanted to start 
arranging some to inform people about why large-scale dams are necessary for Pakistan. 
In this case, it seems that rather than gathering data and learning why these people are 
against dams—or uncertain about them—Abdul’s intention to inform them presents a 
hierarchy of knowledge. This dam process, rather than utilizing sustainable principles 
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spoken by the participants of being inclusive in the process, instead reflects a process of 
persuasion.  
 The concerns of the prioritization of technocrats and bureaucrats in the planning 
process held by professionals do seem to follow similar hegemonic descriptions of 
disciplines that Goldman (2007) discussed in his study of how knowledge operates in the 
World Bank. Abdul mentioned that the Planning Commission did permit including an 
environmental position in the 1990s. But participants never talked about how the state has 
included other perspectives. Because of this, it is possible to see how there is a 
prioritization of knowledge within the Planning Commission and other state agencies.  
 Furthermore, as Abdul noted, expertise shows there is an importance in choosing 
where is the correct place to construct a dam. This is especially consequential considering 
Pakistan is susceptible to earthquakes. It is possible to see this comment as something 
that prioritizes the discourse of experts in development discourse because, regardless of 
how populations are affected, the location of the dam is necessary to avoid human-made 
disasters via dam failure.   
 Just as the World Commission on Dams concluded, relocation settlements are a 
part of the planning process for dams, according to the professionals I spoke with. With 
this in mind, Malik had told me that those who are affected most by a project 
construction should benefit the most. This benefit would surface once a population is 
moved from a village to a new settlement that has all of the conveniences of modernity, 
including hospitals, schools, and other institutions. In fact, Malik told me that he grew up 
in a village as a way of justifying this perspective. This comment on ushering villages 
into modernity and education does reflect a discourse that illustrates a hierarchy of 
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knowledge. It is possible to see discourse supporting the notion of marginalizing local 
discourses as an exercise of power. For Foucault (1997) power represses groups such as 
nature or individuals through subjugated knowledge—a whole series of knowledge that is 
disqualified as inferior to scientific knowledge. In this case, it is evident that supporting 
dams as development will improve the human capital of an affected population into more 
productive citizens is an exertion of the government power toward a group of people who 
are not considered modern by those who plan dams. Because of this, it is then possible to 
view this as political discourse in what is presented as technical justification for a dam. 
Malik is not the only one who presented this, however. WAPDA has used this 
justification in their report on Dasu Dam5.  
 Despite so-called politicization of dam construction that emerged around the 
Kalabagh Dam, Hamid Ali told me that Pakistan always settles its conflicts in the end 
with negotiations. This comment shows that in order to implement development projects 
that are perceived as technical decisions, technocratic decision-makers nevertheless use 
their discourse in political methods.  
A political dimension to the technical support of dams emerged when I was told 
about the importance of water resources management. After speaking with participants, it 
became apparent that there is an important role for water resources management needed. 
Through management of water resources, it can ensure that politics does not permeate 
into technical discussion of dams, which is what Majid Ibrahim implied when he argued 
that Sindhi protestors are paranoid because it is impossible to steal water during an era 
where data is found easily. The concept of using technology to observe water resources 
                                                
5 See Chapter III 
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was not just present in the interviews I had with professionals. Returning to the use of 
unmanned aerial cameras connected to a Microsoft XBOX 360 video game console 
discussed in Chapter IV, this technology could be used to further the country’s ability to 
justify water deliveries via dams, and it could also represent an ability to empower local 
farmers and others to conduct water resources management in nearby canals. Since dams 
are seen partially as a method to manage water flow in the country, the use of drones 
challenges that top-down solution. Essentially, this could work as a method of using 
technical methods to support political claims about how dams can deliver reliable water 
to those who use the irrigation network rather than relying only on expensive dams. In 
addition, if the cameras are used as a bottom-up approach to holding government 
accountable, it is once again being used as a political tool.  
 
Climate change and politics 
The Pakistan government is a necessary component in dams and development since none 
of the participants I spoke with recognized private investment as a feasible alternative. 
This means the state is necessary to find investment, whether it is from foreign states or 
multilateral aid agencies. However, there is acceptance of the politics attached to these 
aid agreements whenever dams are supported as an option during the era of sustainable 
development.  
 Part of the concern about sustainable development is that it must also not be too 
expensive to construct relative to other options. What reinforces dams as sustainable is 
that participants are able to see it as more affordable partly because they imagine the 
electric rates per unit will be low enough. Foreign direct investment is a concern as well 
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because participants were not optimistic about any private investors arriving in the 
country.  
 In addition, just as a few participants told me, there is a cost of accepting aid. 
Although constructing dams is perceived as a technical project, it could result in 
becoming involved in increased military conflicts in the United States’ War on Terrorism 
or to provide military support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen. This also applies to the aid 
received from multilateral agencies. News reports while I was in Pakistan showed 
protests about the public owned Pakistan International Airway being privatized at the 
request of the International Monetary Fund. So it seems technocratic justification for 
these development projects does come with a cost of the political agenda of whoever is 
providing the aid. Although dams are presented in a very technical manner by supporters, 
the means of attracting finances necessary in order to construct the project means it is 
accepting any strings attached to the aid package. Therefore, implicit in this scientific 
discourse is acceptance of a geopolitical discourse—such as the United States’ War on 
Terrorism.  
 While the international community discusses bracing for the upcoming climate 
change era, Pakistan is still involved with what participants criticized as dirty energy 
sources that China was invested in. The acceptance of dams that are funded by China is 
another case that ties the two countries and the politics associated with it. Many 
participants spoke directly about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) $46 
billion aid deal (CPEC). Acceptance of building dams that have a high price tag means 
the state will have to engage with China’s global politics, and this has already resulted in 
international embarrassment, according to Bina Siddiqui, during the Paris Climate Talks 
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in 2015. Pakistani state officials’ inability to commit to any sustainable projects is rooted 
in that if China will pay for any dams, the country will also have to import technology to 
construct low grade coal power plants. This concern of Bina Siddiqui and other 
participants about CPEC shows that these are not just technical decisions about 
specifications of how much a dam will cut down on carbon dioxide. Rather, it becomes 
politics when the country begins to shop around for a buyer to bankroll the project.  
 The political dimensions of CPEC emerge once again when considering the 
amount of money that Pakistan would dedicate to combating militancy along the 
Chinese-paved route to Gwadar Port. Now, CPEC is not just a road built by China to 
access the Gwadar Port. The aid package also includes energy and other development 
projects. In fact, the Government of Pakistan asked China to invest in the Diamer-Bhasha 
Dam as a part of the CPEC deal (Dawn, 2015). However, after interviews with 
participants and informal discussion with others showed that it would be commitment of 
Pakistan in ensuring that terrorism does not affect Chinese goods travelling on the road to 
Gwadar. This means the Pakistani military must secure this area. As Naseer Mirza 
discussed, CPEC has the potential to cost Pakistan in terms of military security of the 
area. Therefore, it is possible to see how otherwise technical projects, like Diamer-
Bhasha Dam, possesses a dimension of politics in its construction although these projects 
are presented as apolitical.  
  
The professional road to Islamabad 
Many people often told me there was nothing to do in Islamabad but to shop and eat. 
Despite this, the city remains an important point for professionals to end up because it is 
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the location of several central offices of government ministries and the federal 
government. When I spoke with professionals in Islamabad, many of the planning 
decisions seemed to emerge from this city of more than two million people. During the 
professional pathway to Islamabad, professionals noted that government bureaucrats, 
technocrats, and politicians often lose touch with how people are affected with 
development, which can be applied to dams. Therefore, we see that by the time 
government officials arrive in Islamabad, they have become accustomed to making 
decisions based on technical specifications.  
The process of how long it takes a bureaucrat to arrive in Islamabad, the planning 
center of the country, is worth noting in that it seems to remove a people-centered 
approach to development. It takes several years to earn the opportunity to live and work 
in Islamabad for a bureaucrat. By the time that person is in the city, the person is more 
likely to be separated from how many Pakistanis in the country live, as Hamid Ali argued 
about how one makes it to promotion in Islamabad. These observations of bureaucracy 
and technocracy in Pakistan held by participants illustrate some parallels with Max 
Weber’s theory of bureaucracy. Most notably, it appears many Pakistanis begin public 
service in regions outside of the capital. For example, Hamza Malik proudly told me that 
he was born in a village and was able to advance to high political office. Therefore, once 
someone makes it to Islamabad, that person has the rules of decision-making cemented 
into their minds. This does fit in with some of Weber’s ideal characteristics of a 
bureaucracy. Specifically, the second principle in which there is office hierarchy that 
“stipulate a clearly established system of super- and subordination in which there is a 
supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones” (Weber, 1978, p. 957). The move 
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from what are then perceived as lower rung offices to Islamabad is a representation of a 
hierarchy. This move up the professional ladder does show that, if Weber’s theory of 
bureaucracy holds up, professionals do give priority to technical knowledge within one’s 
bureaucracy over offering an inclusive perspective on dams and development, especially 
when considering that the fifth principle of Weber’s theory states that “official activity 
demands the full working capacity of the official” (p. 958).   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented a discussion about two dams, Kalabagh and Diamer-Bhasha. 
These two dams evoked a different reaction from each of my participants. I did not ask 
any questions about Kalabagh Dam to any of the participants in the study, yet it emerged 
naturally each time. Participants argued that Kalabagh Dam is a project that does not 
have politicization features in it. Rather, opponents invented political dimensions to 
Kalabagh Dam. On the other hand, Diamer-Bhasha Dam was only spoken about with a 
few participants and was talked about in a much more positive light.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to examine how professionals in Pakistan viewed dams as 
sustainable development and climate change-adaptive infrastructure. This thesis provided 
an answer to this research inquiry. Professionals view dams as a technical, apolitical 
response to sustainable development in a climate change context. The point of illustrating 
this is that this otherwise technical discourse has a political dimension to it. This has been 
apparent in Pakistan’s history; it is not a new phenomenon. As I discussed in Chapter III, 
technical knowledge had a privileged place in decision-making. This was evident in 
David Lilienthal’s intervention between India and Pakistan before they warred over the 
Indus System basin, which is located in contested Kashmiri territory. In Chapter IV, I 
discussed themes that emerged from my semi-structured interviews with professionals in 
Islamabad and Lahore. In Chapter V, through discussion of the Kalabagh Dam and 
Diamer-Bhasha Dam and extrapolation of the interviews I conducted, I discussed how 
this technocratic discourse in reality contains a political dimension to it.   
 This thesis also serves as a way to nuance the Pakistani professional, a departure 
from how Ahmad and Rashid (2011) view them. Professionals’ perspectives on 
sustainable development shared similarities. Essentially, for a project to be considered 
sustainable, participants told me that energy projects must function for a long period of 
time and does not put jeopardize the existence of natural resources. However, I was also 
told that energy projects should not be politically divisive. From there, participants were 
divided on dams as sustainable development and climate change-adaptive infrastructure. 
Some felt that dams are technically right for the job, especially when water resources are 
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perceived as the country’s main natural resources. On the other hand, as I learned with 
the case of Kalabagh Dam, dams can place political stress in the country. This may be 
because Pakistan does not see itself as a united country with a shared idea of nationalism, 
as one participant said. Or it is because building dams puts the upstream community in a 
higher place of power, as another participant said, drawing a parallel to India and 
Pakistan.  
Political discourse attached to international development discourse affects the 
country as well. Conferences that debated the place of large-scale dams in development 
was an affront to reasoning for Hamza Malik, who said if these projects were so 
dangerous, India, the United States and China would have been destroyed. Interestingly, 
Bina Siddiqui told me how embarrassed she was during the Paris Climate Talks in 
December of 2015. In that case, China dictated how Pakistan behaved because Pakistani 
leaders did not want to jeopardize any development projects from the CPEC aid package.  
With this thesis, I hope to have illustrated that professionals hold development 
discourses that are not just reverberated from international finance institutions, such as 
the World Bank. In fact these professionals’ discourses are used as a way of criticizing 
the government’s plans of development at times. To be sure, these participants do find 
that the Government of Pakistan decides policy in a top-down manner—even those who 
support dams criticized the government for this. Furthermore, throughout this thesis, I 
discussed how technical discourse utilized by professionals does have a political 
dimension to it. Therefore, I do believe it would benefit the country, especially when 
considering sustainable projects are those that last a long period of time, if technical 
discourse were not relied upon as apolitical. By doing so, it moves toward removing that 
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technocratic knowledge that is used as power against those who are affected and feel 
unable to be included in the dam development process. This is something that the World 
Commission on Dams felt was necessary as well (WCD, 2000).  
 
Making sense of politics in technocratic discourse 
Illustrating political dimensions that are evident in these supposed technocratic discourses 
is important to do in order to question the role of scientific authority in a modern 
democratic government. As a way to wrap up the importance of indicating the political 
dimension in these discourses, in this section I discuss the significance of these 
discourses being political. I aim to make sense of the politics in the supposed technocratic 
discourse used by energy and water professionals to support dams as sustainable 
development in Pakistan. This is what leads me to finding how this technocratic discourse 
exerts power by relying on the nature of authority that comes with science, how it shapes 
dams as the more efficient form of development, and how it is used to dismiss those who 
argue against dams.  
First, it should be discussed what happens when science attempts to create 
specific political outcomes, as attempted by these technical discourses. When science is 
used to inform decision-making, it is referred as following a linear model. In other words, 
political debate focuses on science rather than discussing possible alternative actions. 
This is because science is uncertain in its nature and there is a diverse body of scientific 
findings to support any political agenda (Pielke, 2004; Bijker et al., 2009). For example, 
examining Majid Ibrahim’s belief that since science supports dams as sustainable 
development, public opinion should therefore support this development shows a form of 
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the linear model as discussed by Pielke (2004). The result of this linear model is that it is 
more effective in bringing politics into science rather than science into policy. This is 
because science plays the central role in a political battle (Pielke, 2007). 
Moreover, Pielke (2007) argues that scientists who seek to mobilize science 
discourses with the intention of bolstering support for policy decisions already made—
such as policies on dams—serve as “Issue Advocates” (Pielke, 2007, p. 118). This form 
of scientist typically aligns with a group and aims to advance this group’s interest through 
engaging science and decision-makers through which this scientist also participates. As 
an issue advocate, working toward political advocacy, a reduction of the scope of choice 
in decision-making is the result.  
Asking why scientific discourses are mobilized to support dams as sustainable 
and climate change adaptive infrastructure is an important question to ask. Those who 
supported dams used perceived technical discourse in a political form. This resulted in 
shutting down “biased” civil society groups and opportunistic politicians in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, as participants told me. Now, this is a common characteristic that Pielke 
(2007) finds in the dismissive use of “junk science” versus “sound science” (p. 126). The 
problem with this is that political debates focus on whether the science is sound or junk 
rather than focusing on specific policy alternatives (Pielke, 2007).  The use of dismissing 
contesting discourses as “junk science” is a way to exclude others from having legitimate 
arguments against dams as sustainable development, which is what I encountered 
whenever participants would refer to environmentalists in favor of small-scale dams as 
misguided science due to the flow of the Indus River.  
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Because it is evident to see that politics is apparent in the technocratic discourse 
in support for dams as sustainable development, it is important to see what it means that 
this discourse should be considered political. Continued reflection on Pielke (2007), it is 
possible to still agree there is science in the discourse participants in my study used to 
support dams. However, this science is used for issue advocating. In this case, it is 
possible to see that these professionals utilized technocratic discourse to mobilize science 
in favor of limiting the scope of policy options toward dams for sustainable development, 
an already existing policy within Pakistan.  
In order to categorize professionals, who support dams as sustainable 
development, as “Issue Advocates,” the issue they are supporting should be obvious to 
see. In this case, it is. It seems the discourse used by professionals to support dams as 
sustainable development limits the scope of possible policy options toward dams. What 
this means is that science is relied upon to limit the possibilities of infrastructure 
development policies in the era of sustainable development to dams for water resources 
management and energy generation. With this support of dams depending on the 
authority of science, it also follows along the power/ knowledge paradigm in that their 
scientific knowledge is used to coerce others into agreement.   
After exploring the repercussions of science used in a political sense, it therefore 
answers what it means to find the politics in their technical discourse. That means that by 
illustrating that science can be used to limit the scope of possibilities to match a political 
agenda. For most participants in this study, it was not clear in terms of which political 
party they endorsed. Nevertheless, in a country where opposing dams is a part of a 
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political party’s platform (as found in the Awami National Party), to reduce sustainable 
development possibilities to that of dams takes part in a political conflict.  
 
The near future in Pakistan 
As I conducted the secondary research for this thesis, I would frequent the Pakistan 
section of local bookstores to see if there are any interesting books I should include. This 
would typically be in vain because the typical book on Pakistan paints it as a country in 
disaster due to Islamic militancy, terrorism, and the United States killing of Osama bin 
Laden in Abbottabad. It should go without saying, but this is an inaccurate picture of 
Pakistan’s future—or past and present. For example, a recent report by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, a multinational professional network, claimed that Pakistan is 
on its way to becoming the 20th largest economy by 2030 and the 16th largest by 2050 
(Hussain, 2017). Despite that future, there are a few aspects that should be looked at, 
primarily its relationships with its neighbors: China and India. 
 
China and Pakistan: A special relationship 
My final day in Lahore—and second to last day in Pakistan—was spent driving through 
the city. India and Pakistan were about to face off in a hyped up cricket game, but 
throughout the city of Lahore signs were displaying a conference about the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CEPC) aid package. It is about $46 billion aid package, 
which is more aid Pakistan has received from the United States since 9/11 (Abid & 
Ashfaq, 2016). A student I spoke with in Lahore told me that he considers CPEC as 
consequential for Pakistan, would propel Pakistan as an important country and a sign that 
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Americans should be learning Urdu. CPEC was on the front of the mind of just about 
every Pakistani professional with whom I spoke. Within this thesis, I discuss some 
aspects of this massive aid deal, but I am using this subsection as an example of the 
relationship between the two countries and how it uses similar apolitical discourse to 
support development policies.  
 China and Pakistan have had an enduring special relationship for many years, in 
part because of both countries’ animosity towards India. But CPEC moves that 
relationship forward in unique ways. The roots of CPEC date back to the Musharraf era 
of Pakistan, but this was limited to speculation. From 2013 to 2014, leaders from 
Pakistan and China signed agreements that by February 2014, and the amount China 
pledged to Pakistan began to rise up to $46 billion (Abid & Ashfaq, 2016). The intentions 
for China are to secure energy production for consumption and transport goods from 
China through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. It is a country whose territory possesses only 
one percent of oil reserves yet consumes 12 percent of the global amount. Currently, 
China experiences insecurity for its energy transportation, which ranges from an 
uncertain political relationship with the United States to attacks from pirate attacks in the 
Strait of Malacca. With this sense of insecurity, China will now be able to access the deep 
sea Gwadar Port (near Karachi) by land and begin to transport oil supplies through 
Pakistan (see Fig. 4) (Chaziza, 2016). Besides energy projects, CPEC also focuses on 
development of the Gwadar Port and the construction of an international airport. 
Furthermore, the Karakoram Highway that connects the two countries will also be 
widened and railways in the north will upgraded (Abid & Ashfaq, 2016).   
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Because China must rely on Pakistan’s infrastructure, it committed $46 billion for 
overall infrastructure development (Sheikh, et al., 2016). Throughout the corridor from 
Gwadar, Pakistan to Kashgar, China, there are several development components. The 
first is the Gwadar Port Project, a deep sea port at which China will have a 40-year 
operational control (Chaziza, 2016). A geopolitical factor that is affected by CPEC 
development is for Pakistan to have resources to confront terrorism from within the 
country.  
The largest component of CPEC is China’s investment into Pakistan’s energy 
sector. Nearly $33 billion of the aid goes toward energy development. China’s funding 
will contribute to solving Pakistan’s energy shortfalls through building a natural gas 
pipeline from Iran to Pakistan. Also included are two large-scale dams: Suki Kinari 
Hydropower Station in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa estimated at $1.8 billion; and Karot 
Hydropower Station located in Azad Jammu Kashmir and Punjab estimated at $1.42 
billion (Government of Pakistan, 2017). Although Pakistan and China have discussed 
such an investment like CPEC since the 1990s, there are some environmental issues that 
will result due to the many projects financed. For instance, the construction of a pipeline 
is impossible to be considered ecological and resilient in a climate change context 
(Shaikh et al., 2016).  
Now some Pakistanis I spoke with were excited about this aid investment but 
others were hesitant about the effects of a military commitment to combating terrorism 
along the corridor as this may result in more violence, not less. Nevertheless, it is 
projected to be an economic boom for the country. Ramay (2015) argues that CPEC 
promises critical development for the future of both China and Pakistan because of the 
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infrastructural investment (see Figure 5). This investment is projected to bring in gross 
domestic product growth by six percent. In addition, the Chinese investment could also 
provide energy security for Pakistan through more than 15,000-megawatt energy in coal-
based power plants. This could lead to a growth in the private sector (Naseem, 2015). 
Because of the possible benefits for Pakistan from CPEC, Abid & Ashfaq (2016) 
recommend that all political parties should express full support for CPEC and resolve any 
political issues for the mutual benefit of CPEC’s success. At the same time, the Pakistan 
government should also make public all details of the projects and ensure the security of 
Chinese foreign workers (Abid & Ashfaq, 2016). What can be taken from these 
recommendations is consistent with some of the discourses presented in this thesis: 
setting aside any political differences in favor of the technocratic discourse apparent in 
what CPEC will bring to Pakistan.   
 
Figure 4: A map detailing the potential for connecting China and Pakistan (Shaikh et al., 2016). 
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Figure 5: China investment into Pakistani sectors (Naseem, 2015).  
China and Pakistan have had a friendly relationship since the 1950s. In fact, 
Pakistan was instrumental in working as a conduit through which diplomatic talks 
between the United States and China began (USC, 2011). Nevertheless, China’s 
relationship with Pakistan is referred to as the closest to an alliance China has ever had 
since both have a similar outlook on India. CPEC, no matter the outcome, is another 
chapter in the strong relationship between the two countries (Godbole, 2016).  
 
India and Pakistan: A looming crisis over the Indus Waters Treaty 
To say Pakistanis harbor a feeling of paranoia about India is an understatement. 
Pakistanis are within their rights to retain a sense of paranoia about India in terms of the 
Indus Water Treaty. A participant in my study criticized India’s dam construction as it 
tends to violate this treaty, and many other casual conversations I had with Pakistanis 
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lamented Pakistan’s lack of dam building as a dangerous flaw because they could be 
sabotaged by Indian development. In this case, apolitical development policies are driven 
by political motives in regards to India.   
 The Indus Waters Treaty is widely considered as the most successful cooperative 
venture between India and Pakistan, a pact which has been honored even at times of war 
(Subedi, 1999). Yet more than 50 years since the Indus Waters Treaty was signed, India 
and Pakistan continue to argue about the treaty. Pakistan objects to Indian dam projects in 
Jammu and Kashmir, claiming this will result in less water downstream, and officials 
asked the United States and the World Bank to intervene and lead a mediation process 
between the two countries (Gupta & Ebrahim, 2017). The Government of Pakistan also 
requested that water security be a part of the CPEC framework. One way CPEC can be 
used toward water security is that Pakistan requested China to fund the Diamer-Bhasha 
Dam to help Pakistan avoid water scarcity in the future (Rana, 2016).   
 If India decides to back out of the Indus Water Treaty, the Nawaz Sharif 
administration would perceive it as an act of war. Backing out of the Indus Water Treaty 
would have India in upstream control of the Indus System and could lead to a tremendous 
humanitarian disaster (Kugelman, 2016). With this in mind, it is important to reflect on 
what Naseer Mirza told me about how India can easily bring Pakistan to its knees. In 
addition, Hamza Malik’s concerns are also noteworthy when placed alongside Indian 
tensions. Essentially, decision-makers, when describing dams as apolitical, should be 
aware that redirecting flow of rivers can provide the higher ground when political affairs 
emerge. Kugelman (2016) illustrates how India could punish Pakistan in ways that would 
not result in an international crisis of ending the Indus Water Treaty. One outcome is that 
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India could construct more dams and retain nearly a month’s water supply from Pakistan. 
A reality like this has Hamza Malik calling for increased large-scale dams in Pakistan as 
a way to ensure Pakistan’s water security. 
 Differences between India and Pakistan stem from two factors, according to Iyer 
(2005). First, there is the issue that the Indus Waters Treaty was a technical treaty, which 
is evident in the details of the appendices and annexures of the treaty. This results in both 
Indian and Pakistani engineers disagreeing over meanings of the treaty. An example that 
Briscoe supplies is the difference between run-of-river projects and storages. Indian 
engineers can plan dams as they would anywhere else and according to the treaty’s 
guidelines, but Pakistani engineers have the ability to veto power over Indian projects 
(Iyer, 2005). This therefore provides Pakistani engineers with the ability to prioritize 
national interest via engineering discourse.   
 What further drives discontent over the treaty, according to Bhatnagar (2009), is 
that the treaty was a short-term solution for Pakistan’s water needs and India’s interests 
for water resource construction in the 1960s. The World Bank then worked under the 
assumption there was enough water for both countries in the Indus Basin; however, 
populations have risen exponentially in both countries that threatens this assumption. 
Because of this, the treaty needs to be reexamined to see how the basin should be applied 
to growing populations. For Pakistan, revisiting the treaty should ensure its needs are 
met, which means implementing an assurance Pakistan’s minimum water flow is met 
despite Indian upstream construction. Through reconsidering the Indus Waters Treaty, 
India and Pakistan can avoid any conflict, which is perceived as a soon to be future 
occurrence for water sharing countries (Bhatanagar, 2009). Iyer (2005) says Pakistan is 
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happy to renegotiate, yet India does not want to lose its position of political power 
(Bhatanagar, 2009). However, through the use of a mediator—such as the World Bank’s 
role in the 1950s—India can renegotiate without appearing to surrender any political 
power (Bhatanagar, 2009).   
 
Suggestions for future research 
The purpose of this thesis was to understand how professionals view dams as sustainable 
development within the context of climate change. My understanding after finishing this 
project was that dams are justified through technocratic discourse. Although this 
discourse is presented as apolitical and lauded as strictly factual, it in fact has a political 
dimension to its discourse. That being said, as my scope was set and I began to write this 
thesis, I discovered a few ideas that should serve as ideas for future research to move 
toward a better understanding of dams and development in Pakistan.  
 WAPDA remains a powerful agency within Pakistan. However, it seems there is a 
lot of undiscovered dimensions to it. Toward the end of this project, I came to the 
realization that research focused on how this organization operates, and how knowledge 
circulates within the agency would provide powerful insight into the role of technocratic 
knowledge in decision-making in Pakistan, especially within the discourse of dams as 
development. Because my research was geographically limited to Islamabad, and 
WAPDA’s headquarters are located in Lahore, I was unable to visit their headquarters or 
officials. Furthermore, because of my limited stay in Pakistan, I was not able to arrange a 
visit to any official WAPDA dam sites. This is an avenue I believe would be productive 
to understanding how knowledge operates in the agency.   
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Another possible research pathway to understanding the broader issues of dams 
and development in Pakistan is to take a global political economy approach. As O’Brien 
and Williams say (2010), it is difficult to separate politics from economics, and Global 
Political Economy approaches can illuminate how supporting dams over other renewable 
energy projects shows how there is a political dimension to what is otherwise supported 
as technical and apolitical in design. What some participants told me should be expanded 
into further research to understand how professionals view dams versus other larger scale 
forms of energy. This was evident with how skeptical participants were with the 
investment in more expensive solar energy generation. Some participants were not 
convinced this was a rational investment considering that Pakistan would have to import 
more of the necessary technology to install competent solar or wind energy. Because of 
this skepticism, an approach to dams and sustainable development informed by global 
political economy would provide an understanding how professional discourse interacts 
with economics.  
 
Onward and Upward…  
The ending thought of this thesis brought me to wonder: what’s the point? For this thesis, 
I do want to end with a few qualifications on the argument. In this thesis, I examined how 
professionals view dams as sustainable development within the context of climate 
change. I found that scientific disciplines had a privileged place over other ways of 
knowing. This was even evident at the SDPI. I noticed some researchers at the institute 
favored more mathematical-informed disciplines. Whenever I talked with researchers 
during lunch about my research, I would occasionally be asked, “What economic models 
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are you using in your research?” I would respond, “none,” and this seemed to leave the 
other person confused as to how I could ever conduct research without this perceived 
fundamental.  
Once I found that professionals who view dams in this manner do so under the 
justification of technocratic decision-making, it provided some sense to the question 
stated above. Why this is important is to view how these development decisions and the 
use of knowledge drive planning and the use of public resources. This knowledge is used 
as a way of persuading others about its benefits, rather than a culture of inclusion in the 
development process. In a post-World Commission on Dams (WCD) period, it is also 
important that affected populations have an ability to comment on the dam planning 
process. In fact, despite the WCD’s lasting comment on the importance for dams if no 
alternative is available, the report did leave a strategic policy framework for future dam 
development. The framework puts forth seven points for planners to consider1. The first 
component of the framework states that planners should ensure that river development 
projects should have public acceptance and should be developed through an open and 
participatory process (WCD, 2000).  
 A quick clarification of what I’m not saying proves useful to try and ensure my 
argument is not misunderstood. I am not advocating for an anti-science stance based in 
populism. Pakistan had many instances of populism in its politics already. It does not take 
someone in the United States far to see how current United States President Donald J. 
Trump has taken advantage of and furthered an anti-science policy standpoint through 
stripping the Environmental Protection Agency and even issuing a gag order on the 
                                                
1 See WCD for a complete description of the framework.  
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United States Parks Department regarding climate change Tweets, as well as threatening 
existing and future research regarding climate change and exiting the Paris Agreement 
(Nuccitelli, 2017; Shear, 2017). What I am saying is that persons in the position of 
planning dams should be cognizant of the fact that there are people who view water and 
have values tied to water, for example, that may be more diverse than the narrow 
utilitarian views that dominate. These voices should be heard during the planning process 
of development projects, such as dams, if they are going to be branded as sustainable.  
This transitions into how Pakistani government officials and those in power can 
foster a more understanding society in terms of dams and sustainable development. 
Mustafa told me his concern for water resources development in Pakistan was that 
science and engineering subjected water as something exploitable. This technical 
treatment of water has stripped whatever political or cultural values attached to water. 
Much like transforming the hydrological cycle into the hydrosocial cycle, he believes 
Pakistan’s engineering schools should include a more interdisciplinary approach to water. 
By this, he meant that universities in each province of Pakistan should be open to 
instructing engineering pupils that there are a variety of worldviews attached to water. 
Looking at National University of Sciences and Technology’s curriculum for a Bachelors 
of Arts degree in Environmental Engineering, the course pathway does not implement 
any coursework focused on a social science approach to understanding the environment, 
for example (NUST, 2017). Furthermore, the participant told me Pakistan’s engineering 
offices—such as WAPDA—should broaden their job descriptions of engineers to include 
requirements for the position that should essentially include a mix of science and social 
sciences.  
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Although one of the messages of the World Commissions on Dams report was 
that dams were a flawed option for development, there were some other messages that 
illustrate that having an inclusive process in implementing dams as development that 
carries over to this thesis. Dams have proved to be an instrument of development that at 
times leads to impoverishment for many (WCD, 2000; Tilt et al., 2009). What this thesis 
aims to contribute toward is how bringing a local sense of water and climate change is 
instrumental to actual sustainable infrastructure.  
 Including diverse perspectives on water within Pakistan is a step toward water 
justice in Pakistan. However water justice cannot just appear from codification and legal 
push for official acknowledgement. Zwarteveen and Boelens (2014) discuss that the 
pathway to water justice includes questioning “official water truths” and these truths’ 
claims to “rationality, efficiency, democracy and equity” (p. 155). What these authors 
mean by water justice is to challenge water’s cultural and political dimensions (through 
allowing more equity and representation) and the availability of it (redistribution). To 
demand greater water justice, it requires such a critical view that is informed by cultural, 
political, and material dimensions. This process occurs through struggle and 
representation, as well as at the negotiation table and a transdisciplinary creation of 
knowledge in regards to water (Zwarteveen & Boelens, 2014). Now, as a participant told 
me, Pakistan has a history of resolving issues at the negotiation table, so perhaps the first 
step toward water justice would have some sort of familiarity. At the end of the day, 
however, I hope this thesis is a contribution—albeit small—of questioning official water 
truths in Pakistan. 
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APPENDIX  
PARTICIPANTS 
NAME EDUCATION PROFESSIONAL 
BACKGROUND 
Naseer Mirza Civil Engineering Teaching water resource management, 
different organizations, LEAD and 
WWF, and a local participatory 
organization 
Fazlullah Qaisrani Developmental Economics 
MA in 1965 
Economist at World Bank, West 
Pakistan Bureaucrat then Sindh, 
specializes in Sindh affairs 
Hamid Ali M.S. from Netherlands, 
Forest Management, and 
Forest College in Peshawar. 
Worked as a Forester, then in 
development sector including Planning 
Commission and NGOs 
Majid Ibrahim Civil Engineer, MA, and 
then PhD from United 
States university in state of 
Washington.  
Pakistan conservation for a long time, 
UNDP, IUCN, ADB and FAO 
Consulting 
Bina Siddiqui M.A. Environmental 
Development from  
United Kingdom 
Award-winning journalist focusing on 
climate change issues in South Asia  
Abid Mustafa BA, MA, and PhD in 
Geography from  
United States  
Academic who has extensive writing 
experience on Pakistan and climate 
change. Focused on critical geography.  
Hamza Malik B.S. from Lahore 
Engineering 
Former Managing Director of WAPDA, 
then promoted to chairman. Honorary 
doctorate from a university in Lahore. 
Imran Niazi B.S. in Electrical 
Engineering from United 
States  
Consultant with Chinese dam 
development firm and former politician. 
Waseem Anwar B.S. Civil Engineering 
from Lahore, MA 
Corporate Development 
from United States 
Works for international 
nongovernmental organization that has 
environmental focus 
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